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CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE 


CHINA.  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE 


Books  by 

G.  ZAY  WOOD 

1. 

China,    the    United    States    and    the    Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance. 

2. 

The  Chino-Japanese  Treaties  of  May  25,  1915. 

3. 

The  Twenty-one  Demands. 

4. 

China,  Japan  and  the  Shantung  Question. 

China,  the  United  States 

AND  THE 

Anglo- Japanese  AUiance 

G.  Zay  Wood 

Formerly  Editor  of  "  The  Far  Eastern  Republic," 

President  of  The  Chinese  Political  Science  Association,  Curtis 

Fellow  in  International  Law  and  Diplomacy, 

Columbia  University,  etc. 


New  York  Chicago 

Fleming  H.  Revell  Company 

London       and        Edinburgh 


71 5^*//^ 

R  7 1'f'- 


Copyright,  1921,  by 
FLEMING  H.  REVELL  COMPANY 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


r. 


New  York:  158  Fifth  Avenue 
Chicago :  17  North  Wabash  Ave. 
London:  21  Paternoster  Square 
Edinburgh:    75    Princes    Street 


TO 

HIS  EXCELLENCY  SAO-KE  ALFRED^SZE 

Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the 

Republic  of  China  to  the  United  States  of; 

[America, 

This  Book  is  respectfully 

Dedicated 


464308 


FOREWORD 

IN  view  of  the  great  interest  which  has  been 
aroused  by  the  conference  on  limitation  of 
armaments  and  on  the  questions  relating  to  the 
Pacific  and  to  the  Far  East,  no  apology  is  needed 
for  the  appearance  of  this  book  on  The  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  which  is  admittedly  one  of  the 
most  important  questions  yet  to  be  solved.  The 
alliance  has,  because  of  its  very  nature,  an  intimate 
bearing  upon  the  question  of  limitation  of  arma- 
ments, and  a  still  closer  connection  with  the  prob- 
lems affecting  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East.  It  is 
almost  axiomatic  to  say  that  no  agreement  can  be 
reached  upon  limitation  of  armaments  without  set- 
tling first  the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  problems, 
and  that  no  settlement  can  be  arrived  at  in  regard 
to  these  problems,  unless  the  Anglo-Japanese  al- 
liance is  definitely  disposed  of.  The  continuance 
or  discontinuance  of  the  alliance  will,  therefore, 
contribute  in  no  small  degree  to  the  success  or 
failure  of  the  armament  conference  at  Washington. 
The  design  of  this  treatise,  as  its  name  implies, 
is  to  give  a  short  account  of  the  history  of  the 
alliance,  and  to  show  the  reasons,  from  the  Chinese 
and  American  points  of  view,  why  it  should  not  be 

vii 


viii  FOREWORD 

renewed.    No  attempt  is  made  to  be  exhaustive  in 
treatment. 

The  author  begs  to  acknowledge  his  indebtedness 
to  his  friends  who  have  lent  him  assistance  in  the 
gathering  of  the  material,  and  to  the  Editor  of 
China  Review  for  permission  to  reproduce  here 
part  of  an  article  which  has  previously  appeared 
in  its  columns. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  FAOB 

I.    Introduction 11 

II.    The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  1902  .      25 

III.  The  Second  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance, 

1905 53 

IV.  The  Third  A  nolo- Japanese  Alliance, 

1911 64 

V.    The  United  States  and  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance        ....  79 
VI.    China  and  the  Anglo-Japanese   Al- 
liance          110 

VII.    Conclusion 133 

Appendices 

(a)  Text  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Al- 

liance, January  30,  1902     .       .     143 

(b)  Lord  Lansdowne's  Despatch  to  Sir 

C.  MacDonald        ....     146 

(c)  Text  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Al- 

liance, August  12,  1905       .       .150 

(d)  Lord  Lansdowne's  Despatch  to  Sir 

C.  Hardinge 154 

(e)  Text  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Al- 

liance, July  13,  1911    ...     157 

(f)  Memorandum    Presented    to    Sir 

Beilby    Alston,    British    Min- 
ister at  Peking,  July,  1920      .     160 


CONTENTS 

FAQE 

(g)  London-China  Association's  Let- 
ter TO  THE  British  Foreign  Of- 
fice, June  21,  1921       ...     170 

(h)  Chinese   Official    Statement   to 

THE  Press,  June  6,  1920      .       .     174 


CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

AND  THE 

ANGLO-JAPANESE   ALLIANCE 


INTRODUCTION 

THERE  is  nothing  in  the  sphere  of  interna- 
tional politics  at  present  that  merits  more 
attention  or  deserves  more  careful  study 
than  the  future  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance — a 
subject  upon  which  the  Imperial  Conference  of  the 
Premiers  of  the  British  Dominions  has  dwelt  dur- 
ing its  sessions  in  London,  but  about  which  no  de- 
cision has  since  been  reached,  not  only  because  of 
the  serious  difference  of  views  held  by  the  states- 
men from  the  Dominions,  but  also  because  of  the 
vigorous  opposition  coming  from  China  and  the 
United  States. 

First  concluded  in  1902,  revised  and  renewed  in 
1905,  and  again  in  1911,  the  alliance  has  now 
reached  its  stipulated  term  of  ten  years.  In  virtue 
of  the  self -extending  clause  found  in  the  treaty,  the 
alliance  will,  however,  remain  binding  until  one 
year  after  it  is  denounced  by  either  of  the  high 

n 


'  12' ' '•  ■  •  CHtNA, •  THE  UNITED  STATES 

contracting  parties.  In  July,  1920,  Japan  and 
Great  Britain,  when  considering  the  future  of  the 
alliance,  sent  a  joint  communication  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  League  of  Nations,  in  which  the  hope 
was  expressed  that,  if  the  alliance  were  to  continue, 
it  would  be  so  revised  and  modified  as  not  to  be 
in  conflict  with  the  spirit  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League. 

Whether  this  communication  was  due  to  the  de- 
sire of  the  contracting  Powers  to  comply  with  the 
letter  as  well  as  the  spirit  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League,  or  it  was  merely  an  attempt  on  their  part 
to  dodge  the  issue  which  they  should  have  then 
faced  with  courage  and  decision,  it  is  useless  to 
inquire.  Great  Britain  has  since  made  it  known 
that  the  renewal  or  non-renewal  of  the  alliance  de- 
pends largely,  if  not  entirely,  upon  the  pleasure  of 
her  Dominions.  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  anxious 
as  she  has  been  for  the  continuance  of  the  alliance 
in  one  form  or  another,  has  resorted  to  all  legiti- 
mate means  of  diplomacy  to  realise  her  ambition. 
She  sent  her  Crown  Prince  to  England  on  a  state 
visit  at  an  estimated  cost  of  $2,000,000,  and  what- 
ever ostensible  reasons  may  have  been  given,  the 
real  purpose  of  the  visit  was  to  stimulate  whatever 
little  enthusiasm  there  was  in  England  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  and  to 
pave  the  way  for  its  renewal.  It  has  been  said,  of 
course,  that  the  visit  was  a  friendly  one,  and  that 
it  was  designed  to  improve  and  to  strengthen  Anglo- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    13 

Japanese  friendship.  But  it  is  unnecessary  to  add 
that,  to  the  Japanese  people  and  Government  aHke, 
"friendship"  with  Great  Britain  is  almost  synony- 
mous with  the  continuance  of  the  alliance,  for  in 
their  eyes  nothing  could  be  more  unfriendly  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain  than  to  dissolve  the  partner- 
ship that  has  lasted  nearly  twenty  years. 

The  Imperial  Conference  of  the  Premiers  of  the 
British  Dominions  met  in  London,  June  20,  and 
lasted  to  August  5,  1921.  Among  the  subjects  dis- 
cussed at  the  Conference  was  the  future  of  the 
Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  which,  in  view  of  its  vital 
bearing  upon  the  problem  of  Imperial  defence,  upon 
the  Anglo-American  relationship,  and  upon  the 
British  policy  in  the  Far  East,  outstripped  in  im- 
portance all  the  other  questions  on  the  Conference 
agenda.  Unfortunately,  the  statesmen  upon  whom 
the  British  Government  has  depended  for  a  deci- 
sion as  to  the  future  of  the  alliance,  have  held  dif- 
ferent views  on  the  subject,  and  consequently  failed 
to  reach  a  definite  conclusion.  Mr.  Arthur  Meighen, 
the  Prime  Minister  of  Canada,  strongly  opposed 
the  renewal  of  the  alliance  on  the  ground  that  it 
has  served  its  purpose,  that  it  is  no  longer  in  har- 
mony with  the  new  international  spirit,  and  that 
its  continuance  is  harmful  to  the  cordial  relations 
between  Canada  and  the  United  States.  This  view 
was  ably  supported  by  General  Smuts  from  South 
Africa  who  insisted  that  the  question  of  the  re- 
newal   of    the    Anglo-Japanese    alliance    must    be 


14  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

subordinated  to  the  consideration  of  the  absolute 
necessity,  as  an  essential  and  cardinal  principle  of 
British  foreign  policy,  of  maintaining  a  cordial 
understanding  and  co-operation  between  the  British 
Empire  and  the  United  States.  Even  India  ob- 
jected to  the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  as  His  High- 
ness the  Maharajah  of  Kutch,  the  representative 
of  the  Indian  princes  at  the  Imperial  Conference, 
resented  the  idea  that  it  would  ever  be  found  neces- 
sary to  call  on  Japanese  troops  to  defend  India 
against  outside  attack.  On  the  other  hand,  Premier 
Hughes  of  Australia,  who  was  supported  in  his  con- 
tentions by  Premier  Massey  of  New  Zealand,  urged 
the  renewal  of  the  alliance  which,  he  declared,  was 
the  best  and  cheapest  means  of  protecting  Aus- 
tralia as  it  provided  a  strong  check  upon  Japan. 

This  divergence  of  views  is  largely  responsible 
for  the  failure  of  the  Imperial  Conference  to  reach 
a  definite  decision  as  to  the  continuance  or  discon- 
tinuance of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  The  Brit- 
ish Government,  while  disposed  to  drop  the  com- 
bination altogether  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of 
Canada,  South  Africa  and  India,  was,  however, 
unwilling  to  take  any  step  that  would  have  the  ap- 
pearance of  throwing  over  an  ally  of  some  twenty 
years.  To  temporise  once  again,  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  sent  another  joint  communication  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  League  of  Nations,  in  which  they 
agreed  that,  while  the  alliance  remains  in  force, 
the  procedure  prescribed  by  the  Covenant  of  the 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   15 

League  shall  be  adopted  and  shall  prevail  over  that 
prescribed  by  the  alliance,  in  case  where  the  one  is 
inconsistent  with  the  other.  This  communication 
is  dated  July  7,  1921,  and  no  action  has  been  taken 
since.  As  it  stands  now,  the  Anglo-Japanese  al- 
liance remains  in  force  until  one  full  year  after  it 
is  denounced  by  either  of  the  high  contracting 
parties. 

What  is  to  be  done  with  the  alliance?  Will  it 
be  revised  and  renewed?  Should  it  be  renewed  at 
all?  These  questions  are  easy  to  ask,  but  difficult 
to  answer.  It  requires  sufficient  knowledge  of  the 
history  of  the  alliance  and  a  close  acquaintance 
with  the  public  sentiments  in  Japan,  Great  Britain, 
China  and  the  United  States  to  answer  them  cor- 
rectly. Students  of  international  politics  frequently 
find  it  unwise,  if  not  unsafe,  to  anticipate  events 
before  they  occur.  It  is  not  the  object  of  this  book 
to  predict  what  will  or  will  not  happen  to  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  in  the  future.  Its  purpose 
is  to  show,  with  facts  widely  known  and  with  argu- 
ments generally  recognised,  why  the  alliance  should 
not  be  renewed  at  all,  in  any  form  and  under  any 
circumstances. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  at  the  beginning,  there 
is  nothing  in  the  field  of  international  politics  at 
present  that  deserves  more  attention  than  the  future 
of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  Aside  from  the 
contracting  Powers  themselves  who  are  naturally 
most  concerned  with  the  renewal  or  non-renewal 


16  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

of  the  alliance,  there  are  two  other  Powers  whose 
interest  in  the  matter  is  second  only  to  that  of 
Japan  and  Great  Britain,  and  whose  views  ought 
to  be  taken  into  careful  consideration  in  deciding 
the  future  of  the  alliance.  These  two  Powers  are 
China  and  the  United  States,  who  are  greatly  in- 
terested in  the  subject,  each  for  her  own  reasons. 

About  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  towards 
the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  enough  has  been  said 
and  written.  It  has  been  generally,  but  correctly, 
assumed  that  the  sentiment  in  this  country  is  en- 
tirely against  its  renewal  for  the  simple  reason  that, 
in  the  absence  of  a  plain  provision  to  the  contrary, 
the  alliance  may  be  directed  against  the  United 
States  in  case  of  American-Japanese  difficulties, 
that  it  may  be  seized  upon  as  a  convenient  instru- 
ment to  force  the  Japanese  immigration  question, 
that  it  may  so  complicate  the  Pacific  situation  as  to 
make  limitation  of  armaments  impossible,  and  that 
it  may  be  used  by  Japan  as  a  shield  behind  which 
to  work  out  her  designs  in  China.  The  Premiers 
of  Canada  and  of  South  Africa  have  declared  pub- 
licly, and  in  unmistakable  language,  that  they  would 
never  consent  to  the  renewal  of  the  alliance  in  terms 
"which  may  prove  offensive  to  the  United  States.* 

♦In  a  speech  to  the  South  African  Assembly  on  May  20, 
shortly  before  his  departure  for  the  Imperial  Conference  of 
Dominion  Premiers  in  London,  General  Smuts  made  the  fol- 
lowing striking  remark  apropos  of  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance:  'There  is  no  doubt  that  the  position  all 
over  the  world  has  changed  vitally  and  fundamentally  since 
1902,    when    the    treaty    was    concluded.     Conditions    have 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   17 

Even  Premier  Hughes  of  Australia,  who  sees  in 
the  continuation  of  the  alliance  security  for  the 
British  dominions  in  the  Pacific,  and  therefore 
favours  its  renewal,  has  made  it  quite  plain  that  the 
policy  of  "white  Australia"  must  be  insisted  upon 
and  that  the  new  terms  must  be  satisfactory  to  the 
United  States.  In  other  words,  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  Dominion  Premiers,  the  attitude  of 
the  United  States  is  a  pivotal  fact  in  the  considera- 
tion of  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance. 
They  prefer  co-operation  with  America  to  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  political  partnership  with  Japan, 
and  they  are  apparently  willing  and  ready  to  sacri- 
fice the  alliance  for  the  sake  of  the  friendship  of 


changed  completely,  and  I  suppose  if  it  was  a  question  of 
entering  into  a  new  treaty  to-day  there  would  be  little  hesi- 
tation as  to  what  conclusions  the  British  Empire  would  come 
to;  but  it  is  the  case  of  a  treaty  which  was  concluded  many 
years  ago,  and  which  was  renewed  several  times,  and  either 
the  renewal  or  continuation  of  which  now  must  raise  very 
great  questions  indeed.  I  have  said  world  conditions  have 
altered.  Since  the  treaty  was  entered  into,  Russia  has  dis- 
appeared as  a  trade  power,  and  Germany  also,  for  the  time 
being.  The  position  of  Japan  in  the  East  has  altered  com- 
pletely. She  has  a  great  position  now  in  China,  Siberia,  and 
other  parts,  too.  From  a  larger  point  of  view  also  there  is 
no  doubt  that  since  1902  the  friction  between  Japan  and  the 
western  states  of  America  has  also  increased,  so  that  from  all 
these  points  of  view  honourable  members  (referring  to  the 
members  of  the  South  African  Assembly)  will  be  able  to  see 
how  very  intricate  the  whole  question  is.  What  I  would  say 
in  regard  to  the  renewal  of  this  treaty  is  that,  to  my  mind, 
the  paramount  consideration  that  we  ought  to  keep  before  us  in 
the  future,  and  in  the  very  difficult  times  lying  ahead  of  the 
world,  is  that  it  is  essential,  so  far  as  possible,  to  secure 
understanding  and  co-operation  between  the  British  Empire 
and  the  United  States.  I  consider  that  the  second  essential 
and  cardinal  principle  of  our  foreign  policy.     In  the  first 


18  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

the  United  States,  with  whose  policy  in  regard  to 
Japanese  immigration  they  are  in  perfect  accord. 

Now,  on  the  other  hand,  comparatively  little  or 
nothing  has  been  said  or  heard  about  the  position 
of  the  Chinese  Government  and  the  attitude  of  the 
Chinese  towards  this  question  of  the  renewal  of 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  Not  that  the  Chinese 
public  opinion  is  inarticulate  on  the  matter,  not  that 
the  Chinese  Government  is  indifferent  to  the  future 
of  the  alliance  or  unconcerned  with  international 
problems  having  direct  bearing  upon  its  own  inter- 
ests, but  that  the  voice  of  China,  even  in  interna- 
tional matters  concerning  herself,  is  like  a  cry  in 
the   wilderness,   unheard   and   unheeded.      During 


place,  as  I  have  said,  I  consider  it  necessary  not  to  go  in  for 
any  policy  of  antagonism  on  the  Continent  of  Europe,  but  for 
a  policy  of  peace;  and  in  the  second  place  I  think,  from  a 
world  point  of  view,  the  essential  policy  for  the  British 
Empire  is  to  work  with  America  to  secure  her  co-operation, 
and  in  that  way  to  go  forward  in  the  very  difficult  world 
task  that  lies  before  our  Government," 

Mr.  Arthur  Meighen,  before  his  departure  for  the  Imperial 
Conference,  declared  in  the  Canadian  House  of  Commons: 
"The  alliance  is  a  subject  of  great  and  definite  moment,  and 
if  there  is  one  dominion  to  which,  more  than  another,  the 
question  of  the  renewal  is  of  importance,  it  is  to  the  Dominion 
of  Canada.  I  say  that  with  particular  reference  to  the  rela- 
tionship this  Dominion  bears,  and  must  always  bear,  as  a 
portion  of  the  British  Empire,  standing — if  I  may  say  it — 
between  Great  Britain,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  United 
States,  on  the  other.  I  need  not  enlarge  upon  how  serious, 
or  even  how  momentous,  is  the  deliberation  that  must  take 
place  as  regards  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  that  treaty. 
The  importance  of  it  arises  from  the  United  States  therein, 
and  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  and  Australia  and  of  other 
parts  of  the  Empire;  but  the  importance  of  it  to  us  arises, 
in  a  very  great  degree,  out  of  the  very  great  interest  of  the 
United  States  in  the  renewal  or  non-renewal  thereof." 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    19 

the  last  two  years,  when  the  discussion  on  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  has  monopolised  the  col- 
umns of  the  newspapers  in  the  Far  East,  the  Chi- 
nese Government  has  made  known,  time  and  again, 
its  position  towards  the  continuation  of  the  alliance. 
It  has  protested  against  the  renewal  of  the  alliance 
without  China  being  consulted  in  the  negotiation. 
But  the  British  Government  has  not  seen  fit  to 
make  a  formal  reply  to  the  protest,  and  at  one  time 
it  has  even  refused  to  make  public  in  England  the 
text  of  the  Chinese  protest,  while  the  same  has  been 
given  out  by  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  and  widely 
published  in  China.  The  statesmen  from  the  Brit- 
ish Dominions,  as  we  have  seen,  have  waxed  elo- 
quent as  to  the  need  of  co-operation  with  the  United 
States  and  the  necessity  of  taking  American  senti- 
ment into  account  in  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance.  Not  a  word,  however,  has  fallen 
from  their  lips  about  China,  whose  interest  in  the 
matter  has  apparently  never  entered  into  their  con- 
sideration. General  Smuts,  the  South  African 
statesman  who  sees  the  shifting  of  the  centre  of 
world  politics  to  the  Pacific,  speaks  of  the  alliance 
in  terms  of  Japan,  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  and  does  not  seem  to  have  noticed  China 
on  the  map.  Lloyd  George,  in  expressing  his  hope 
for  a  Pacific  understanding  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, referred  to  China  only  when  he  was  poig- 
nantly reminded  of  the  existence  of  such  a  country 
in  the  Far  East! 


20  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

That  China,  like  the  United  States,  is  greatly- 
interested  in  the  future  of  the  alliance  there  can  be 
no  doubt.  Like  the  United  States,  she  objects  to 
the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  though  largely  for  dif- 
ferent reasons.  China  objects  to  its  renewal  on 
the  ground  that  it  has  often  sacrificed  her  sovereign 
rights  and  interests  which  it  is  designed  to  safe- 
guard, that  it  has  frequently  been  used  as  a  screen 
to  cover  attacks  upon  her  integrity  and  independ- 
ence which  it  undertakes  nominally  to  protect,  that 
it  is  diametrically  opposed  in  spirit,  if  not  in  let- 
ter, to  the  principles  of  the  Open  Door  which  it 
professes  to  be  among  its  objects  to  maintain,  and 
that  it  is  responsible  for  the  outbreak  of  two  wars 
in  the  Far  East,  although  its  avowed  object  is  the 
maintenance  of  peace.  The  questions  of  armament, 
of  immigration,  and  of  the  future  British- Ameri- 
can relations,  that  have  influenced  the  opinion  in 
the  United  States,  do  not  enter  into  China's  con- 
sideration. The  interests  of  the  United  States  in 
the  future  of  the  alliance  grow  out  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  danger  that  a  renewal  of  the  alliance 
would  involve;  they  are  largely  indirect.  The  in- 
terests of  China  are  those  which  are  plainly  stated 
in  the  alliance  treaty;  they  are  direct.  While  the 
opposition  in  the  United  States  has  apparently  in- 
fluenced the  opinion  of  the  Dominion  statesmen  at 
the  Imperial  Conference  and  consequently  deferred 
action  by  the  British  Government  on  the  continua- 
tion of  the  alliance,  it  is  not  known  to  what  extent 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   21 

the  opposition  by  China  has  been  responsible  for 
its  postponement. 

Here  we  have  a  triangular  dilemma,  if  it  can 
be  so  called.  Japan  has  been  very  anxious  for  an 
extension  of  the  alliance,  but  has  found  obstacles 
in  its  way.  Great  Britain  is  not  any  too  enthusiastic 
over  the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  but  she  is  frankly 
unwilling  to  throw  over  her  Far  Eastern  ally.  And 
China — the  one  Power  most  vitally  concerned  in 
the  matter — has  protested  loudly  against  the  re- 
newal of  the  alliance,  but  her  words  are  discounted, 
unheeded,  if  not  unheard.  It  is  evident  that  each 
of  the  three  Powers  has  its  own  preference  in  the 
matter,  but  none  of  them  sees  its  way  clear  to 
realise  it.  Is  there  a  solution  of  the  dilemma? 
Or  must  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  be  forever 
consigned  to  the  anomalous  state  wherein  its 
incompatibility  with  the  League  Covenant  is 
recognised,  but  its  terms  are  said  to  remain  in 
force? 

An  unusually  happy  alternative  is  found  in 
President  Harding's  proposition  for  a  conference 
on  the  limitation  of  armaments  and  on  the  Pacific 
and  Far  Eastern  problems,  which,  though  not  very 
pleasing  to  Japan,  is  heartily  welcomed  by  China 
and  Great  Britain.  On  July  10,  just  at  the  time 
when  the  world  was  in  the  dark  as  to  what  has  be- 
come of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  the  following 
official  statement  was  issued  by  the  United  States, 
giving  reasons  for  the  proposition  of  the  confer- 


22  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

ence  and  expressing  hopes  for  its  possible  accom- 
plishment : 

"The  President,  in  view  of  the  far-reaching  im- 
portance of  the  question  of  limitation  of  armament, 
has  approached  with  informal  but  definite  inquiries  the 
group  of  powers  heretofore  known  as  the  principal 
allied  and  associated  powers,  that  is,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Italy  and  Japan,  to  ascertain  whether  it  would 
be  agreeable  to  them  to  take  part  in  a  conference  on 
this  subject,  to  be  held  in  Washington  at  a  time  to  be 
mutually  agreed  upon.  If  the  proposal  is  found  to  be 
acceptable,  formal  invitations  for  such  a  conference 
will  be  issued. 

*Tt  is  manifest  that  the  question  of  limitation  of 
armament  has  a  close  relation  to  Pacific  and  Far 
Eastern  problems,  and  the  President  has  suggested 
that  the  powers  especially  interested  in  these  problems 
should  undertake  in  connection  with  this  conference 
the  consideration  of  all  matters  bearing  upon  their  solu- 
tion with  a  view  to  reaching  a  common  understanding 
with  resj>ect  to  principles  and  policies  in  the  Far  East. 
This  has  been  communicated  to  the  powers  concerned, 
and  China  has  also  been  invited  to  take  part  in  the 
discussion  relating  to  Far  Eastern  problems." 

This  proposal  for  a  conference  on  the  limitation 
of  armaments,  which  is  also  to  discuss  Pacifiic  and 
Far  Eastern  problems,  came  as  a  timely  relief  to 
Great  Britain,  who  has  found  herself  in  an  embar- 
rassing position  because  of  the  pressure  by  Japan 
on  the  one  hand  for  the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  and 
of  the  opposition  by  Canada  and  South  Africa  to 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   23 

its  continuance  on  the  other.  China  has  welcomed 
the  conference,  for  the  fact  that  she  is  among  the 
Powers  invited  assures  her  the  opportunity  of  pre- 
senting her  views  on  the  future  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  the  disposition  of  which  will  cer- 
tainly be  one  of  the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  prob- 
lems to  be  discussed.  To  Japan,  of  course,  this 
idea  of  an  armament  conference  is  not  very  pleas- 
ing, but  she  could  ill  afford  to  decline  a  proposal 
which  has  already  been  accepted  by  all  the  other 
Powers  invited. 

It  may  not  be  without  interest  to  add  here  that, 
while  the  proposal  is  a  welcomed  invitation  to 
Great  Britain,  it  is  by  no  means  a  surprise  to  her. 
In  fact,  the  idea  of  a  Pacific  conference  was  ger- 
minated by  British  statesmen  themselves,  who  have 
seen  in  it  the  desired  opportunity  of  getting  rid 
of  the  alliance  without  hurting  Japanese  suscepti- 
bilities too  much.  At  the  Imperial  Conference, 
General  Smuts  expressed  the  opinion,  which  was 
warmly  endorsed  by  Premier  Massey  of  New 
Zealand,  that  the  results  to  be  expected  from  the 
renewal  of  the  alliance  could  be  secured  equally 
well  from  a  conference  of  the  Powers  interested 
in  the  Pacific.  This  idea  was  later  brought  out 
again  and  again  in  the  debates  in  the  Parliament. 
On  July  7,  in  answer  to  a  question  as  to  the  prog- 
ress of  the  negotiation  for  the  renewal  of  the  al- 
liance, Premier  Lloyd  George  said  that  he  was 
waiting  to  hear  from  China  and  the  United  States, 


24  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

hinting  directly  at  the  negotiations  then  going  on 
for  the  proposal  of  the  Pacific  conference.  It  is 
largely  due  to  the  initiative  of  the  United  States, 
however,  that  the  proposal  for  the  conference  was 
finally  formulated,  and  on  July  10,  announced.* 
It  is  also  due  to  the  initiative  of  the  United  States 
that  China,  France  and  Italy  have  been  invited  to 
participate  in  the  conference. t 

The  question  now  remains:  what  action  will  the 
conference  take  in  regard  to  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  ?  Will  Japan  and  Great  Britain  be  allowed 
to  renew  the  compact  in  its  present  form,  or  with 
modifications  ?  Can  a  general  agreement  be  reached 
by  all  the  Powers  interested  in  the  Pacific  and  the 
Far  East  so  as  to  take  the  place  of  the  alliance? 
Italy  and  France  are  but  slightly  interested  in  the 
question.  The  future  of  the  alliance  depends  as 
much  upon  the  wishes  of  China  and  the  United 
States  as  upon  those  of  the  contracting  Powers 
themselves. 

*  Prior  to  the  issuance  of  the  proposal,  President  Harding, 
in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Mondell,  the  Republican  leader  in  the 
House,  appealed  for  an  expression  of  opinion  favourable  to 
the  limitation  of  armaments  through  international  agreement. 
The  Borah  amendment,  which  had  previously  passed  the  Sen- 
ate, authorising  the  President  to  invite  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  to  a  conference  for  the  purpose  of  reducing  their 
naval  expenditures  for  the  next  five  years,  was,  as  a  result 
of  the  appeal,  also  passed  in  the  House  on  June  29  by  a  vote 
of  330  to  4.  The  passage  of  the  amendment  by  such  a  large 
majority  must  have  encouraged  the  President  in  making 
"informal  but  definite  inquiries"  about  the  conference  on  the 
limitation  of  armaments. 

t  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Spain  have  also  been  invited  to 
participate  in  the  discussions  on  the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern 
questions. 


II 

THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE,  1902 

POLITICS  makes  strange  bed-fellows,  it  has 
been  often  observed.  If  this  is  true  with 
individuals,  it  is  equally  true  with  nations. 
Or,  how  can  we  account  for  the  conclusion  of  the 
alliance  between  Japan  and  Great  Britain  in  1902? 

The  story  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  has  all 
the  elements  of  a  romance.  Bom  out  of  a  com- 
mon desire  of  Japan  and  Great  Britain  to  defend 
their  vital  interests  in  the  Far  East,  which  were 
being  seriously  menaced  towards  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century  by  the  slow  but  steady  encroach- 
ment by  Russia  in  Manchuria,  North  China,  and 
Korea,  it  was  not,  however,  consummated  until  a 
series  of  political  vicissitudes  and  diplomatic  re- 
verses, which  both  Powers  had  suffered,  convinced 
them  of  the  community  of  their  interests  and  the 
advantages  of  a  defensive  alliance. 

It  is  an  open  secret  that,  long  before  ever  con- 
sidering Japan  as  a  worthy  partner,  Great  Britain 
had  riveted  her  eyes  upon  China,  whom  she  had 
regarded  as  a  potential  ally,  rich,  populous,  and 
strong  enough  to  cope  with  the  Russian  Colossus. 
These  two  countries,  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  had 
been  traditional  enemies.    Their  interests  conflicted 

25 


26  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

in  the  Far  East,  in  the  Middle  East,  and  in  the 
Near  East.  Russia  was  in  secret  alliance  with 
France  ever  since  1891,  and  with  the  assistance  of 
her  ally,  she  was  able  to  have  everything  very 
much  in  her  own  way,  in  Europe  as  well  as  in  the 
East.  On  the  other  hand,  without  a  political  part- 
ner. Great  Britain  was  forced  to  play  a  lone  hand 
in  all  Eastern  affairs.  It  was  then,  as  it  is  to-day, 
a  cardinal  point  of  the  British  foreign  policy  to 
defend  British  interests  in  India  at  all  cost.  The 
Russian  menace  to  the  security  of  India  occupied 
the  attention  of  all  British  diplomats  and  states- 
men. It  is,  therefore,  easily  understandable  why 
Great  Britain  had  looked  upon  China  as  a  possible 
and  potential  ally. 

In  1894  broke  out  the  Chino-Japanese  War  in 
which  China  was  badly  defeated.  The  Chinese 
giant  was  shown  to  be  built  with  feet  of  clay, 
unable  to  stand  up  in  the  defence  of  her  own  in- 
terests, not  to  say  those  of  Great  Britain.  There 
was  no  doubt  that  Great  Britain  was  disappointed 
in  the  absolute  feebleness  of  China  not  suspected 
before,  but  she  found  encouragement  in  the  dis- 
covery that,  in  the  Far  East,  there  was  at  least  one 
Power  whose  growing  strength  might  yet  be  turned 
to  good  account.* 


♦"The  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  would  have  been  an  Anglo- 
Chinese  alliance,  if  China  had  won  the  Sino-Japanese  War," 
said  Mr.  Tang  Shaoyi,  in  an  interview  with  a  special  cor- 
respondent of  the  New  York  Tribune,  which  was  published 
in  that  paper,  under  a  Shanghai  date,  June  12,  1920,    "Great 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   27 

Following  the  Chino-Japanese  War  was  a  pe- 
riod of  international  scramble  in  which  Russia 
was  the  most  conspicuous  figure.  With  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  and  the  com- 
mencement of  the  construction  of  the  Chinese  East- 
ern Railway,  Russian  influence  in  Manchuria  be- 
gan to  assume  the  most  menacing  aspect.  Her  lease 
of  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan  only  served  to 
make  her  influence  more  complete,  and  her  po- 
sition in  Manchuria  more  impregnable.  Noav 
keenly  realising  that  it  was  to  the  interest  of 
British  commerce  that  Manchuria  should  not  fall 
into  the  hands  of  Russia,  Great  Britain  began  to 
place  herself  in  readiness  to  meet  the  Muscovite 
challenge.  She  looked  around  once  again  for  m 
diplomatic  partner,  and  her  choice  could  not  have 
been  more  unfortunate.  Germany  was  picked  as 
her  help-mate  in  the  struggle  against  Russia.  On 
October  16,  1900,  the  Anglo-German  agreement, 
commonly  called  the  "Yangtze  Valley  agreement" 
in  Germany,  was  concluded  and  signed  by  Lord 


Britain  made  overtures  to  China  shortly  before  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War  through  her  minister  to  Peking,  Mr.  Mac- 
Donald.  He  asked  China  to  enter  into  an  understanding  with 
Great  Britain.  China  at  that  time  was  afraid  of  Russia,  and 
the  Peking  Government  did  not  wish  to  make  any  entangling 
alliances.  Then  came  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  and  Great 
Britain  watched  carefully  to  see  which  nu^ijn  would  become 
the  better  ally.  To  the  victor  belonged  tne  alliance,  and 
Japan  won  the  war.  MacDonald  was  immediately  transferred 
from  Peking  to  the  Embassy  at  Tokio.  The  result  was  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  That  is  a  point  that  has  not  been 
touched  upon  in  tracing  the  origin  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance." 


28  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

Salisbury  on  behalf  of  Great  Britain  and  Count 
Hatzfeldt,  German  Ambassador  at  London,  on  be- 
half of  Gemiaiiy.  From  the  British  point  of  view, 
the  agreement  was  entered  into  with  implicit  under- 
standing of  being  used  as  an  instrument  to  check- 
mate Russian  advances  in  Manchuria.  The  United 
States  was  invited  to  join,  but  the  invitation  was 
declined.  Japan  saw  advantage  in  the  agreement, 
and  adhered  to  it  as  one  of  its  original  signato- 
ries. 

Nothing  was  further  from  the  intention  of  Ger- 
many, however,  than  to  use  the  agreement,  as  Japan 
and  Great  Britain  both  thought  it  could  be  used, 
as  an  instrument  to  checkmate  Russian  activities 
in  Manchuria.  On  March  15,  1901,  von  Biilow, 
then  Chancellor  of  Germany,  declared  before  the 
Reichstag  that  "the  Anglo-German  agreement  had 
no  reference  to  Manchuria,"-  where  Germany  had 
no  political  or  economic  interest  to  speak  of.  Ger- 
m.ary  refused,  therefore,  to  apply  the  agreement  to 
Manchuria. 

With  this  refusal,  no  doubt,  both  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  were  sadly  disappointed.  The  two 
Powers  were  thus  driven  to  look  for  new  diplo- 
matic partners.  But,  in  view  of  the  political  situa- 
tion existing  then,  what  countries  would  be  willing 
to  join  their  hands?  Russia  was  the  very  Power 
whose  moves  on  the  Manchurian  field  both  Japan 
and  Great  Britain  were  more  anxious  to  check. 
Germany,  much  preferred  by  Japan  as  an  ally  be- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE  29 

cause  of  her  military  strength,  proved  such  a  disap- 
pointment that,  unless  she  could  show  a  consider- 
able change  of  heart,  it  was  absolutely  futile  to  ap- 
proach her  again.  For  France  there  was  no  consid- 
eration at  all  as  a  political  partner,  for,  through 
her  alliance  with  Russia,  she  was  tied  hard  and 
fast  to  the  wheels  of  Russian  diplomacy  in  the 
Near  East  as  well  as  in  the  Far  East.  Italy  might 
be  willing  to  join  hands  either  with  Japan  or  with 
Great  Britain.  Owing  to  the  comparatively  insig- 
nificant amount  of  material  interest  she  had  in 
China,  however,  and  owing  to  the  relatively  small 
diplomatic  influence  that  she  could  exert  in  Peking, 
any  political  combination  with  Italy  would  con- 
tribute very  little  indeed  to  the  ultimate  realisation 
of  the  aims  which  Japan  and  Great  Britain  had  in 
view.  And  the  only  Power  vitally  interested  in 
the  affairs  in  China  and  capable  of  being  an  ef- 
fective ally  of  Japan  and  Great  Britain  in  the  Far 
East  was  the  United  States.  But  the  United  States, 
as  everybody  knows,  had  then,  as  she  has  to-day,, 
a  greater  respect  for  the  injunctions  which  Wash-  ^ 
ington  and  Jefferson  had  handed  down  of  keeping 
away  from  entangling  alliances  than  for  interna- 
tional political  combinations,  which  constituted  an 
essential  part  of  the  state  system  of  Europe,  but 
not  of  America.  Apparently,  therefore,  there  was 
a  dearth  of  suitable  partners,  who  could  join  the 
hands  either  of  Japan,  or  of  Great  Britain,  or  of 
both,  in  their  endeavour  to  protect  their  political 


30  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

and  economic  interests  in  China  seriously  menaced 
by  Russian  designs. 

In  the  face  of  such  a  situation,  two  alternatives 
were  possible.  Both  Japan  and  Great  Britain  could 
endeavour  to  effect  an  understanding  with  Russia, 
so  as  to  avoid  all  possible  causes  of  conflict.  If 
they  should  fail  in  this  attempt,  or  if  they  should 
deem  it  impossible  and  impracticable,  they  could 
bring  about  a  combination  between  themselves  for 
the  purposes  which  they  had  in  view. 

Now  it  was  an  open  secret  that  in  Japan  there 
were  at  that  time  two  groups  of  statesmen,  holding 
very  different  views  in  regard  to  her  international 
policy.  One  group,  composed  of  Marquis  Ito, 
Count  Inouye,  Count  Katsura,  and  Marquis  Yama- 
gata,  and  other  influential  members  of  the  Genro, 
was  strongly  in  favour  of  coming  to  an  under- 
standing with  Russia  herself,  respecting  their  mu- 
tual ambitions  and  aims  in  Manchuria  and  Korea. 
The  other  group,  composed  of  Count  Hayashi, 
Count  Komura,  Viscount  Sone,  and  other  political 
leaders  of  less  prominence,  was  pro-British  in  senti- 
ment, and  was,  therefore,  most  strenuous  in  their 
endeavour  to  effect  an  Anglo-Japanese  understand- 
ing. The  first  group  held  the  opinion  that  ques- 
tions concerning  Korea  and  Manchuria  could  be 
best  settled  between  Japan  and  Russia  alone,  and 
that  any  political  arrangement  without  taking  Rus- 
sia into  consideration  was  no  settlement  at  all. 
The  Elder  statesmen  were  not,  at  any  rate,  prepared 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   31 

to  go  into  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain.  It  was 
their  belief  that,  in  view  of  the  traditional  policy 
of  isolation  of  Great  Britain,  it  was  most  unlikely 
that  Japan  could  rely  upon  her  for  assistance  in 
time  of  need.  On  the  other  hand,  the  younger 
statesmen  of  Japan  were  firm  in  their  belief  that 
any  satisfactory  understanding  was  impossible  with 
Russia,  and  that  the  only  way  to  bring  her  to  terms 
was  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
whose  interests  in  China  and  Korea  were  said  to 
be  identical  with  those  of  Japan. 

Rightly  or  wrongly,  they  believed  that,  if  Russia 
were  faithful  in  her  international  obligations,  the 
Yamagata-Lobanoff  protocol  of  May  28,  1896,  and 
the  Rosen-Nissi  Agreement  of  April  13,  1898, 
which,  were,  as  far  as  Japan  was  concerned,  still 
satisfactory,  should  be  faithfully  observed  by  both 
Powers.  The  fact  that  Russia  had  been  playing 
fast  and  loose  with  them  indicated  how  little  her 
words  could  be  trusted. 

In  England,  the  opinion  was  equally  divided.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  was  maintained  that  Great  Britain 
should  continue  her  policy  of  isolation  and  inde- 
pendence, keeping  her  hands  free,  remaining  the 
absolute  master  of  her  own  fate,  and  trusting  to 
her  own  force  for  the  protection  of  her  political 
and  economic  interests  in  China.  It  was  pointed 
out  that,  if  any  understanding  could  be  arrived  at 
with  Russia,  it  would  be  well  and  good,  and  if  it 
were  not  possible,  any  arrangement  with  Japan  re- 


32  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

sembling  anything  like  an  alliance  would  be  a  per- 
petual source  of  provocation  to  Russia.  Besides, 
the  idea  of  ever  entering  into  a  diplomatic  com- 
bination w^ith  Japan  was  said  to  be  most  "un- 
English,"  and  no  matter  whatever  its  plausible  ob- 
jects might  be,  an  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  would 
be  bound  to  incur  the  severe  condemnation  of  the 
whole  Christendom.  On  the  other  hand,  the  opin- 
ion was  equally  strong  that  new  factors  of  inter- 
national politics  demanded  a  re-consideration  of 
Great  Britain's  traditional  foreign  policy.  The  fact 
that  she  was  without  an  ally  in  any  part  of  the 
world,  upon  whom  she  could  rely  for  help  and  as- 
sistance in  the  protection  of  her  imperial  interests, 
suggested  most  strongly  the  advisability  of  effecting 
a  partnership  with  the  rising  Power  of  the  Far 
East,  whose  strength  could  not  be  questioned. 

This  opinion  was  held  by  a  large  number  of 
British  statesmen,  and  was  most  eloquently  voiced 
by  Sir  Ellis  Ashmead-Bartlett,  in  a  speech  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  the  conduct  of  British  for- 
eign policy.  "It  must  have  occurred  to  every  one," 
he  said  on  March  1,  1898,  "that,  during  the  past 
five  years — since  1893 — this  country  has  been 
steadily  pushed  down-hill  in  many  parts  of  Africa, 
in  Asia,  and  in  other  quarters  of  the  globe.  There 
is  not  a  single  case  that  I  know  of  in  which  this 
country  has  been  able  to  make  effective  response 
to  foreign  encroachment  or  aggression.  I  need 
only  mention  Africa — West,   Central,   East,   and 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   33 

South — Madagascar,  Siam,  Tunis,  the  North  West- 
ern frontier  of  India,  China,  South  and  North,  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  and  the  Mediterranean.  Ever}^- 
where  there  has  been  British  retreat  and  British 
repulse.  Why  is  this  ?  It  is  not  the  result  of  acci- 
dent. There  are  two  reasons  for  it.  In  the  first 
place,  the  deliberate  attack,  or  encroachment,  which 
has  been  made  upon  British  interests  by  the  great 
Russo-French  combination  which  has  been  and  is 
being  felt  everywhere;  and  in  the  second  place,  the 
injurious  and  insane,  and  the  most  mischievous 
change  of  policy  which  took  place  in  1893,  when 
this  country  began  alienating  its  ancient  allies, 
which  has  left  it  in  a  state  of  practical  isolation 
ever  since.  It  is  the  fact  that  ever  since  1893  we 
have  not  had  a  single  ally  in  either  Eastern  or 
Western  Europe,  or  elsewhere,  that  is  necessary  to 
our  foreign  policy,  and,  until  that  great  mistake  is 
retrieved,  until  we  return  to  the  ancient  alliances 
of  this  country,  which  are  based  not  on  sentimental 
imagination  or  popular  outcry,  but  upon  mutual 
and  common  interests,  there  is  no  hope  that  this 
coimtry  will  succeed."  _. 

"We  have  heard  the  splendid  isolation  of  Eng- 
land, but  England  cannot,  against  an  armed  Eu- 
rope, stand  alone;  England,  with  the  richest  and 
most  coveted  possessions  in  the  world,  must  be  a 
prey  to  the  ambitions  of  other  nations."  -^nd  then 
he  went  on  to  point  out  the  impossibility  of  Great 
Britain  facing  alone  the  great  combination  of  Rus- 


34  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

sia  and  France,  and  possibly  of  Germany,  and  em- 
phasising the  fact  that  in  Japan,  the  rising  Power 
in  the  Far  East,  Great  Britain  could  find  a  political 
partner,  whose  interests  in  Korea  and  China  were 
more  or  less  like  those  of  her  own.**  "I  consider,** 
he  continued,  "the  rise  of  the  Japanese  power  in 
the  East  has  been  very  providential  for  this  coun- 
try. I  do  not  know  what  our  position  would  have 
been  now  if  we  had  to  face  a  combination  of  Rus- 
sia and  France,  and  possibly  of  Germany  as  well, 
in  the  Far  East.  There  is  a  very  great  and  strong 
power  growing  up  in  Japan,  and  by  the  help  of 
Japan  alone  can  we  retain  our  position  in  the 
Northern  Pacific."  And  Sir  Ellis  also  emphasised 
the  point  that  by  concluding  an  alliance  with  Japan, 
the  position  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Far  East  would 
become  practically  invincible.  ''By  sea,  the  Eng- 
lish and  Japanese  fleets  are  absolute  masters  of  the 
position.  By  land,  with  the  aid  of  the  Japanese 
army,  we  are  equally  masters  of  the  position."  It 
was  with  this  obvious  result  in  view  that  Sir  Ellis, 
like  so  many  of  his  countrymen  at  that  time,  urged 
the  conclusion  of  an  Anglo-Japanese  alliance. 

While  both  Japan  and  Great  Britain  were  yet 
uncertain  as  to  the  wisdom  of  such  a  novel  com- 
bination, balancing  in  their  minds  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  that  were  likely  to  ensue  there- 
from, the  political  events  in  the  Far  East  were 
moving  at  such  vertiginous  speed  as  to  allow  but 
little  time  for  hesitation  or  deliberation.    The  lease 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    35 

by  Russia  of  Port  Arthur  and  Ta-lien-wan  was 
immediately  followed  by  the  lease  of  Wei-hai-wei 
by  Great  Britain  for  as  long  a  period  as  Russia 
would  remain  in  Port  Arthur.  The  animosity  be- 
tween the  two  Powers  was  aggravated  by  their 
struggles  for  railway  and  mining  concessions  in 
China,  and  it  took  on  the  colour  of  actual  hostility 
against  each  other,  when  Russia,  in  consequence 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion,  occupied 
South  Manchuria  and  disregarded  the  treaty  rights 
of  British  subjects  and  of  the  other  nationals  in 
the  region.  Japan  was  also  alarmed  by  Russian 
activities  in  Korea,  where  she  had  claimed  para- 
mount interest.  The  attempt  by  Russia,  though 
futile  in  its  result,  to  lease  a  Korean  port  com- 
manding the  Japanese  Strait,  served  to  intensify 
the  fear  which  the  Japanese  Government  and  peo- 
ple had  alike  of  Muscovite  designs.  And  the  re- 
peated failure  on  the  part  of  Russia  to  keep  her 
promise  to  wtihdraw  her  troops  from  Manchuria, 
and  the  invidious  diplomacy  which  she  had  adopted 
in  her  dealings  with  the  feeble  Government  at 
Peking — diplomacy  of  the  kind  given  expression 
in  the  Alexieff-Tseng  Agreement,  the  Lamsdorff- 
Yang-yu  Agreement,  and  in  M.  Lessar's  demands 
in  August,  1901,  exasperated  not  only  China,  who 
was  weak  and  had  therefore  but  little  to  say,  but 
also  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  who  were  anxious 
to  protect  their  own  rights  and  interests. 

All    these    events    served    more    and    more    to 


36  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

estrange  Russia  from  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  and 
at  the  same  time,  drew  the  latter  Powers  closer 
and  closer  together.  The  repudiation  by  Germany 
of  the  Anglo-German  Agreement  of  October  16, 
1900,  by  refusing  to  apply  it  to  Manchuria,  drove 
the  two  Powers  into  each  other's  arms.  They 
realised  that  there  was  a  dearth  of  suitable  part- 
ners, and  that  if  any  political  combination  were 
to  be  effected,  it  could  be  made  only  between  them- 
selves. They  looked  each  other  squarely  in  the 
face,  and  decided,  owing  to  a  strange  community 
of  interests  in  China,  to  bind  each  other  in  a  defen- 
sive alliance.  The  result  was  the  conclusion,  after 
numerous  exchanges  of  views  between  the  two 
Governments,  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of 
January  30,  1902. 

It  is  needless  to  add  that  the  alliance  would  not 
have  been  so  easily  brought  about  had  it  not  been 
for  the  new  factors  coming  in  for  considertaion. 
In  the  first  place,  it  should  be  noted  that  Count 
Tadasu  Hayashi,  one  of  the  most  enthusiastic  ex- 
ponents of  an  Anglo- Japanese  understanding,  was 
appointed  Japanese  Minister  at  the  Court  of  St. 
James.  His  diplomatic  position  afforded  him  the 
necessary  opportunity  to  discuss  with  Lord  Lans- 
downe.  Lord  Salisbury,  and  other  members  of  the 
British  Government  the  possibility  as  well  as  the 
advisability  of  coming  to  a  binding  understanding 
between  the  two  countries.  These  discussions  were, 
of  course,  carried  on  by  Count  Hayashi  on  his  own 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   37 

intiative,  though  witli  the  knowledge  and  approval 
of  his  home  Government.  And  the  second  factor 
in  the  situation,  which  accelerated  the  negotiations 
on  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  was  the  mission  to 
Europe,  headed  by  no  less  a  personage  than  Marquis 
Ito,  the  foremost  statesman  of  Japan  at  that  time. 
It  was  generally  assumed  that  he  had  in  his  pocket 
a  proposal  for  a  Russo-Japanese  understanding, 
which  he  was  to  take  up  with  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment upon  his  arrival  at  St.  Petersburg.  Officially, 
Marquis  Ito  took  this  trip  for  the  purpose  of  im- 
proving his  health;  but  the  fact  that  he  was  to  go 
to  St.  Petersburg  during  the  Winter  of  1901 — the 
Russian  capital  which  enjoys  no  particular  reputa- 
tion as  a  health  resort,  especially  in  the  Winter 
season,  belied  his  ostensible  purpose.  Indeed,  the 
British  Government  was  frankly  fearful  that  Japan 
might  negotiate  an  alliance  with  Russia  before  the 
Anglo-Japanese  negotiations  could  be  brought  to 
a  successful  end. 

Sagacious  diplomat  as  he  was.  Count  Hayashi 
was  quick  to  play  the  trump  card  that  was  placed 
in  his  hands.  "I  came  to  the  conclusion,"  he  ad- 
mitted in  his  own  Memoirs,  "that  the  British  states- 
men sincerely  desired  an  alliance  treaty,  but  were 
fearful  of  the  conclusion  of  a  convention  between 
Japan  and  Russia.  I  thought,  therefore,  that  we 
might  take  advantage  of  that  fear  on  England* s 
part,  and  by  pretending  that  an  agreement  would 
be  negotiated  with  Russia  hasten  on  the  conclusion 


38  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

of  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain."  *  The  pretence 
was  used  with  great  effect.  After  a  few  exchanges 
of  views  as  to  the  preliminary  draft,  the  treaty  was 
finally  concluded  on  January  30,  1902.  In  coming 
to  the  agreement,  the  Governments  of  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  were  said  to  be  "actuated  solely  by  a 
desire  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and  general  peace 
in  the  extreme  East,"  ''the  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and  the 
Empire  of  Korea,"  and  "equal  opportunities  in 
those  countries  for  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  all  nations."  Among  other  things,  it  recognised 
the  independence  of  China  and  Korea;  it  admitted 
the  rights  of  Japan  and  Great  Britain  to  "take  such 
measures  as  may  be  indispensable"  in  order  to  safe- 
guard their  "special  interests"  in  China  and  Korea; 
it  provided  for  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain  in 
case  Japan  was  involved  in  war  with  one  single 
Power,  and  for  British  assistance  when  more  than 
one  Power  joined  in  hostilities  against  Japan.  Lord 
Lansdowne  was  asked  to  explain  "why  under  this 
agreement  do  you  undertake  to  protect  Japan  in 
the  defence  of  the  interests  which  are  recognised 
under  the  agreement  if  she  be  attacked  by  two 
Powers,  whereas  you  do  not  undertake  to  come  to 
her  assistance  if  she  be  attacked  by  only  one 
Power?"  In  reply,  he  said:  "The  answer  seemed 
to  me  to  be  an  obvious  one.     We  desire  to  protect 

*A.   M.   Pooley,   "The   Secret   Memoirs  of   Count  Tadasu 
Hayashi,"  p.  129. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   39 

Japan  against  what  we  may  conceive  to  be  the  great- 
est peril  which  might  menace  her  and  that  would 
certainly  be  a  coalition  of  other  Powers.  Japan 
has  a  strong  Navy  and  a  strong  Army,  and  might 
very  fairly  expect  to  hold  her  own  in  a  single- 
handed  encounter  with  any  other  Power;  but  if  she 
were  to  be  threatened  with  an  attack  by  more  than 
one  Power  she  would  undoubtedly  be  in  imminent 
peril ;  and  it  is  in  that  imminent  peril  that  we  desire 
to  come  to  her  succour." 

In  this  connection,  it  may  be  of  interest  to  know 
how  the  alliance  was  received  in  the  Parliament 
and  how  the  statesmen  responsible  for  its  conclu- 
sion defended  it.  Lord  Lansdowne,  in  answer  to 
a  question  put  to  him  in  the  House  of  Lords  on 
February  13,  1902,  as  to  the  reasons  why  Great 
Britain  thus  abandoned  her  traditional  policy  of 
isolation,  said: 


"I  think  it  is  true  that  in  recent  years  international 
agreements  involving  assistance  on  the  part  of  this 
country  to  other  Powers  have  been  generally  regarded 
with  considerable  suspicion  and  misgiving;  but  I  say 
frankly  we  are  not  going  to  be  deterred  by  these  con- 
siderations, or  to  admit  for  a  moment  that  because  this 
Agreement  does  involve  a  new  departure  it  is  there- 
fore open  to  adverse  criticism. 

/'I  do  not  think  that  any  one  can  have  watched  the 
recent  course  of  events  in  different  parts  of  the  world 
without  realising  that  many  of  the  arguments  which 


40  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

a  generation  ago  might  have  been  adduced  in  support 
of  a  poHcy  of  isolation  have  ceased  to  be  entitled  to 
the  same  consideration  now./  What  do  we  see  on  all 
sides?  IWe  observe  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the 
great  Powers  to  form  groups.  We  observe  a  tendency 
to  over-increasing  naval  and  military  armaments  in- 
volving ever-increasing  burdens  upon  the  people  for 
the  defence  of  whose  countries  these  armaments  are 
accumulated.  There  is  also  this — that  in  these  days 
war  breaks  out  with  a  suddenness  which  was  unknown 
in  former  day s^ when  nations  were  not,  as  they  are 
now,  armed  to  the  teeth  and  ready  to  enter  on  hos- 
tilities at  any  moment.  When  we  consider  these  fea- 
tures of  international  situation,  we  must  surely  feel 
that  that  country  would  indeed  be  endowed  with  an 
extraordinary  amount  of  what  I  might  call  self-suffi- 
ciency which  took  upon  itself  to  say  that  it  would  ac- 
cept, without  question,  without  reservation,  the  doc- 
trine that  all  foreign  alliances  were  to  be  avoided  as 
necessarily  embarrassing  and  objectionable.  There- 
fore I  would  entreat  your  Lordships  to  look  at  this 
matter  strictly  on  its  merits,  and  not  to  allow  your 
judgment  to  be  swayed  by  any  musty  formulas  or  old- 
fashioned  superstitions  as  to  the  desirability  of  pur- 
suing a  policy  of  isolation  for  this  country.  If  con- 
sidered on  its  merits,  I  venture  to  suggest  that  what 
you  have  to  take  into  account  in  regard  to  an  alliance 
of  this  kind  is,  first,  whether  the  ally  is  a  desirable 
ally,  and  in  the  next  place  whether  the  objects  of  the 
alliance  are  commendable,  and  last,  but  not  least, 
whether  the  price  you  pay  for  the  alliance  is  greater 
than  you  ought  to  pay.    If  these  questions  can  be  satis- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE  41 

factorily  answered,  then/ 1  say  the  alliance  is  not  a  bad 
thing  for  the  country,  but,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  good 
thing;  for  prima  facie  if  there  be  no  countervailing 
objections,  the  country  which  has  the  good  fortune  to 
possess  allies  is  more  to  be  envied  than  the  country 
which  is  without  them// 

Lord  Lansdowne  did  not  take  upon  himself  to 
show  that  as  an  ally  Japan  was  desirable,  but  he 
simply  reminded  the  House  that  that  nation  had 
been  in  the  past  referred  to  in  the  warmest  terms. 
He  then  went  on  to  answer  the  other  two  questions 
which  he  had  set  before  the  House: 

"Then  as  to  the  object  of  the  alliance.  They  are 
stated  very  clearly  on  the  face  of  the  Agreement.  They 
are,  in  the  first  place,  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo 
in  the  Far  East;  in  the  second  place,  they  are  the 
maintenance  of  that  commercial  policy  which  is  for 
convenience  usually  described  as  the  policy  of  the 
open  door ;  and  I  think  I  may  say  that  the  third  object 
of  the  Agreement  is  the  maintenance  of  that  which 
seems  to  me  to  be  a  very  valuable  interest  to  us  indeed 
— the  maintenance  of  peace  of  that  part  of  the  world 
to  which  the  Agreement  applies.  These  are  not  objects 
desired  by  this  country  alone.  I  believe  I  shall  be  cor- 
rect when  I  say,  speaking  in  general  terms,  that  the 
whole  of  the  great  Powers  with  whom  we  have  been 
in  constant  communication  in  the  last  few  years  in 
regard  to  the  affairs  of  China,  that  all  of  these  Powers 
have  at  one  time  or  another  given  their  adhesion  to 
the  policy  of  the  status  qu^  and  the  policy  of  equal 


42  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

commercial  opportunities  for  all  countries  in  the  Far 
East. 

"There  is,  therefore,  nothing  in  this  Agreement 
that  does  violence  to  the  policy  which  has  been  ac- 
cepted by  other  great  Powers.  Then  is  it  the  case 
that  we  are  paying  an  excessive  price  for  this  alliance  ? 
I  understood  the  noble  Earl  (Spencer)  to  say  that  he 
well  understood  our  feelings  towards  Japan,  but  that 
he  was  unable  to  understand  why  it  was  necessary  to 
resort  to  an  international  agreement  of  this  descrip- 
tion in  order  to  give  effect  to  our  policy.  Well,  my 
Lords,  I  venture  to  say  that  if  it  is  indeed  our  policy 
to  support  Japan,  to  protect  against  the  danger  of  a 
coalition  of  other  Powers,  I  do  not  think  we  can  avow 
it  too  frankly  or  too  distinctly ;  and,  to  my  mind,  there 
is  a  much  greater  danger  in  leaving  important  ques- 
tions of  international  policy  of  this  kind  to  vague  and 
hazy  understandings  than  there  is  in  embodying  them 
explicitly  in  an  Agreement,  the  purport  of  which  can- 
not possibly  be  misunderstood  by  those  concerned." 

In  a  covering  despatch  to  Sir  Claude  MacDonald, 
at  that  time  British  Minister  at  Tokio,  Lord  Lans- 
downe  said:  ''This  Agreement  may  be  regarded  as 
the  outcome  of  the  events  which  have  taken  place 
during  the  past  two  years  in  the  Far  East,  and  of 
the  part  taken  by  Great  Britain  and  Japan  in  deal- 
ing with  them.*    This  statement  was  not  quite  ac- 


*  The  British  Parliamentary  Papers,  Treaty  Series,  No.  3, 
1902:  Agreement  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan 
relative  to  China  and  Korea,  signed  at  London,  January  30, 
1902.    Vide  also  Appendix  B. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   43 

curate.  Whatever  might  have  been  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  al- 
liance— of  which  there  v^ere  many,  as  we  have 
shown  above,  it  was  admitted  on  all  hands  that  the 
genesis  of  the  alliance  went  further  back  than  two 
years.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Anglo- Japanese 
flirtations  had  been  going  on  in  no  uncertain  fash- 
ion even  before  the  conclusion  of  the  Chino- Japa- 
nese War,  when  Great  Britain  made  up  her  mind 
that  China  was  not  strong  enough  to  be  trusted 
as  an  ally  against  the  Muscovites.  At  that  time, 
international  philandering  was  of  the  most  Platonic 
sort,  and  no  concrete  result  was  expected  there- 
from. In  1895,  Great  Britain  refused  to  take  part 
in  the  three-Powers  intervention  to  keep  Japan  out 
of  Liaotung  peninsula.  A  year  before.  Great 
Britain  consented  to  a  revision  of  her  treaties  with 
Japan,  and  to  the  abolition  of  the  extra-territorial 
jurisdiction,  thus  according  her  a  cordial  and  full 
recognition  of  her  place  among  the  family  of  na- 
tions. In  return  for  these  favours,  Japan  was  will- 
ing to  withdraw  her  troops  from  Wei-hai-wei  so 
as  to  make  it  possible  for  British  occupation.  In 
1899,  Japan  exerted  her  influence  to  arrange  for  a 
British  concession  in  Newchwang.  And  in  1900, 
upon  the  outbreak  of  the  Boxer  Insurrection,  the 
two  Powers  conducted  themselves  in  perfect  har- 
mony, both  during  the  campaign  and  throughout 
the  negotiations  for  peace.  In  the  year  following, 
negotiation  for  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  was 


44  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

taken  up  by  Count  Hayashi  and  Lord  Lansdowne, 
with  the  result  already  known. 

The  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  treaty  was  said  to 
be  a  remarkable  document,  "the  like  of  which  is 
seldom  seen  in  history,  especially  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  it  united  reciprocally  two  nations 
widely  apart  in  race,  religion,  and  history,  one  of 
which  had  rarely  in  time  of  peace  entered  into  a 
regular  alliance  with  a  European  Power."  *  It  was 
truly  said  that  for  the  first  time  in  her  history  that 
Great  Britain  had  concluded  a  defensive  alliance 
of  this  sort  with  a  foreign  Power,  and  indeed  it 
was  the  first  time  in  modem  history  of  the  world 
that  a  European  Power  had  concluded  an  alliance, 
not  with  an  Occidental,  but  with  an  Oriental 
Power. 

But  what  effect  or  effects  did  the  alliance  have 
upon  the  general  course  of  events  in  the  Far  East? 
How  were  the  Contracting  Powers  benefited  by  it? 
What  bearing  did  it  have  upon  the  future  of  China? 
And  how  much  did  it  contribute  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  Open  Door  policy?  All  international  agree- 
ments, this  and  the  others  to  come,  in  order  to 
ascertain  their  true  purport,  must  be  analysed  to 
answer  these  questions. 

Speaking  of  the  effects  of  the  alliance  as  far  as 
Japan  was  concerned,  we  cannot  do  any  better  than 
quoting  a  Japanese  writer,  Dr.  T.  lyenaga,  who 
has  been  for  years  a  semi-official  spokesman  for  the 

*  K  Asakawa,  "The  Russo-Japanese  Conflict,"  p.  202. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE  45 

Japanese  Government  in  the  United  States,  and 
the  Director  of  the  East  and  West  News  Bureau 
in  New  York  City.  "Leaving  the  treatment  of  the 
effects  of  the  treaty  on  England  to  English  writers, 
from  a  Japanese  standpoint  it  seems  that  the  agree- 
ment safeguards  Japan's  position  in  Korea,  it 
greatly  relieves  her  from  working  under  the  night- 
mare of  a  European  coalition  against  her,  it  en- 
hances her  advice  (sic)  with  that  of  England  at 
the  Court  of  Peking,  and  it  adds  to  the  weight  of 
whatever  Japan  may  undertake  to  do  in  foreign 
relations."  *  Indeed,  it  would  come  as  a  natural 
consequence  of  the  consummation  of  the  alliance 
that  Japan,  having  thus  allied  herself  with  a  world 
Power,  or  with  "the  strongest  naval  Power"  in  the 
world  then,  would  take  her  full  part  in  the  game 
of  world  politics. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  advantages  which  Great 
Britain  hoped  for  from  the  alliance  were  not  so 
definable.  Generally  speaking,  it  helped  to  improve 
her  diplomatic  prestige  abroad,  and  placed  her  in 
a  well  fortified  position  where  she  could  direct  her 
offensive  and  defensive  operations.  It  has  been 
generally  held,  but  very  erroneously,  that  from  the 
British  point  of  view,  the  object  of  the  alliance  was 
to  provide  against  a  Russian  invasion  in  India. 
This  was  the  avowed  object  of  the  second  and  the 
third  alliances,  with  which  we  shall  deal  in  late^ 
chapters,  but  certainly  not  that  of  the  first  alliance 
*  The  American  Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1902,  p.  461. 


46  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

treaty  (the  text  may  be  found  in  the  appendix), 
in  which  not  a  word  was  said  about  India  at  all. 
In  fact,  according  to  Count  Hayashi's  memoirs, 
India  was  purposely  excluded  from  the  sphere  of 
operation  of  the  alliance  on  the  ground  that,  inas- 
much as  Japan  had  no  material  interests  there,  to 
include  the  British  Indian  Empire  in  the  scope  of 
the  alliance  would  mean  too  much  responsibility 
for  her.  The  alliance,  it  is  true,  was  directed 
against  Russia;  but  the  published  version  of  the 
treaty  gives  no  ground  for  thinking  or  believing 
that  it  provided  against  Russian  menace  to  India. 
On  the  very  contrary,  Jt  was  distinctly  stated  in  the 
treaty  that  the  "special  interests"  of  Great  Britain 
related  "principally  to  China."  An  English  writer, 
whose  competency  to  speak  on  such  a  subject  has 
been  well  recognised,  observed  that  from  the  British 
point  of  view,  the  making  of  the  Anglo- Japanese 
alliance  in  1902  "was  a  wise  and  necessary  meas- 
ure, intended  to  check  the  encroachments  of  Russia 
upon  Northern  China  and  to  safeguard  our  com- 
mercial interests  in  that  region."  * 

But  the  question  remains:  How  was  Great 
Britain  benefited  by  the  alliance?  Did  the  combi- 
nation with  the  Island  Empire  of  the  East  really 
improve  the  prestige  of  the  Island  Empire  of  the 
West?  "In  general,"  it  was  shrewdly  observed, 
"an  alliance  does  not  add  to  a  nation's  prestige; 

*J.  O.  P.  Bland,  "Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in 
China,"  p.  291. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   47 

it  is  a  confession  of  weakness  rather  than  an  evi- 
dence of  strength."  *  The  alliance  was  attracted 
by  the  rising  power  in  Japan,  and,  as  Sir  Ellis 
Ashmead-Bartlett  had  observed,  by  the  prospect 
that,  through  a  naval  and  military  combination, 
both  Powers  would  be  placed  in  an  invincible  po- 
sition. 

That  the  alliance  was  directed  against  Russia  and 
against  her  sinister  activities  in  Northern  China  and 
Korea  was  well  realised  by  herself  and  by  her  ally. 
This  was  evidenced  by  the  sardonic  declaration  by 
the  Governments  of  Russia  and  France,  which  the 
conclusion  of  the  alliance  elicited.  The  two  Gov- 
ernments, after  due  consultation  on  the  subject, 
made  this  declaration  on  March  17,  1902: 

"The  allied  Governments  of  Russia  and  France 
have  received  a  copy  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agree- 
ment of  the  30th  January,  1902,  concluded  with 
the  object  of  maintaining  the  stattis  quo  and  the 
general  peace  in  the  Far  East,  and  preserving  the 
independence  of  China  and  Korea,  which  are  to 
remain  open  to  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all 
nations,  and  have  been  fully  satisfied  to  find  therein 
affirmed  the  fundamental  principles  which  they 
have  themselves,  on  several  occasions,  declared  to 
form  the  basis  of  their  policy,  and  still  remain  so. 

"The  two  Governments  consider  that  the  ob- 
servance of  these  principles  is  at  the  same  time  a 
guarantee  of  their  special  interests  in  the  Far  East. 
*  Prof.  Edwin  Maxey,  "The  Arena,"  May,  1902,  p.  453. 


48  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

Nevertheless,  being  obliged  themselves  also  to  take 
into  consideration  the  case  in  which  either  the  ag- 
gressive action  of  third  Powers,  or  the  recurrence 
of  disturbances  in  China  jeopardising  the  integrity 
and  free  development  of  that  Power,  might  become 
a  menace  to  their  own  interests,  the  two  allied  Gov- 
ernments reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  con- 
sult in  that  contingency  as  to  the  means  to  be 
adopted  for  securing  those  interests,*' 

The  St.  Petersburg  Messager  Officiel  published 
three  days  later  (March  20,  190©  the  Franco- 
Russian  Declaration,  together  with  an  official  state- 
ment that  the  Government  of  Russia,  in  spite  of 
the  comments  in  diplomatic  circles  and  in  some  of 
the  continental  newspapers  to  the  contrary,  had 
received  the  announcement  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  "with  the  most  perfect  calm'*  and  had  ac- 
corded it  the  most  cordial  reception  inasmuch  as  the 
object  of  the  alliance  was  the  very  one  which  Rus- 
sia had  always  insisted  upon,  namely,  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  independence  and  integrity  of  China 
and  Korea.  "Russia  desires  the  preservation  of 
the  status  quo"  the  statement  continued  to  say, 
"and  general  peace  in  the  Far  East,  by  the  con- 
struction of  the  great  Siberian  Railroad,  together 
with  its  branch  line  through  Manchuria,  toward  a 
port  always  ice-free.  Russia  aids  in  the  extension 
in  these  regions  of  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
the  whole  world.  Would  it  be  to  her  interest  to 
put  forward  obstacles  at  the  present  time?     The 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE  49 

intention  expressed  by  Great  Britain  and  Japan  to 
attain  those  same  objects,  which  have  invariably- 
been  pursued  by  the  Russian  Government,  can 
meet  with  nothing  but  sympathy  in  Russia,  in  spite 
of  the  comments  in  certain  poHtical  spheres  and  in 
some  of  the  foreign  newspapers,  which  endeavoured 
to  present  in  quite  a  different  light  the  impassive 
attitude  of  the  Imperial  Government  toward  a  dip- 
lomatic act  which,  in  its  eyes,  does  not  change  in 
any  way  the  general  situation  of  the  political 
horizon." 

This  Russian  statement  was  significant  for  it  ex- 
plained what  Russia  had  conceived  to  be  the  status 
quo  in  the  extreme  East,  that  the  Contracting 
Parties  of  the  alliance  expressed  it  to  be  their  de- 
sire to  maintain.  "We  have  each  of  us  desired," 
said  Lord  Lansdowne  in  his  covering  letter  to  Sir 
MacDonald,  "that  the  integrity  and  independence 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  should  be  preserved,  that 
there  should  be  no  disturbance  of  the  territorial 
status  quo  either  in  China  or  in  the  adjoining  re- 
gions, that  all  nations  should,  within  those  regions, 
as  well  as  within  the  limits  of  the  Chinese  Empire, 
be  afforded  equal  opportunities  for  the  development 
of  their  commerce  and  industry,  and  that  peace 
should  not  only  be  restored,  but  should,  for  the 
future,  be  maintained."  In  other  words,  what 
Great  Britain  had  meant  by  status  quo  was  the 
maintenance  of  the  territorial  and  commercial  con- 
ditions existing  in  China,  and  in  the  adjoining 


50  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

regions.  What  Russia  had  understood  by  status 
quo  was  the  preservation  of  the  special  rights  and 
privileges  which  she  had  in  Manchuria  and  North- 
ern China.  It  was  curious  that  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment did  not  interpret  the  status  quo  as  to  mean 
continuous  occupation  by  Russian  forces  of  Man- 
churia. At  the  time  when  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty 
was  concluded,  January  30,  1902,  the  Russian  troops 
were  still  in  occupation  of  Manchuria.  In  the 
absence  of  a  clear  definition  of  the  status  quo,  Rus- 
sia would  have  more  than  legitimate  ground  if  she 
should  decide  to  continue  her  occupation  of  Man- 
churia in  order  to  be  in  conformity  with  the 
avowed  object  of  the  alliance! 

The  most  striking,  as  well  as  the  most  important 
for  our  purpose,  of  the  provisions  of  the  alliance 
treaty  and  of  its  objects,  was  the  ostensible  attempt 
by  the  Contracting  Parties  to  preserve  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  China  and  to  maintain 
equal  opportunities  "for  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  all  nations."  How  far  they  were  successful  in 
this  attempt  is  a  question,  which  cannot  be  an- 
swered at  this  stage  of  our  narrative  without  an- 
ticipating the  long  train  of  events.  For  our  pur- 
pose, it  is  sufficient  to  say  here,  that  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  whatever  might  be  said  for  or 
against  it,  and  whatever  might  be  its  hidden  ot 
open  motives,  was  to  us  nothing  less  than  an  asser-i 
tion  of  Japanese  and  British  spheres  of  interest  in 
China,  an  open  challenge  to  Russia,  and  a  distinct 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    51 

violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  Open  Door  policy.  It 
was  true,  indeed,  that  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
"recognised  the  independence  of  China  and  Korea" 
and  declared  themselves  "to  be  entirely  uninflu- 
enced by  any  aggressive  tendencies  in  either  coun- 
try." But  did  they  not  also  declare  that,  in  view 
of  their  special  interests  in  China  and  Korea,  "the 
High  Contracting  Parties  recognise  that  it  will  be 
admissible  for  either  of  them  to  take  such  measures 
as  may  be  indispensable  in  order  to  safeguard  those 
interests  if  threatened  either  by  the  aggressive  ac- 
tion of  any  other  Power  or  hy  disturbances  aris- 
ing in  China  or  Korea?"  Such  a  provision  might 
be  in  the  interest  of  the  Contracting  Parties,  but  it 
was  highly  dangerous  to  the  sovereign  rights  of 
China  and  Korea.  When  carried  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion, the  provision  was  nothing  less  than  a 
mutual  recognition  that  both  Contracting  Parties 
would  have  a  free  hand  in  taking  whatever  meas- 
ures necessary  to  protect  their  special  interests,  in 
disregard  of  the  independence  and  the  sovereignty 
of  China  and  Korea.  If  a  revolution  should  break 
out  in  China,  which  injured  the  allied  interests  in 
the  country,  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  according 
to  the  alliance,  would  consider  it  "admissible"  for 
either  of  them,  or  both,  "to  take  such  measures  as 
may  be  indispensable  in  order  to  safeguard  those 
interests."  In  other  words,  they  would  consider 
it  "admissible"  to  intervene  in  any  domestic  dis- 
turbance in  China!    And  if  Russia  should  continue 


52  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

her  occupation  of  Newchwang  permanently,  Japan 
and  Great  Britain  would,  according  to  this  under- 
standing, also  seize  other  ports  of  China  to  balance 
the  power  and  to  protect  their  special  interests! 
Could  such  a  spirit  be  reconciled  with  the  avowed 
object  of  the  alliance,  which  seeks  to  maintain  the 
administrative  independence  and  territorial  integ- 
rity of  China  so  as  to  provide  equal  opportunities 
for  commerce  and  industry  for  all  nations  in  the 
world?  Both  Japan  and  Great  Britain  unctuously 
declared  that  they  were  "specially  interested  in 
maintaining  the  independence  and  territorial  integ- 
rity of  the  Empire  of  China"  and  "in  securing 
equal  opportunities"  for  all  nations.  And  these 
very  same  Powers  pledged  each  other  a  free  hand 
to  do  whatever  each  saw  fit  in  case  of  foreign 
aggression  or  internal  disturbance  in  China.  A 
free  hand  could  only  mean  intervention,  and  inter- 
vention in  the  domestic  affairs  of  China  would 
nullify  the  very  independence,  and  in  many  cases, 
impair  the  very  integrity,  the  maintenance  of  which 
they  professed  to  be  "specially  interested"  in! 


/ 


III 

THE  SECOND  ANGLO-JAPANESE 
ALLIANCE 

THE  alliance  of  1902  would  have  lasted  with- 
out renewal  till  the  beginning  of  1907,  and 
could  not  have  been  terminated  by  either 
party  without  twelve  months'  notice  to  the  other. 
The  Japanese  Government,  seeing  that  the  war  with 
Russia  was  drawing  to  an  end,  thought  it  wise  to 
\  take  time  by  the  forelock  and  have  it  renewed  im- 
mediately. 

The  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  of  1905  bore  little 
or  no  resemblance  to  that  of  three  years  ago.  It 
was  virtually  a  new  instrument  altogether.  De- 
signed for  an  entirely  different  set  of  purposes  and 
objects,  and  intended  to  meet  diplomatic  contin- 
gencies not  provided  for  in  the  original  document, 
the  second  alliance  could  hardly  be  said  to  be  a 
renewal  of  the  old. 

The  alliance  was  negotiated  at  London  between 
Lord  Lansdowne  and  Count  Hayashi  prior  to  the 
meeting  of  the  Peace  Conference  at  Portsmouth 
between  Japan  and  Russia.  When  President  Roose- 
velt offered  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States, 
and  when  the  belligerent  Powers  agreed  to  treat 

53 


54  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

for  peace,  the  statesmen  at  Tokio  were  quick  to  see 
the  advantages  of  a  new  and  strengthened  alliance 
with  Great  Britain,  which  would  not  only  fortify 
her  position  at  the  forthcoming  peace  conference, 
but  also  insure  her  against  the  revival  of  any  com- 
bination of  European  Powers  such  as  that  which 
she  was  confronted  with  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
Chino- Japanese  War.  Count  Hayashi,  under  in- 
structions from  the  Government  at  Tokio,  immedi- 
ately began  negotiations  with  the  British  Foreign 
Minister,  the  result  of  which  was  the  signature  of 
the  second  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  on  the  12th  of 
August,  1905,  exactly  three  days  after  the  peace 
negotiations  at  Portsmouth  were  commenced.  Al- 
though the  text  of  the  agreement  was  not  published 
at  the  time,  it  was  no  secret  with  the  Russian  dele- 
gates at  the  Peace  Conference  that  a  new  alliance 
had  been  entered  into  between  Japan  and  Great 
Britain.  What  influence  it  had  upon  the  conduct 
of  the  peace  negotiations  was  not  definitely  known, 
however. 

The  new  alliance  was  designed  to  replace  the 
agreement  concluded  between  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  on  the  30th  of  January,  1902.  It  had  as 
its  objects  (1)  the  consolidation  and  maintenance 
of  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of 
India,  (2)  the  preservation  of  the  common  inter- 
ests of  all  Powers  in  China  by  insuring  her  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
Open  Door  policy,  and  (3)  the  maintenance  of  the 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   55 

territorial  rights  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
in  the  Far  East  and  India,  and  the  defence  of  their 
special  interests  in  the  said  regions.  It  was  agreed  *^ 
that,  if  these  interests  and  rights  were  menaced, 
the  Contracting  Parties  would  communicate  with 
each  other  fully  and  frankly  and  would  take  com- 
mon measures  to  safeguard  them;  and  that,  if 
either  Contracting  Party  should  be  involved  in  war 
in  defence  of  these  rights  and  interests,  the  other 
would  come  at  once  to  the  assistance  of  her  ally 
and  conduct  the  war  in  common.  As  Japan  pos- 
sessed paramount  political,  military,  and  economic 
interests  in  Korea,  Great  Britain  recognised  her 
right  to  take  such  measures  of  guidance,  control, 
and  protection  in  Korea  as  she  deemed  proper  and 
necessary  to  safeguard  and  to  advance  those  inter- 
ests, provided  always  such  measures  were  not  con- 
trary to  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  Great  Britain  had  a  special  interest  in  the 
security  of  the  Indian  frontier,  Japan  recognised 
her  right  to  take  such  measures  as  she  found  neces- 
sary for  safeguarding  her  Indian  possessions.  The 
alliance  was  to  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  after  J 
the  date  of  its  signature. 

That  the  terms  of  the  new  treaty  were  entirely 
different  from  those  of  the  old  was  apparent.  It 
is  not  quite  accurate,  therefore,  to  speak  of  the  new 
alliance  as  a  renewal  of  the  old.  To  call  it  a  revi- 
sion, it  is  nearer  to  the  truth.     To  emphasise  the 


56  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

difference  between  the  two,  we  need  only  contrast 
the  terms  of  the  two  agreements. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance 
treaty  of  1902  was  to  run  for  five  years,  and  there- 
after until  one  year  after  either  Contracting  Power 
should  have  denounced  it.  *'But  if,  when  the  date 
fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either  ally  is  ac- 
tually engaged  in  war,  the  alliance  ipso  facto  shall 
continue  until  peace  shall  have  been  concluded." 
But  the  new  treaty  was  to  run  for  ten  years,  al- 
though with  the  same  provisions  for  its  termina- 
tion. The  first  alliance  was  strictly  defensive,  in- 
asmuch as  it  provided  that,  in  case  either  of  the 
Contracting  Parties  should  become  involved  in  war, 
the  other  would  maintain  "a  strict  neutrality'*  and 
would  use  her  best  efforts  to  prevent  other  Powers 
from  joining  in  hostilities  against  her  ally,  and 
that  she  would  go  to  the  assistance  of  her  ally  only 
when  the  ally  was  attacked  by  more  than  one 
Power.  The  new  alliance  was  much  broader  in 
scope,  as  it  provided  that  war  with  one  Power 
should  be  sufficient  cause  for  common  action.  It 
was  of  course  understood  that  such  a  war  must  not 
be  aggressively  provoked  by  either  of  the  Contract- 
ing Parties,  and  must  be  a  war  in  defence  of  their 
territorial  rights  and  special  interests  in  China, 
India,  and  Korea.  In  the  first  agreement,  India 
was  purposely  left  out  upon  the  demand  of  the 
Japanese  Government;  but  the  scope  of  the  new 
treaty  extended  to  India  as  well  as  to  "Eastern 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   57 

Asia.'*  In  concluding  the  alliance  of  1902,  the 
Governments  of  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  it  was 
pointed  out,  were  "actuated  solely  by  a  desire  to 
maintain  the  stattis  quo  and  general  peace  in  the 
extreme  East/'  Although  the  maintenance  of  gen- 
eral peace  was  still  included  among  the  purposes  of 
the  revised  treaty,  it  was  not  known  that  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  were  still  actuated  by  the  desire 
to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  the  Far  East.  This 
change  of  heart  was  perhaps  due  to  the  fact  that 
Japan  had  won  the  war  against  Russia.  To  con- 
tinue to  respect  the  status  quo  as  provided  for  in 
the  first  alliance  agreement  would  be  to  permit 
Russia  to  remain  in  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan, 
and  to  deny  Japan  herself  the  right  to  take  over 
the  southern  portion  of  the  Island  of  Sakhalin  and 
to  succeed  to  the  Russian  economic  concessions  in 
South  Manchuria.  And,  lastly,  it  may  also  be  ob- 
served, that,  in  1902,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  were 
"specially  interested  in  maintaining  the  independ- 
ence and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of 
China  and  the  Empire  of  Korea,  and  in  securing 
equal  opportunities  in  those  countries  for  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations."  The  second 
alliance,  however,  referred  only  to  the  independ- 
ence and  integrity  of  China  and  the  maintenance 
of  the  Open  Door  policy  in  that  country.  The  in- 
dependence and  the  integrity  of  Korea  were  en- 
tirely overlooked. 

In  addition  to  these  differences  which  are  dis- 


58  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

cernible  from  the  published  terms  of  both  treaties, 
we  may  also  note,  in  passing,  a  few  less  conspicu- 
ous but  none  the  less  important  elements  that  dis- 
tinguish the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  of  1905  from 
that  of  1902.  It  was  an  open  secret  that,  while 
the  old  agreement  was  directed  against  Russia  and 
against  her  only,  the  revised  treaty  was  meant  not 
only  for  Russia  who  was  still  a  menace  to  the  se- 
curity of  the  British  India,  but  also  for  Germany, 
who,  because  of  the  rapid  increase  and  expansion 
of  her  military  and  naval  forces,  threatened  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.  In  fact,  the  second 
alliance  marked  the  beginning  of  the  series  of 
international  agreements,*  which  were  designed, 
nominally  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  Open 
Door  policy  in  China  and  her  territorial  integrity, 
but  really  for  the  purpose  of  "encircling'*  Germany 
in  the  diplomatic  world.  And  then  it  may  also  be 
observed  that  the  old  alliance  was  more  favourable 
to  Japan  than  to  Great  Britain,  as  it  prevented 
France  from  joining  in  the  hostilities  against  her. 
To  Great  Britain,  the  new  alliance,  covering  not 
only  a  common  sphere  of  interest  in  the  Far  East, 
but  also  India,  was  at  least  in  this  one  respect  more 
favourable  than  the  old.  It  freed  her  from  con- 
stant anxiety  concerning  the  future  of  her  greatest 
dependency,  and  "allies  her  more  intimately  with 


♦The  Franco- Japanese  Agreement,  1907;  the  Russo-Jap- 
anese Agreement,  1907;  the  Anglo-Russian  Agreement,  1907, 
etc. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   59 

a  nation  which  has  shown  itself  to  be  a  military 
and  naval  Power  of  the  first  rank.'* 

As  has  been  noticed,  the  objects  of  the  alliance 
were  to  preserve  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern 
Asia  and  India,  to  maintain  the  Open  Door  policy 
"by  insuring  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  na- 
tions in  China,"  and  to  safeguard  the  "territorial 
rights"  and  "special  interests"  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and 
India.  With  the  first  object  we  have  nothing  to 
quarrel.  It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  the  al- 
liance of  1902  had  a  similar  declaration.  The  fact 
that  it  had  failed  absolutely  to  maintain  peace  in 
the  Far  East  showed  most  clearly  the  real  worth 
of  such  a  declaration.  The  second  object  was 
plausible,  for  it  was  ostensibly  a  reiteration  of  their 
desire  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  policy 
in  China.  "But  its  meaning  would  have  been 
clearer  had  the  characteristic  bit  of  diplomatic  hum- 
bug been  omitted.  Instead  of  its  object  being  'the 
preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all  the 
Powers  in  China,'  it  is,  of  course,  the  preservation 
in  China  and  the  far  and  Middle  East  of  the  in- 
terests of  Great  Britain  and  Japan.  The  phrasing 
almost  amounts  to  an  impertinence,  since  none  of 
the  other  Powers  have  asked  England  and  Japan 
to  take  care  of  their  interests  in  that  part  of  the 
world,  and  none  of  them  would  be  at  all  disposed 


60  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

to  admit  greater  competence  on  the  part  of  these 
two  Powers  to  look  after  other  national  interests 
than  is  possessed  by  the  other  nation  themselves." 
At  any  rate,  the  profession  for  the  Open  Door  by 
the  Contracting  Parties  was  stultified  by  their 
avowed  purpose  of  maintaining  and  defending  their 
"territorial  rights"  and  "special  interests"  in  India 
and  in  the  Far  East.  What  were  these  "territorial 
rights"  and  "special  interests?"  Who  were  to  de- 
fine them?  Special  interests  are  incompatible  with 
the  principle  of  the  Open  Door.  To  insist  on  the 
one  is  to  nullify  the  other.  It  is  easy  to  understand 
that  the  "territorial  rights"  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India  referred  to  her 
possessions  of  India,  of  Burma,  and  of  Hongkong, 
and  possibly  to  her  lease  of  Wei-hai-wei.  But  what 
were  the  "territorial  rights"  of  Japan  in  the  said 
regions  ?  In  India,  she  had  none ;  in  Eastern  Asia, 
she  had  not  yet  acquired  any  at  the  time  of  the 
conclusion  of  the  second  alliance.  It  is  true  that 
Port  Arthur  and  the  Kwangtung  peninsula  were 
occupied  by  the  Japanese  forces  at  the  time;  it  is 
also  true  that  Japan  had  also  occupied  the  Sakhalin 
Island.  In  these  regions,  however,  Japan  could 
have  no  other  territorial  rights  than  those  involved 
in  military  occupation.  The  Russo-Japanese  War 
was  not  yet  brought  to  the  end  when,  on  August 
12,  1905,  the  new  alliance  treaty  was  signed  at 
Lx)ndon.  The  peace  conference  at  Portsmouth  had 
commenced  but  for  three  days,  and   it  was  not 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   61 

known  what  form  the  peace  treaty  would  take. 
Even  the  international  law  principle  of  uti  possi- 
detis— the  principle  which  legalises  the  state  of 
territorial  possession  at  the  moment  of  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace,  unless  stipulations  to  the  contrary 
are  contained  in  the  treaty — could  not,  therefore, 
be  held  to  be  operative.  In  Korea,  Japan  had  not 
yet  acquired  any  territorial  rights.  In  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  country  was  overrun  by  Japanese 
forces  and  placed  under  Japanese  military  occu- 
pation, Korea  was  still  an  independent  nation.  At 
the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  second  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  therefore,  Japan  did  not  possess 
a  foot  of  territory,  either  by  acquisition,  by  lease, 
or  by  conquest,  on  the  continent  of  Asia.  It  is 
difficult  to  see  why  Great  Britain  should  go  out  of 
her  way  to  undertake  the  maintenance  for  her  ally 
of  the  "territorial  rights"  of  which  Japan  had  none, 
and  was  not  likely  to  have  any  if  Russia  should 
have  stood  firm  and  if  China  should  have  refused 
to  consent  to  the  transfer  of  the  territorial  leases 
in  Manchuria  from  one  belligerent  Power  to 
another. 

The  real  importance  of  the  second  Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance  was,  at  any  rate,  not  to  be  found  in 
the  meaningless  provision  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  Open  Door  policy.  Although  many  have  been 
led  to  believe  that  the  Open  Door  was  the  funda- 
mental principle,  upon  which  the  foundation  of 
the  alliance  rested,  the  truth  was  that  the  inclusion 


y 


62  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

of  the  principle  was  designed  to  deprive  the  al- 
Hance  of  its  sting,  and  to  win  for  it  the  applause 
of  the  world.  It  was  a  gratuitous  declaration,  de- 
void of  sincerity  of  purpose  of  ever  carrying  it  out. 
In  the  light  of  the  events  that  took  place  in  China 
in  general,  and  in  Manchuria  in  particular,  im- 
mediately after  the  conclusion  of  the  Russo-Japa- 
nese conflict,  and  in  view  of  the  repeated  violations 
by  Japan  of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity, 
which  became  a  source  of  constant  irritation  and 
complaint  by  the  Western  Powers,  it  is  within  the 
bounds  of  truth  to  say  that  the  declaration  for  the 
Open  Door  in  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  of  1905 
looked  as  if  it  were  made  to  violate,  and  not  to 
observe.  With  the  numerous  infractions  of  the 
principle  by  Japan  in  Manchuria,  we  shall  deal  in 
extenso  in  a  later  chapter.  It  is  sufficient  to  say 
here  that,  as  far  as  it  concerned  the  maintenance 
of  the  Open  Door  policy  in  China,  the  second 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  did  nothing  more  than  lip- 
service  to  the  policy.  Like  all  the  sanctimonious 
agreements  that  Japan  has  entered  into  since  1902, 
it  proved  to  be  absolutely  useless  and  worthless  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  policy.  Its 
efficacy  was  tested  in  the  five  years  following  the 
conclusion  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  but  it  was 
found  wanting. 

The  hollowness  of  the  profession  for  the  Open 
Door  in  China  and  for  her  independence  and  in- 
tegrity became  all  the  more  glaring  with  the  con- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   63 

elusion  of  secret  agreements  between  Japan  and 
Russia,  first  in  1907,  and  again  in  1910.  The  se- 
cret agreement  of  1907  was  entered  into  at  the 
same  time  as  the  public  agreement  of  that  year. 
Its  principal  obiject  was  to  delimit  the  respective 
spheres  of  interest  or  influence  of  Japan  and  Russia 
in  Manchuria.  The  secret  agreement  of  1910  sup- 
plemented the  public  agreement  of  the  same  year, 
which  was  entered  into  by  Japan  and  Russia  as  a 
direct  answer  to  the  challenge  which  the  American 
Secretary  offered  in  the  form  of  a  proposal  for 
the  neutralisation  of  railways  in  Manchuria.  Be- 
sides reaffirming  their  respective  spheres  in  Man- 
churia, the  secret  agreement  provided  for  the 
maintenance  of  their  acquired  interests  even  at  the 
risk  of  resorting  to  force. 


IV 

THE  THIRD  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE 

WHILE  busily  engaged  in  the  gigantic  task 
of  empire-building  in  Korea,  and  thor- 
oughly occupied  in  her  process  of  peace- 
ful penetration  in  Manchuria,  Japan  was  not 
unmindful  of  the  fact  that  her  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  concluded  on  August  12,  1905,  required  a 
careful  revision  in  order  to  meet  the  important  po- 
litical changes  that  had  taken  place  in  the  Far  East 
in  the  five  or  six  years  following  the  conclusion  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  conflict. 

It  should  be  recalled,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
second  alliance  was  signed  before  Japan  and  Russia 
agreed  upon  the  terms  of  peace  as  finally  embodied 
in  the  Portsmouth  Treaty.  Between  the  two  Pow- 
ers, technically  speaking,  the  war  was  still  going 
on,  and  peace  had  not  yet  been  concluded.  The 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  of  1905  was  entered  into 
flagrante  hello.  This  fact  accounted  for  the  pres- 
ence of  the  sixth  article  in  the  alliance  treaty,  which 
provided  for  the  continuous  maintenance  of  neu- 
trality by  Great  Britain  if  no  other  Power  should 
join  in  hostilities  against  Japan.  With  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace  at  Portsmouth,  this  provision  became 
no  longer  useful  as  it  was  no  longer  applicable. 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE       65 

And  it  must  be  noted  that  the  defeat  of  Russia 
was  in  itself  an  important  change  in  the  diplomatic 
situation  in  the  Far  East.  Instead  of  being  a 
menace  to  the  British  interests  in  Northern  China, 
in  India,  and  in  the  Middle  East,  Russia,  through 
her  readiness  to  forget  the  past  and  willingness  to 
reconcile  with  former  foes, — ^became  a  fast  friend, 
not  only  of  Japan,  but  also  of  Great  Britain.  The 
Russo-Japanese  agreements  of  1907  and  1910  and 
the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  1907  show  more 
than  anything  else  the  radical  change  of  heart  and 
policy  on  the  part  of  Russia.  The  conclusion  in 
1907  of  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  settled  once 
forever  the  outstanding  disputes  regarding  their 
mutual  interests  in  the  Near  East  and  Middle  East 
and  removed  the  traditional  Russian  menace  to 
India.  The  second  alliance  was  partly  directed 
against  Russia,  and  the  provision  for  "the  security 
of  the  Indian  frontier"  had  apparently  the  Russian 
menace  in  view.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out 
that  such  a  provision,  with  a  friendly  Russia  in  the 
North,  would  be  meaningless. 

But  the  most  radical  change  in  the  political  situa- 
tion in  the  Far  East  was  the  annexation  of  Korea 
by  Japan  in  1910,  which,  according  to  the  contem- 
porary interpretations  given  by  the  press  in  the 
Orient,  was  the  direct  result  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
agreement  of  that  year.  It  should  be  recalled  that 
in  the  second  alliance  treaty,  Japan  was  recognised 
to  have  possessed  "paramoimt  political,  military, 


66  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

and  economic  interests  in  Korea,"  and  the  right  to 
take  such  measures  for  the  guidance,  control,  and 
protection  of  the  kingdom.  And  the  measure  which 
Japan  deemed  proper  and  necessary  for  the  purpose 
was  annexation.  With  the  Hermit  Kingdom  be- 
coming an  integral  part  of  the  Japanese  Empire, 
such  a  recognition  by  Great  Britain  as  found  in 
the  alliance  agreement  would  be  not  only  unneces- 
sary, but  entirely  superfluous.  It  was  highly  de- 
sirable that  all  these  provisions  should  be  elimi- 
nated from  the  agreement,  as  they  were  no  longer 
applicable  or  useful.  Thus,  on  July  13,  1911,  a  new 
alliance  was  concluded  at  London,  the  object  of 
which  was,  like  that  of  the  second  alliance,  to  main- 
tain the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and  India, 
to  insure  the  independence  and  integrity  of  China 
and  the  Open  Door  policy,  and  to  preserve  the  ter- 
ritorial rights  of  the  Contracting  Parties  in  the  re- 
gions of  Eastern  Asia  and  India  and  their  special 
interests  in  those  regions. 

In  view,  however,  of  the  readiness  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain  to  accept  without  protest  the  secret 
agreements  which  Japan,  her  ally,  had  entered  into 
with  Russia  in  1907  and  in  1910  and  which,  as  we 
have  pointed  out  in  the  previous  chapter,  were 
hardly  in  accord  with  the  Open  Door  principle  but 
clearly  in  violation  of  the  integrity  of  China,  it  was 
difficult  to  understand  how  these  two  Powers  could 
thus  brazenly  pronounce  to  the  world  that  the  main- 
tenance of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  in 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   67 

China  and  of  her  integrity  was  included  among  the 
objects  of  the  alliance.  Did  not  the  Contracting 
Parties  rely  for  their  bold  but  meaningless  asser- 
tion upon  the  assurance  that  the  Russo-Japanese 
secret  agreement  of  1907  and  of  1910  would  remain 
forever  a  secret?  Or  were  they  quite  aware  that 
the  profession  for  the  integrity  of  China  and  the 
Open  Door  policy  was  but  a  meaningless  reitera- 
tion which  was  in  conflict  with  their  secret  engage- 
ments and  understandings?  They  were  either  pre- 
suming too  much  upon  the  general  ignorance  of 
the  world  or  dishonest  to  themselves.  In  one  case 
they  deliberately  entered  into  an  engagement  which 
they  knew  was  impossible  of  fulfilment,  and  in  the 
other  they  undertook  to  do  something  for  China  and 
for  the  rest  of  the  world  which  they  never  had  any 
honest  intention  of  doing.  The  alliance  might  serve 
to  consolidate  the  general  peace  in  the  region  of 
Asia  and  India  and  to  maintain  the  territorial  rights 
and  special  interests  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  in  those  regions.  To  say  that  it  would 
also  serve  to  preserve  "the  common  interests  of 
all  the  Powers  in  China"  by  insuring  her  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  and  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunities  is  to  attribute  to  the  alliance  a 
virtue  not  intended  even  by  its  Contracting  Pow- 
ers. • 
The  real  object  of  the  third  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  was,  however,  to  be  found  in  the  desire  of 
the  British  Government  to  make  it  clear  that  the 


68  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

alliance,  if  it  was  to  be  continued,  should  not  and 
could  not  be  held  to  apply  in  case  of  an  armed  con- 
flict between  Japan  on  the  one  side  and  the  United 
States  on  the  other.  This  exception  was  deemed 
necessary  by  the  British  Government  for  reasons 
of  State,  and  the  necessity  became  all  the  more  ap- 
parent to  the  British  Government  when  it  found 
that  the  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  were  none  too  cordial  and  that  Japan,  as  an 
answer  to  the  American  proposal  for  the  neutrali- 
sation of  the  Manchurian  railways,  did  not  hesitate 
in  1910  to  conclude  a  secret  agreement  amounting 
to  a  defensive  alliance  with  Russia,  which  had  un- 
deniably the  United  States  in  view.  The  British 
Government  had,  for  this  reason,  considered  a  re- 
vision of  the  alliance  so  as  to  make  it  inapplicable 
in  case  of  difficulties  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States.  The  opportunity  did  not  present  itself  until 
at  the  end  of  1910  or  at  the  beginning  of  1911, 
when  President  Taft  urged  the  conclusion  of  gen- 
eral Arbitration  Treaties  with  all  the  Powers  of 
the  world.  An  Arbitration  Treaty  was  being  nego- 
tiated between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
and  another  one  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  such  general  ar- 
bitration arrangements  would  conflict  with  the  obli- 
gations of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  "Our  sub- 
sisting alliance  with  Japan,*'  observed  the  London 
Times  editorially,  July  10,  1911,  "binds  us  to  come 
to  her  assistance  in  the  cases  defined,  and  it  remains 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   69 

in  force  until  1915.  Any  such  alliance  manifestly 
conflicts  with  any  general  arbitration  treaty  with 
a  third  Power.  The  difficulty  would  never  be  likely 
to  arise  in  practice,  for,  in  spite  of  the  occasional 
wild  talk  of  Chauvinists,  responsible  statesmen  on 
both  sides  of  the  Pacific  are  unanimous  in  regard- 
ing as  inconceivable  any  development  in  which  our 
obligations  under  the  alliance  would  conflict  with 
those  under  the  proposed  Arbitration  Treaty.  We 
all  know  that  our  Japanese  allies  are  as  anxious 
as  we  are  to  live  on  friendly  terms  with  the  United 
States  and  to  see  us  on  friendly  terms  with  them; 
and  we  have  no  doubt  that  the  successful  conclu- 
sion of  the  present  negotiations  will  be  sincerely 
welcomed  in  Japan.  Nevertheless,  the  formal  con- 
tradiction between  the  two  treaties  is  not  to  be  gain- 
said. Happily  our  relations  with  Japan  are  such 
that  should  it  be  thought  desirable,  there  would  be 
no  difficulty  in  agreeing  upon  some  modification  in 
the  wording  of  the  Treaty  of  alliance  that  would 
do  away  with  the  incongruity."  And  it  may  be 
added  that  the  conclusion  of  a  general  Arbitra- 
tion Treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  or  between  the  United  States  and  Japan, 
was  something  more  than  mere  incongruity.  Bound 
as  they  were  by  the  alliance  subsisting  between 
them,  Japan  and  Great  Britain  would,  naturally  and 
very  logically,  be  confronted  with  conflicting  obli- 
gations which  they  could  not  fulfil  at  one  and  the 
same  time.     It  was  not  only  desirable,  but  highly 


70  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

necessary,  therefore,  that  this  possibiHty  of  con- 
flicting obligations  should  be  eliminated. 

It  was  with  the  removal  of  this  embarrassment 
in  view  that  the  Governments  of  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  began  negotiations  for  the  revision  of  the 
alliance.  The  discussion  of  the  revision  could  not, 
of  course,  be  confined  to  the  mere  phraseology  of 
the  alliance.  It  was  sure  to  raise  the  infinitely  more 
important  question  of  its  prolongation.  At  that 
time,  it  should  be  recalled  that  the  Prime  Ministers 
of  the  self-governing  Dominions  were  assembled 
in  London  for  Imperial  Conference.  The  British j 
Government  seized  this  precious  opportunity  to  dis 
cuss  with  them  the  general  principles  of  British 
foreign  policy  and  to  secure  from  them  the  unani- 
mous approval  of  the  revision  and  renewal  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  "The  Government  lai 
the  general  principles  of  our  foreign  policy  fully 
and  plainly  before  their  colleagues  from  oversea  in 
the  confidential  sittings  with  the  Defence  Commit- 
tee," the  London  Times  commented  in  an  editorial, 
July  13,  1911.  "There  was  a  free  interchange  of 
views  upon  these  high  matters,  amongst  which  the 
Japanese  alliance  stands  prominent,  at  these  sit- 
tings ;  and  it  is  clear  that,  when  the  Dominion  Min- 
isters had  heard  the  statements  and  the  explana- 
tions made  to  them,  they  were  satisfied  that  this 
policy  is  the  best  that  could  be  devised  in  the  last- 
ing interests  of  the  Empire  as  a  whole  and  of  each 
of   its  constituent  units.     Any   new   arrangement 


le 

1 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   71 

now  made  with  Japan,  or  any  modification  of  our 
present  arrangement  with  her,  will  be  made  with 
the  new  authority  and  the  new  moral  force  given 
to  it  by  the  previous  assent  of  all  the  self -govern- 
ing Dominions."  And  it  was  with  this  assent  that 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  Baron  T.  Kato,  Japanese  Am- 
bassador at  London,  signed  on  July  13,  1911,  the 
third  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  of  which  the  fourth 
Article  was  easily  the  most  important.  It  provided 
that  should  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
conclude  a  treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  a  third 
Power,  the  said  party  would  not  be  obliged  to  go 
to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such  an  arbi- 
tration treaty  was  in  force. 

It  has  generally  been  assumed  that  Great  Britain 
first  proposed  this  revision.  The  truth  is  other- 
wise, however.  Viscount  Ishii,  who  came  to  the 
United  States  at  the  head  of  a  Special  Mission  in 
1917  and  who  took  part  in  the  revision  of  the  al- 
liance in  1911,  was  responsible  for  the  statement 
that  Japan  had  taken  the  initiative  in  the  matter. 
In  a  speech  before  the  National  Press  Qub  at 
Washington,  September  21,  1917,  Viscount  Ishii 
said:  "Let  me  tell  you  a  little  piece  of  secret  his- 
tory. When  it  became  known  to  us  that  the  Ameri- 
can and  British  Governments  were  alike  desirous 
of  entering  into  a  general  treaty  of  arbitration,  but 
that  they  found  the  making  of  such  a  treaty  was 
precluded  by  the  terms  of  the  British  alliance  with 


72  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

Japan  as  they  then  stood,  it  was  not  with  the  con- 
sent of  Japan,  but  it  was  because  of  Japan's  spon- 
taneous offer  that  the  stipulations  of  the  alliance 
were  revised  so  that  no  obstacle  might  be  put  in 
the  way  of  the  proposed  treaty.  As  you  know, 
Article  IV  of  the  new  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  now 
in  effect  excludes  the  United  States  from  its  opera- 
tion. This  is  a  true  account  of  the  genesis  of  that 
clause.  ...  It  was  my  good  fortune  to  be  in  the 
Foreign  Office  at  Tokio  at  the  time  of  the  revision 
of  the  Treaty  of  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  and, 
modest  as  was  the  part  I  took  therein,  I  can  give 
you  the  personal  and  emphatic  assurance  that  there 
was  at  that  time  no  one  in  the  Government  or 
among  the  public  of  Japan  opposed  to  the  terms 
of  that  revision." 

Was  it  really  true  that  "at  that  time  no  one  in 
the  Government  or  among  the  public  of  Japan  op- 
posed to  the  terms  of  that  revision?"  Of  course, 
officials  of  the  Japanese  Government  would  have 
very  little  to  say;  at  least,  not  publicly.  But  the 
Japanese  press,  muzzled  though  it  was,  then  as  it 
is  now,  could  not  be  kept  permanently  silent.  We 
have  here  at  least  one  editorial  comment  on  the 
subject  by  a  Japanese  paper,  which  is  interesting, 
not  only  for  the  views  it  expressed,  but  also  for  the 
fairly  accurate  prediction  which  it  ventured.  The 
Yorodzu  regarded  the  renewed  and  revised  pact  as 
a  "diplomatic  blunder"  of  the  Japanese  Government 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   73 

(of  the  Katsura  Cabinet)  and  commented  on  it  in 
the  following  language: 

"The  revised  treaty  of  alliance  makes  Japan  a  ludi- 
crous figure.  She  is  required  to  stand  guard  to  India 
and  British  interests  in  China  without  receiving  any 
return  from  England.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  re- 
newal and  the  revision  of  the  alliance  was  made  at 
the  initiative  of  Downing  Street.  Our  diplomats  have 
the  peculiar  virtue  of  being  passive  and  of  following 
the  lead  of  other  nations  endowed  with  greater  diplo- 
matic finesse.  Th  alliance  is  to  remain  binding  for 
ten  years  from  now.  Just  wait  ten  years.  Before 
that  period  expires,  England  will  have  found  or  created 
a  chance  to  clasp  hands  with  Germany,  while  her  col- 
onies bordering  the  Pacific  will  have  augmented  their 
armaments  to  such  an  extent  that  they  will  no  longer 
be  haunted  by  the  spectre  of  a  Japanese  invasion.  Until 
such  a  stage  is  reached,  Great  Britain  needs  Japanese 
co-operation.  But  when  once  that  stage  is  reached, 
British  interests  in  China  will  no  longer  be  threatened 
by  Germany,  while  the  British  fleet,  freed  of  anxiety 
over  the  activities  of  the  Kaiser's  navy,  will  be  able  to 
leave  home  waters  and  protect  the  colonies.  Then  it 
is  time  that  John  Bull  would  throw  the  alliance  over- 
board." 

This  prophecy  was  made  ten  years  ago,  when  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  revised  and  renewed 
for  the  second  time.  In  the  light  of  the  events  that 
have  taken  place  since  then,  it  is  easy  to  appreciate 
how  near  the  prophecy  has  come  to  be  true.    Be- 


74  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

fore  the  alliance  has  expired,  Great  Britain,  instead 
of  finding  or  creating  "a  chance  to  clasp  hands  with 
Germany,"  has,  tog-ether  with  the  allied  Powers, 
defeated  Germany  in  such  a  way  that  she  cannot 
prove  to  be  a  menace  again.     German  interests  in 
the  Orient  have  been  practically  wiped  out,  and  the 
German  fleet  has  been  reduced  to  a  negligible  quan- 
tity.    Thus,  within  the  life  term  of  the  alliance. 
Great  Britain  has  reached  the  stage  when  or  where 
she  ceases  to  be  haunted  by  a  spectre  of  a  Japanese 
or  German  invasion.     British  interests  in  the  Far 
East  are  no  longer  threatened  by  Germany,  and 
her   colonies   in   the   Pacific,   which   have   always 
dreaded  of  a  Japanese  invasion,  have  found  them- 
selves now  greatly  relieved,  not  only  by  the  increase 
of  their  own  armaments,  but  also  by  the  fact  that 
the  British  fleet,  freed  of  the  duty  to  counter  the 
German  menace  in  the  North  Sea,  is  able  to  leave 
home  waters   for  the  protection  of  the  colonies. 
With  this  vital   change  of  circumstances,  all  the 
reasons  which  had  possibly  prompted  Great  Britain 
to  revise  and  to  renew  the  alliance  in  1911  have 
disappeared,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  or 
not   *'Jdhn   Bull   would   throw   the  alliance   over- 
board.'' 

The  misgivings  which  Japanese  newspapers  had 
entertained  in  1911  about  the  revised  compact,  were, 
however,  a  little  premature.  It  was  then  suspected 
that,  as  far  as  the  United  States  was  concerned, 
the  alliance  was  emasculated  by  the  insertion  of 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   75 

Article  IV,  exempting  either  contracting  party  to 
go  to  war  with  a  Power  with  whom  there  was  in 
existence  a  treaty  of  general  arbitration.  On  the 
contrary,  the  alliance  was  not  deprived  of  its  ef- 
ficacy. The  treaty  of  general  arbitration  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  in  anticipa- 
tion of  the  conclusion  of  which  the  alliance  was 
revised,  was  not  ratified  by  the  Senate.  The  result 
is  that,  since  1911,  there  has  been  no  agreement  or 
convention  in  existence  between  the  two  countries 
that  can  be  regarded  as  within  the  definition  of  a 
treaty  of  general  arbitration.  The  obligation  of 
Great  Britain  to  come  to  Japan's  assistance  has 
never  been  affected. 

The  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  has  now  already 
reached  its  stipulated  term  of  ten  years,  and  it 
would  have  lapsed  had  it  not  been  for  the  self- 
extending  clause  in  the  treaty.  In  the  Summer  of 
1920,  the  renewal  of  the  alliance  was  considered 
by  the  Governments  of  Japan  and  Great  Britain. 
Owing  to  the  desire  on  the  part  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment to  consult  the  opinions  of  the  Dominions 
about  the  continuation  of  the  alliance,  no  definite 
decision  was  reached.  It  was  officially  announced, 
however,  that  the  alliance  was  found  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  League  of  Nations,  in  letter,  if  not 
in  spirit.  "The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and 
Japan,"  reads  the  official  communication  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  League,  which  was  signed  by  Lord 
Curzon  and  Viscount  Chinda,  and  dated  July  8, 


1(>  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1920,  "have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  agreement  of  July  13,  1911,  now  existing 
between  the  two  countries,  though  in  harmony  with 
the  spirit  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, is  not  entirely  consistent  with  the  letter  of 
that  Covenant,  which  both  Governments  desire 
earnestly  to  respect.  They  accordingly  have  the 
honour  jointly  to  inform  the  League  that  they  rec- 
ognise the  principle  that  if  the  said  agreement  be 
continued  after  July,  1921,  it  must  be  in  a  form 
which  is  not  inconsistent  with  that  Covenant."  In 
other  words,  the  alliance  was  by  mutual  agreement 
between  the  Japanese  and  British  Governments  per- 
mitted to  run  for  another  year,  and  if  it  were  con- 
tinued after  July,  1921,  they  would  so  revise  its 
terms  as  to  be  consistent  with  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  in  letter  as  well  as  in  spirit. 

This  joint  communication  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
League  was  held  by  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown, 
Sir  Gordon  Hewart  and  Sir  Ernest  Pollock,  as  con- 
stituting a  denunciation  of  the  alliance;  and  accord- 
ingly, if  this  view  had  prevailed,  the  alliance  would 
have  ceased  to  exist,  by  July  8,  1921 — "one  year 
from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  shall  have  denounced  it."  But 
Lord  Birkenhead  took  a  different  position.  On 
July  3,  1921,  when  the  Dominion  Premiers  delib- 
erating on  the  alliance  were  unable  to  reach  a  de- 
cision as  to  its  renewal  or  non-renewal,  and  when 
Premier  Lloyd  George  was  about  to  propose  that 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   11 

the  operation  of  the  alliance  should  be  extended  for 
a  period  of  three  months  for  the  purpose  of  allow- 
ing a  full  discussion  on  its  disposal,  the  Lord  High 
Chancellor  made  the  eleventh-hour  ruling  (though 
it  might  seem  very  timely  to  some  British  states- 
men) that  the  joint  note  sent  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  July  8,  1920,  did  not  con- 
stitute a  "denunciation"  and  that  the  alliance  would, 
therefore,  automatically  remain  in  force. 

In  this  ruling,  both  the  Governments  of  Japan 
and  Great  Britain  acquiesced.  Accordingly,  on  July 
7,  1921,  another  joint  communication  was  des- 
patched to  the  Secretary  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
announcing  that  the  contracting  parties  of  the  al- 
liance had  agreed  that,  in  case  of  inconsistency,  the 
procedure  prescribed  by  the  League  would  take  the 
place  of  the  procedure  prescribed  by  the  alliance. 
The  communication  reads: 

"Whereas  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  and 
Japan  informed  the  League  of  Nations  in  their  joint 
notification  of  8th  July,  1920,  that  they  recognised  the 
principle  that  if  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  agree- 
ment of  13th  July,  1911,  is  continued  after  July,  1921, 
it  must  be  in  a  form  which  is  not  inconsistent  with 
the  Covenant  of  the  League,  they  hereby  notify  the 
League,  pending  further  action,  that  they  are  agreed 
that  if  any  situation  arises  whilst  the  agreement  re- 
mains in  force  in  which  the  procedure  prescribed  by 
the  terms  of  the  agreement  is  inconsistent  with  the 
procedure  prescribed  by  the  Covenant  of  the  League 


78  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

of  Nations,  then  the  procedure  prescribed  by  the  said 
Covenant  shall  be  adopted  and  shall  prevail  over  that 
prescribed  by  the  agreement." 

Until  it  is  denounced  by  both  or  either  of  its 
contracting  parties,  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  as 
it  stands  to-day,  will  remain  in  force  indefinitely. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  ANGLO- 
JAPANESE  ALLIANCE 

A  CLOSE  study  of  the  history  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  such  as 
presented  in  the  preceding  chapters,  must  lead 
inevitably  to  the  conclusion  that  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  are  intimately  involved.  The 
very  fact  that  Japan  and  Great  Britain  saw  fit  to 
attempt  to  exempt  the  United  States  from  the  op- 
eration of  the  alliance  when  they  were  engaged  in 
revising  and  renewing  it  in  1911  is  an  unmistakable 
recognition  by  the  Contracting  Powers  of  the  in- 
terests which  the  United  States  has  had  in  the  al- 
liance. The  most  cordial  sentiments  which  the 
Dominion  statesmen  have  publicly  expressed  for 
America  and  their  insistence  upon  American  co- 
operation in  settling  the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern 
problems  are  additional  proofs  of  the  fact  that,  of 
the  disposition  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  to 
renew  or  not  to  renew,  the  United  States  is  by  no 
means  an  indifferent  spectator.  Officially,  not  a 
word  has  been  said  or  heard  that  would  indicate 
that  the  United  States  is  opposed  to  the  continua- 
tion of  the  alliance.  Much  of  the  opposition  has 
found  expression  in  the  American  newspapers  only. 

79 


80  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  as  to  where  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  stands  on  the 
question.  If  its  views  have  not  been  expressed 
before,  it  is  because  they  will  be  expressed  at  a  con- 
venient opportunity  when  they  can  count  most. 

The  interests  of  the  United  States  in  the  future 
of  the  alliance  grow  out  of  the  possibilities  of  dan- 
ger which  its  renewal  will  naturally  imply,  and  of 
the  important  and  vital  bearing  which  it  will  surely 
have  upon  the  American-British  relations  in  the 
future,  upon  the  question  of  limitation  of  arma- 
ment, and  upon  the  American  policy  in  the  Pacific 
and  the  Far  East.  For  almost  twenty  years,  the 
alliance  has  existed;  but  it  was  not  imtil  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  when  Japan 
began  to  follow  the  very  same  aggressive  designs 
upon  Manchuria  and  Korea  for  which  she  had 
fought  Russia,  that  the  people  in  the  United  States 
commenced  to  ask  whether  the  alliance  was  not 
being  used  for  purposes  diametrically  opposed  to 
those  mentioned  in  its  preamble.  In  1902,  when 
the  alliance  was  entered  into  for  the  first  time,  the 
United  States  welcomed  it  as  a  potential  force  in 
adjusting  the  political  balance  of  the  Far  East. 
When  'the  alliance  was  revised  and  renewed  in 
1905,  the  attitude  of  the  American  people  was  cold, 
but  not  hostile.  A  few  years  later,  when  Japan, 
intoxicated  by  her  victorious  struggle  against  Rus- 
sia, attempted  to  close  the  "open  door"  in  Man- 
churia, the  United  States  began  to  suspect  the  use- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   81 

fulness  of  the  alliance.  This  suspicion  assumed  the 
form  of  apprehension  in  1907-8,  when  the  Ameri- 
can-Japanese relations  became  greatly  strained  ow- 
ing to  the  San  Francisco  school  children  question 
— so  much  so  that  President  Roosevelt  sent  the 
American  battle  fleet  to  the  Far  East,  ostensibly 
on  a  practising  cruise.  Hurriedly,  the  alliance  was 
revised  again  in  1911,  and  according  to  Viscount 
Ishii  whom  we  have  quoted  before,  this  was  done 
in  order  to  exempt  the  United  States  from  the 
operation  of  the  alliance.  Now  the  instrument  has 
reached  its  stipulated  term  of  ten  years;  it  is  due 
for  renewal  or  denunciation.  What  Japan  has  done 
under  the  cloak  of  the  alliance  within  the  last  ten 
years  is  a  long  story  which  it  is  not  necessary  to 
go  into  here.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  with 
the  United  States,  the  alliance  has  grown  less  and 
less  in  favour,  not  only  because  Japan  has  failed 
to  accomplish  what  has  been  expected  of  her,  but 
also  because  she  has  done  what  is  contrary  to  the 
professed  objects  of  the  alliance. 

While  the  official  attitude  of  the  United  States 
has  never  yet  been  made  known,  it  is  no  secret  that 
the  sentiment  of  the  American  people  is  uniformly 
against  the  continuation  of  the  alliance.  Japanese 
publicists  have  professed  inability  to  see  why  the 
American  people  should  oppose  the  renewal  of  the 
alliance  which  deos  not  directly  concern  them,  and 
of  which  they  are  not  a  contracting  party.  When 
the  situation  is  carefully  surveyed  and  analysed, 


82  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

however,  it  is  not  so  difficult  as  the  Japanese  writers 
have  thought  to  understand  why  the  American 
people,  taken  as  a  whole,  overwhelmingly  oppose 
the  extension  of  the  alliance,  either  in  its  present 
form  or  with  suitable  modifications.  Their  an- 
tagonism rests  upon  a  number  of  reasons,  the  most 
important  of  which  are:  (1)  the  belief  that  the 
alliance  has  served  its  original  purpose  and  is  no 
longer  in  harmony  with  the  new  international  order 
of  affairs;  (2)  the  suspicion  which  they  have  to- 
wards Japan  as  a  nation;  (3)  the  fear  of  future 
difficulties  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
over  the  immigration  question;  (4)  the  possibility 
of  using  the  alliance  as  it  has  been  used  in  the  past 
as  a  shield  behind  which  to  hide  designs  upon  China 
contrary  to  the  Open  Door  principle;  (5)  the  fear 
that  a  renewal  of  the  alliance  will  result  in  com- 
petition in  armament  between  the  United  States 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Japan  and  Great  Britain  on 
the  other,  and  thus  menace  the  British-American 
relationship,  and  (6)  finally,  the  belief,  amounting 
almost  to  conviction,  that  the  alliance  will  be  di- 
rected against  the  United  States,  protestations  by 
statesmen  of  Japan  and  Great  Britain  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding. 

It  is  admitted  on  all  hands  that  the  alliance  has 
outlived  its  usefulness,  and  that  with  the  present 
day  world  conditions  brought  about  as  a  result  of 
the  European  War,  it  is  no  longer  in  harmony. 
Russia,  who  was  the  objective  of  the  first  two  al- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   83 

liances,  has  been  paralysed  by  her  internal  disturb- 
ances, and  yet  for  another  score  of  years  she  is  not 
likely  to  resume  her  old  vigour  and  to  take  a  com- 
manding place  in  the  council  of  nations.  In  fact, 
because  of  the  understandings  reached  between  Rus- 
sia on  the  one  side  and  Japan  and  Great  Britain  on 
the  other,  the  so-called  Russian  menace  has  since 
1907  ceased  to  be  the  raison  d'etre  of  the  alliance. 
When  it  was  revised  and  extended  in  1911,  it  had 
Germany,  instead  of  Russia,  as  its  potential  enemy. 
The  withdrawal  of  the  British  squadron  from  the 
Far  Eastern  waters,  made  necessary  by  the  concen- 
tration of  British  naval  forces  in  the  North  Sea, 
is  an  indication  at  once  of  the  limited  use  which 
Great  Britain  had  made  of  the  alliance,  and  of  the 
potential  enemy  against  whom  it  was  supposed  to 
operate.  Japan's  participation  in  the  European 
War  in  1914  to  fulfil  her  obligations  to  Great 
Britain  as  an  ally  is  another  proof  of  the  fact  that 
the  alliance  was  directed  against  Germany.  The 
result  of  the  European  conflict  is  such  that  to-day 
Germany  has  ceased  to  be  a  factor  of  international 
politics  in  the  Far  East.  Her  erstwhile  strong 
navy  has  been  destroyed;  her  colonial  possessions 
have  been  all  taken  away  from  her;  in  short,  Ger- 
many to-day  is  bereft  of  all  the  possibilities  to  be- 
come a  danger  either  to  Great  Britain  in  Europe 
or  to  Japan  in  the  Far  East.  Where  is,  therefore, 
the  raison  d'etre  of  the  alliance  to-day?  Obviously, 
the  instrument  has  served  its  purpose,  and  in  the 


84  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

present  day  international  situation  its  continuance 
is  no  longer  necessary. 

Ever  since  1905  when  she  won  the  victorious 
war  against  Russia,  Japan  has  been  suspected  by 
the  American  people,  as  by  the  rest  of  the  world, 
of  harbouring  imperialistic  ambitions  and  sinister 
designs  in  the  Far  East  and  in  the  Pacific.  This 
stispicion  has  been  greatly  strengthened,  first  by  her 
annexation  of  Korea;  then  by  her  repeated  at- 
tempts to  close  the  Open  Door  in  Manchuria,  by 
her  forcible  occupation  of  Chinese  territory  and 
seizure  of  German  possessions  in  the  Pacific,  then 
by  her  excessive  demands  upon  China,  and  finally 
by  her  forcible  appropriation  of  the  northern  half 
of  Saghalien  and  the  eastern  coast  of  Siberia.  The 
Yap  dispute  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
has  further  contributed  to  the  feeling  of  distrust 
which  the  American  people  have  always  had  to- 
wards the  Japanese  as  a  nation.  It  has  been  gen- 
erally believed  here  in  the  United  States  that  the 
alliance  has  been  employed  by  Japan  for  the  pur- 
pose of  territorial  aggrandisement,  and  that  if  it 
were  renewed,  it  would  merely  add  momentum  to 
her  expansion  movement  which  requires  immediate 
checking  as  it  is. 

And  then  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States,  there  is  always  this 
question  of  immigration  which  has  not  yet  been 
settled  and  which  is  not  likely  to  be  settled  yet  for 
a  long  time.     The  United  States  will  continue  to 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   85 

prohibit  Japanese  immigration,  the  Western  States 
will  continue  to  legislate  against  the  Japanese  al- 
ready in  this  country,  and  Japan  will  continue  to 
harp  on  the  theme  of  "race  equality.'*  Serious  dif- 
ficulties may  easily  arise  over  this  question  between 
Japan  and  United  States.  With  the  Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance  renewed,  it  is  easy  to  see  the  possi- 
bility of  its  being  made  use  of  in  such  difficulties. 
Even  EreinierJIughes  of  ^Australia,  who__advo- 
cates  the  extension  of  the  alliance  in  a  modified 
form,  sees  the  possibility  of  the  Commonwealth 
being  overrun  by  the  Japanese  under  the  aegis  of 
the  alliance,  and  therefore  insists  upon  the  policy 
of  "white  Australia"  as  a  necessary  condition  for 
the  continuation  of  the  alliance.  Premier  Massey 
of  New  Zealand,  who  supports  Premier  Hughes  in 
his  advocacy  for  the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  sup- 
ports him  also  for  the  exclusion  of  the  Japanese. 
Is  it  any  wonder  that,  while  the  Dominion  states- 
men who  are  in  favour  of  the  alliance  see  trouble 
ahead,  the  American  people  who  are  opposed  to  it 
should  also  take  into  serious  consideration  possible 
difficulties  between  Japan  and  United  States  over 
the  immigration  question  ?  * 

*  A  writer  in  Current  History,  August,  1921,  on  the  Menace 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  makes  the  point  that  Japan's 
policy  in  regard  to  the  so-called  "California  issue"  is  a  mere 
cloak  to  cover  her  ambitious  designs  in  the  Far  East.  "This 
issue,  like  that  of  race  equality  in  general,  is  being  used  by 
Japan  merely  as  a  smoke  screen  to  hide  her  actions  in  the 
Far  East,  and  to  imbue  the  populace  of  Japan  with  a  strong 
hatred  of  America  as  a  popular  pretext  for  war.  Her  loud 
protestations    about   the    California    issue   are   answered    by 


86  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

There  is  another  angle  from  which  the  question 
of  the  renewal  or  non-renewal  of  the  Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance  has  been  viewed  in  the  United  States. 
It  has  been  held  that  within  the  last  ten  or  more 
years  Japan  has  used  the  alliance  as  a  cloak  to  cover 
her  sinister  designs  in  China,  which  are  contrary 
to  the  Open  Door  policy  and  to  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity  for  industrial  and  economic  un- 
dertakings for  all  nations  in  the  world.  Instances 
are  not  wanting  to  show  that  the  alliance,  in  spite 
of  its  avowed  object  of  preserving  "the  common 
interests  of  all  the  Powers,"  has  been  relied  upon 
to  extend  or  to  protect  exclusive  Japanese  interests 
in  China.  We  need  only  refer  to  two  well-known 
cases  in  which  American  interests  were  involved. 
The  first  is  the  so-called  Chinchow-Aigun  Railway 
dispute.  On  October  2,  1909,  a  preliminary  con- 
tract Vas  entered  into  by  the  Viceroy  of  Manchuria 
and  the  Governor  of  Fengtien  on  the  one  side,  and 
the  American  Banking  Group  *  and  Pauling  & 
Company  (British)  on  the  other,  for  the  financing, 
construction,  and  operation  of  a  railway  from  Chin- 


merely  pointing  to  the  fact  that  Japan  herself  does  not  allow 
foreigners  to  become  citizens  or  hold  land,  does  not  allow 
them  even  to  become  labourers  or  engage  in  any  business. 
Many  Americans  now  realise  that  Japan  is  harping  on  the 
California  issue  to  keep  America's  attention  from  the  Far 
East,  just  as  she  harped  on  the  issue  of  race  equality  at  the 
Peace  Conference  to  keep  the  world's  attention  from  the  issue 
of  Shantung." 

*J.  P.  Morgan  &  Company,  Kuhn,  Loeb  &  Company,  the 
First  National  Bank,  and  the  National  City  Bank  of  New 
York,  constituted  the  American  Group. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   87 

chow  to  Aigun.  Secretary  Knox,  in  a  memorandum 
to  the  British  Government,  said :  "The  Government 
of  the  United  States  is  prepared  cordially  to  co- 
operate with  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government 
in  diplomatically  supporting  and  facilitating  this 
enterprise,  so  important  alike  to  the  progress  and 
to  the  commercial  development  of  China."  This 
enthusiastic  overture  by  the  American  Secretary  of 
State  elicited  but  a  qualified  acquiescence  in  the 
scheme  from  the  British  Government.  In  the  mean- 
time, Japan  objected  to  the  construction  of  the  line. 
Russia,  who  was  always  hand  in  glove  with  her 
former  enemy,  also  protested  to  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment against  the  scheme.  "British  policy  at  this 
juncture,"  said  an  English  writer  on  Far  Eastern 
questions,  "might  have  served  the  purposes  of  the 
'open  door'  and  international  morality;  but  Down- 
ing Street's  loyalty  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance, 
wherein  lay  clearly  the  line  of  least  resistance,  took 
the  form  of  a  general  acquiescence  in  Japan's  pro- 
ceedings, even  though  these  were  obviously  detri- 
mental to  the  fundamental  objects  for  which  the 
alliance  was  made."  As  a  result,  the  scheme  of 
financing  and  constructing  the  Chinchow-Aigun 
Railway  collapsed  like  a  bubble. 

Closely  connected  with  this  affair  was  the  well- 
known  proposal  by  Secretary  Knox  for  the  com- 
mercial neutralisation  of  Manchurian  railways — a 
proposal  which  was  cordially  welcomed  by  China 
as  a  means  of  putting  an  end  to  the  economic  in- 


88  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

roads  in  Manchuria,  was  accepted  in  principle  by- 
France  and  Great  Britain,  but  was  flatly  rejected  by 
Japan  and  Russia.  Two  suggestions  were  made  by 
the  United  States,  either  of  which,  if  carried  out, 
would  have  safeguarded  China's  sovereignty  over 
Manchuria  and  maintained  the  Open  Door  therein. 
"The  most  effective  way  to  preserve  the  undis- 
turbed enjoyment  by  China  of  all  political  rights 
in  Manchuria  and  to  promote  the  development  of 
those  provinces  under  a  practical  application  of  the 
policy  of  the  Open  Door  and  equal  commercial  op- 
portunity would  be  to  bring  the  Manchurian  high- 
ways, the  railroads,  under  an  economic,  scientific, 
and  impartial  administration  by  some  plan  vesting 
in  China  the  ownership  of  the  railroads  through 
funds  furnished  for  that  purpose  by  the  interested 
Powers  willing  to  participate."  "Should  this  sug- 
gestion not  be  found  feasible  in  its  entirety,  then 
the  desired  end  would  be  approximated,  if  not  at- 
tained, by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  dip- 
lomatically supporting  the  Chinchow-Aigun  ar- 
rangement and  inviting  the  interested  Powers 
friendly  to  complete  commercial  neutralisation  of 
Manchuria  to  participate  in  the  financing  and  con- 
struction of  that  line  and  of  such  additional  lines 
as  future  commercial  development  may  demand, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  supply  funds  for  the  pur- 
chase by  China  of  such  of  the  existing  lines  as 
might  be  offered  for  inclusion  in  this  system."  The 
Chinchow-Aigun  project,  as  we  have  shown,  did 
not  materialise  owing  to  objections  from  Japan  and 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   89 

Russia,  in  which  Great  Britain,  because  of  her  allied 
relationship  with  Japan,  acquiesced.  The  proposal 
for  neutralisation,  however,  met  with  no  better 
fate.  Japan  and  Russia  joined  hands  once  again, 
and  objected  to  the  proposal  on  the  ground  that  if 
it  were  carried  out  it  would  alter  the  statits  quo  in 
Manchuria.  Like  the  Chinchow-Aigun  project, 
therefore,  the  neutralisation  proposal  vanished  into 
thin  air.  This  failure,  it  is  true,  could  not  be  at- 
tributed directly  to  the  existence  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally 
true  that,  had  it  not  been  for  the  alliance.  Great 
Britain  would  have  been  free  to  take  a  stand  against 
the  Russo-Japanese  combination.  In  other  words, 
because  of  her  political  partnership  with  the  Island 
Empire  of  the  Far  East,  Great  Britain  was  tied 
hard  and  fast  to  the  wheels  of  Japanese  diplomacy 
in  China.  The  alliance,  with  the  ostensible  object 
of  preserving  common  interests  of  all  nations  in 
China,  was,  at  least  in  these  two  instances,  nothing 
short  of  an  unsurpassable  barrier  to  the  enjoyment 
by  the  United  States  and  other  Powers  of  equal 
opportunity  in  Manchuria. 

Now,  it  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasised  that 
the  United  States  will  not  yield  an  inch  in  her  in- 
sistence upon  the  Open  Door  policy,  and  will  not 
barter  away  her  rights  to  equal  opportunity  in  China 
(Manchuria  included)  for  any  political  combina- 
tion which  the  other  Powers  may  enter  into  in  the 
furtherance  of  their  own  interests  to  the  exclusion 
of  those  of  the  rest  of  the  world.     It  has  been 


90  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

proved  beyond  doubt  that  the  alliance  between 
Japan  and  Great  Britain  has  been  employed  as  an 
instrument  in  furthering  Japanese  imperialistic  de- 
signs in  China.  To  renew  it  now  will  be  tanta- 
mount to  sanctioning  the  sinister  way  in  which  it 
has  been  made  use  of. 

But  the  more  important  reason  for  objecting  to 
the  continuance  of  the  alliance  even  in  a  modified 
form  is  to  be  found  in  the  general  apprehension 
that  a  renewal  of  the  alliance,  no  matter  whatever 
form  it  may  take  and  whatever  terms  it  may  con- 
tain, will  eventually  result  in  competition  in  arma- 
ment between  the  United  States  on  the  one  hand 
and  Japan  and  Great  Britain  on  the  other.  This 
competition,  as  surely  as  the  sun  rises  in  the  East, 
will  give  birth  to  serious  misunderstandings,  which 
may  result  in  hostilities,  not  only  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States,  but  also  between  the  United 
States  and  England  and  her  Dominions.  One  of 
the  arguments  that  the  Prime  Minister  of  Canada 
has  used  against  the  renewal  of  the  alliance  is  that 
it  would  impede  the  possibiHties  of  an  international 
agreement  for  the  limitation  of  armaments.  And 
it  may  be  added  here,  any  agreement  for  limitation 
of  armament  must  depend  largely  upon  the  readi- 
ness of  the  United  States.  The  United  States  will 
ndt  be  ready  to  limit  her  armament,  until  or  unless 
she  can  reach  a  comprehensive  understanding  with 
England,  with  her  Dominions.  Is  it  at  all  likely 
that  such  an  understanding  can  be  arrived  at  while 


I  AND  THE  ANCxLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   91 

I  Great  Britain  is  in  alliance  with  Japan  who  is  in- 
I  sisting  upon  the  completion  of  her  eight-eight  pro- 
I  gramme  *  and  rapidly  building  up  her  armament  to 
i  equal  that  of  the  United  States?  It  should  always 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  question  of  the  renewal 

*  Under  the  title  "Japan's  Amazing  Naval  Programme," 
the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  made  a  remarkable 
analysis  of  Japan's  naval  preparations  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  European  war,  by  comparing  Japan's  navy  of  to-day 
to  that  of  Germany  before  the  war.  It  may  be  pointed  out 
here  that  Japanese  navy  personnel  is  now  76,000  men,  exceed- 
ing the  total  of  German  navy  in  1915.  The  article  in  question 
reads : 

"The  position  of  the  Japanese  Government  in  regard  to 
disarmament  is  somewhat  equivocal.  But  there  is  nothing 
equivocal  about  the  apparent  desire  of  Japan  to  possess  the 
strongest  navy  in  the  world.  The  policy  prompted  by  such  a 
desire  seems  to  external  observation  to  be  as  ruinous  as  it  is 
uncalled  for,  and  one  of  the  good  results  of  such  a  confer- 
ence as  that  for  which  Senator  Borah's  resolution  provides 
would  be  to  ehcit  an  intelligible  explanation  from  Japan  as 
to  the  purpose  of  the  tremendous  naval  programme  to  which 
she  stands  committed. 

"Taking  into  account  the  national  resources  of  Japan,  the 
so-called  eight-eight  naval  expansion  scheme  is  the  most  am- 
bitious ever  undertaken  in  time  of  peace  by  any  modern  na- 
tion. It  imposes  on  the  Japanese  people  an  effort  greater  than 
that  of  Germany  in  1914  when  her  war  preparations  reached 
their  maximum.  In  fighting  power  it  aims  at  placing  Japan 
nearer  the  United  States  than  Germany  was  to  England  in 
1914.  It  proposes  to  make  Japan  the  equal  if  not  the  superior 
of  America  in  naval  power  and  will  relegate  the  British  navy 
as  it  stands  to-day  definitely  to  the  third  place. 

"The  eight-eight  programme  provides  that  Japan  must  have 
eight  superdreadnoughts  and  eight  battle-cruisers,  all  less  than 
eight  years  old.  It  was  at  first  assumed  that  this  programme 
included  at  least  four  of  the  superdreadnoughts  in  the  present 
Japanese  navy  and  four  of  the  present  battle-cruiser  fleet. 
But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  these  ships  are  relegated  to  the 
second  line,  although  to-day  there  are  no  finer  fighting  ships 
afloat. 

"The  four  superdreadnoughts  shortly  to  receive  a  subordi- 
nate rating  are  larger  than  any  in  the  British  navy,  the  four 
battle-cruisers  are  the  equal  of  the  British  Tiger  and  larger 
than  the  Repulse  and  Renown.     The  first  two  of  the  eight 


92  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

of  the  alliance  is  closely  and  intimately  connected 
with  the  question  of  the  limitation  of  armament. 
After  all,  the  alliance  is  a  military  instrument,  de- 
signed for  military  purpose.  Its  continuance,  in 
whatever  form  it  may  take,  will  necessarily  mean 
the  continuous  military  and  naval  co-operation  be- 
tween Japan  and  Great  Britain.  The  United  States 
is  not  building  her  navy  to  out-rank  that  of  Great 
Britain;  she  is  not  building  her  fleet  to  double  that 
of  Japan;  the  motive  that  underlies  her  naval  pro- 
gramme can  be  easily  understood:  that  so  long  as 

new  battle-cruisers  have  just  been  started,  their  keels  having 
been  laid  in  December.  They  are  designed  to  be  the  equal 
of  the  British  Hood  and  the  American  battle-cruisers  of  the 
Lexington  class,  43,000  to  45,000  tons  in  displacement,  carry- 
ing 16-inch  and  possibly  18-inch  guns  and  having  a  speed  of 
d)Zy2  knots. 

''The  world  is  asked  to  believe  by  the  Japanese  Premier 
and  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in  London  that  all  this  pro- 
digious naval  preparation  is  to  defend  the  coast  and  the  com- 
merce of  Japan,  and  nothing  more.  But  there  ought  to  be 
some  correspondence  between  the  volume  of  a  nation's  ocean- 
borne  commerce  or  the  tonnage  of  the  ships  that  carry  it 
and  the  relative  strength  of  her  fighting  fleet. 

"Now  Japan's  merchant  marine  'is  approximately  only  one- 
fifth  that  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  one-fourth  that  of 
the  United  States.  Further,  Japan's  foreign  trade  is  to  that  of 
the  United  Kingdom  as  1  to  3^/^  and  to  that  of  the  United 
States  as  1  to  6i^.  Yet  Japan  is  planning  to  build  a  navy 
equal  to  that  of  the  United  States  to  protect  one-four  as 
much  merchant  shipping  and  less  than  one-sixth  as  much 
foreign  commerce,  and  proposes  greatly  to  surpass  the  British 
navy  to  protect  one-sixth  as  much  merchant  shipping  and  a 
little  over  one-fourth  as  much  foreign  trade. 

"Perhaps  the  most  amazing  feature  of  it  all  is  the  docility 
with  which  the  Japanese  taxpayer  submits  to  the  crushing  bur- 
den that  is  being  laid  upon  him.  The  naval  programme  of 
Japan  proposes  to  use  33.3  per  cent,  of  her  entire  national 
revenue  for  the  navy;  it  claims  five  times  as  large  a  share  of 
her  imperial  revenues  as  did  the  German  fleet  from  the  Ger- 
man Imperial  Treasury  in  the  last  year  of  peace." 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   93 

Japan  and  Great  Britain  are  in  alliance,  so  long 
will  the  United  States  need  a  navy  capable  of  pro- 
tecting her  own  interests  in  the  Atlantic  as  well  as 
in  the  Pacific.  Japan  is,  as  has  been  shown,  stick- 
ing to  her  eight-eight  programme.  Against  whom, 
the  Americans  will  ask,  is  she  building?  Japanese 
statesmen  and  diplomats  have  urged  the  renewal  of 
the  alliance.  Why  is  it  necessary  to  renew  the  al- 
liance ?  again  the  Americans  will  ask.  And  against 
whom  is  it  to  be  aimed?  Whatever  may  be  said 
about  the  absolute  necessity  of  carrying  out  Japan's 
eight-eight  programme  for  her  national  defence,  and 
whatever  advantages  may  be  pointed  out  about  the 
renewal  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  compact,  the  truth 
is  that,  when  renewed,  and  even  revised,  the  al- 
liance will  be  a  serious  obstacle  to  cordial  co-opera- 
tion and  good  relationship  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States.  This  is  because  the  alliance 
is,  in  the  first  place,  a  military  instrument,  and  as 
such  it  is  conducive  to  bringing  about  armed  con- 
flict between  Japan  and  the  United  States;  and  sec- 
ondly, because  of  this  possibility,  both  countries 
will  be  engaged  in  increasing  their  armaments;  and 
thirdly,  because  in  case  of  the  outbreak  of  hostili- 
ties, England,  if  not  Great  Britain,  including 
Canada,  Austraha,  and  other  Dominions,  would  be 
bound  by  the  alliance  to  come  to  the  aid  of  Japan 
against  the  United  States.  Any  trifling  difficulty, 
any  misunderstanding  about  Japanese  immigration 
in  California  or  about  American  interests  in  China, 


94  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

will  create  a  casus  belli  more  reasonable  and  per- 
haps more  convincing  for  resorting  to  force  than 
the  violation  by  Germany  of  Belgian  neutrality. 
The  outbreak  of  the  European  War  in  August, 
1914,  saw  the  United  States  almost  as  unprepared 
to  face  the  situation  as  was  China,  and  for  almost 
two  years  after  the  war  was  raging  in  Europe,  the 
United  States,  when  called  upon  to  participate  in 
the  conflict,  was  still  ill  prepared  to  meet  the  con- 
sequences. She  is  not  to  bss^caught  napping  again, 
however.  The  lesson  once  learned  is  not  likely  to 
be  forgotten  again. 

Its  enthusiastic  advocates  will  point  out,  then, 
that  the  alliance  is  not,  and  has  never  been,  directed 
against  the  United  States.  Its  renewal  will  not, 
therefore,  adversely  affect  the  future  British- 
American  relations.  On  the  contrary,  the  United 
States  is  intentionally  exempted  from  the  operation 
of  the  alliance,  they  will  say,  pointing  to  the  fourth 
article  of  the  1911  agreement  as  their  proof,  which 
reads :  ** Should  either  High  Contracting  Party  con- 
clude a  treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  a  third 
power,  it  is  agreed  that  nothing  in  this  alliance  shall 
entail  upon  such  contracting  party  the  obligation 
to  go  to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such  a 
treaty  of  arbitration  is  in  force."  The  United 
States,  they  say,  had  concluded  in  1911  a  treaty  of 
general  arbitration  with  Great  Britain,  and  for  that 
reason.  Great  Britain  will  not  come  to  the  aid  of 
Japan  against  the  United  States  in  case  of  war.    In 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   95 

support  of  this  argument,  Japanese  statesmen  at 
home  and  diplomats  abroad  freely  gave  out  state- 
ments, purporting  to  show  that  Japan  and  Great 
Britain,  in  concluding  the  alliance,  had  never  had 
the  United  States  in  mind,  and  that  the  article 
quoted  above  specifically  exempted  the  United 
States  from  the  operation  of  the  alliance.  Thus, 
Viscount  Hayashi,  Japanese  Ambassador  at  Lon- 
don, commenting  on  Lord  Northcliffe's  assertion 
that  by  the  terms  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  compact 
Great  Britain  was  not  under  any  obligation  to  join 
her  ally  if  war  should  unfortunately  break  out  be- 
tween Japan  and  the  United  States,  issued  the  fol- 
lowing statement  to  the  London  Times,  January 
3,  1921: 

"I  welcome  the  statement  as  a  timely  and  wise  warn- 
ing to  both  Japan  and  the  United  States.  The  basic 
idea  of  the  alliance  is  to  protect  by  common  action 
the  territorial  rights  and  special  interests  of  both  Japan 
and  Great  Britain  in  Eastern  Asia  and  India. 

"The  United  States  has  never  been  thought  of  by 
the  contracting  parties  as  a  country  which  would 
ever  take  or  contemplate  taking  any  action  likely  to 
threaten  their  territorial  rights  or  special  interests  in 
the  Far  East,  and  there  was,  therefore,  never  in  the 
mind  of  the  Japanese  Government  any  idea  to  fight 
the  United  States  at  all. 

"Moreover,  in  the  most  improbable  of  eventualities, 
such  as  a  war,  I  prefer  merely  for  the  sake  of  argu- 
ment, Japan  would  not  expect  England  to  come  to  her 
help   since   the    Japanese   and    British    Governments 


96  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

agreed  to  insert  in  the  alliance  treaty  Article  4,  which 
would  absolve  Great  Britain  from  any  obligation  to 
join  Japan  against  America.  Only  general  phraseology 
was  selected  in  the  alliance  agreement  for  reasons  of 
diplomatic  nicety,  but  what  the  negotiators  of  the  agree- 
ment had  in  mind  is  obvious. 

"I  must,  further,  state,  in  refutation  of  irresponsible 
an  sensational  utterances  in  the  American  press  and 
elsewhere,  that  there  exists  no  secret  agreement  be- 
tween the  Japanese  and  British  Empires.  I  am  sin- 
cerely sorry  that  thre  are  such  mischief-makers  whose 
efforts  are  not  only  injurious  to  Japan  and  England 
alone  but  to  the  United  States  itself  in  these  circum- 
stances. 

"I  can  assure  you  with  all  the  emphasis  at  my  com- 
mand that  an  alliance  will  never  stand  in  the  way  of 
good  understanding  and  friendly  relations  betweei 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  nor  is  it  in  th( 
least  the  intention  of  Japan  to  use  the  alliance  as  ; 
means  to  direct  pressure  in  any  degree  upon  her  ol< 
friend,  the  United  States." 

Leaving  its  accuracy  to  be  commented  on  a  little 
later,  we  may  at  once  notice  that  the  statement 
undertook  to  "refute"  "irresponsible  and  sensa- 
tional utterances  in  the  American  press  and  else- 
where," and  denied  the  existence  of  secret  agree- 
ment between  Japan  and  Great  Britain.  This  is 
interesting  for  the  reason  that  the  statement  issued] 
on  July  4,  1921,  by  Baron  Shidehara,  Japanese 
Ambassador  at  Washington,  was  also  in  the  nature 
of  a  "refutation"  of  irresponsible  utterances  against 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE  97 

the  alliance.  Of  the  two,  the  statement  by  Baron 
Shidehara  is  more  interesting  and  more  important, 
as  it  had  apparently  been  submitted  to  the  Japanese 
Foreign  Office  at  Tokio  before  it  was  given  to  the 
press  in  Washington.     It  reads: 

"Negotiations  looking  to  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  have  not  yet  begun.  In  the  mean- 
time, a  campaign  seems  to  be  actively  at  work  misrep- 
resenting the  possible  effect  of  the  alliance  upon  the 
United  States.  By  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  can 
it  be  honestly  stated  that  the  alliance  was  ever  designed 
or  remotely  intended  as  an  instrument  of  hostility  or 
even  defense  against  the  United  States.* 

"The  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  in  its  history  for 
nearly  twenty  years,  has  twice  been  renewed.  In  each 
case  the  fundamental  policy  underlying  it  has  remained 
unchanged.  It  aims  permanently  to  preserve  and  to 
consolidate  the  general  peace  of  the  Far  East.  The 
original  agreement  of  1902,  in  line  with  that  policy,  was 
calculated  to  localize  any  war  which  might  be  forced 
upon  either  contracting  party  in  defense  of  its  defined 
interests  or  vital  security.  It  was  made  when  China 
was  under  the  menace  of  foreign  aggression,  and  the 
United  States,  showing  the  utmost  friendliness  toward 
both  parties  to  the  alliance,  viewed  the  compact  with 
sympathy  and  approval. 

*  The  version  given  out  by  the  Foreign  Office  at  Tokio  is 
somewhat  different  in  wording.  The  first  paragraph  reads: 
"A  commencement  has  not  yet  been  made  with  negotiations 
in  respect  of  the  continuation  of  the  alliance  between  Great 
Britain  and  Japan.  Yet  the  work  of  propaganda  appears 
already  to  have  been  set  on  foot  with  the  object  of  mis- 
representing the  effect  which  the  alliance  is  likely  to  produce 
upon  the  United  States,"  etc. 


98  CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

"In  1905,  when  the  alliance  was  renewed  and  re- 
vised to  meet  the  changed  conditions  that  followed  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  no  thought  occurred  to  the  states- 
men of  either  country  that  the  United  States  might 
possibly  become  a  potential  enemy  of  either,  and  for 
that  reason,  and  that  alone,  no  provision  was  inserted 
taking  so  remote  a  contingency  into  consideration. 

"The  alliance  was  again  revised  in  1911,  and  Article 
IV  of  that  agreement  contains  the  following  provision : 
Should  either  high  contracting  party  conclude 
a  treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  a  third  power, 
it  is  agreed  that  nothing  in  this  agreement  shall 
entail  upon  such  contracting  party  an  obligation  to 
go  to  war  with  the  power  with  whom  such  treaty 
of  arbitration  is  in  force. 

"This  provision,  in  its  relation  to  the  United  States, 
has  often  been  made  the  subject  of  conflicting  inter- 
pretations. To  a  practical  mind,  however,  the  circum- 
stances which  led  up  to  its  inclusion  should  at  once 
serve  to  remove  all  doubt  regarding  its  significance. 
The  idea  of  revising  the  alliance  in  1911  was  conceived 
primarily  with  the  object  of  facilitating  the  negotia- 
tions which  were  known  to  be  then  in  progress  between 
London  and  Washington  for  the  conclusion  of  a  gen- 
eral arbitration  treaty. 

"Neither  Japan  nor  Great  Britain  has  ever  contem- 
plated, under  the  alliance,  any  casus  foederis  preju- 
dicial or  inimical  to  the  interest  of  the  United  States; 
and  any  plan  designed  to  remove  the  possibility  of  an 
armed  conflict  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  was  of  course  agreeable  to  Japan.  It  was  in 
pursuance  of  this  policy  that  the  quoted  provision  of 
Article  IV  was  adopted. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   99 

"The  same  policy  inspires  Japan  as  strongly  to-day 
as  ever  before.  It  has  not,  in  any  degree,  been  affected 
by  the  fact  that  the  Anglo-American  general  arbitra- 
tion treaty  failed  to  secure  the  approval  of  the  United 
States  Senate.  Nor  is  it  practically  necessary  to  carry 
on  the  legal  analysis  of  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
Peace  Commission  treaty,  signed  and  ratified  by  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  in  1914,  should  be  con- 
strued as  a  general  arbitration  treaty  within  the  mean- 
ing of  Article  IV  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  agreement. 
For,  apart  from  that  question,  it  was  already  well 
understood  at  the  time  of  negotiating  the  existing 
agreement  that  the  alliance  should  in  no  case  be  di- 
rected against  the  United  States. 

"In  explanation  of  Japan's  attitude.  Count  Uchida, 
the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister,  made  the  following 
statement  to  the  Budget  Committee  of  the  Japanese 
House  of  Representatives  on  February  4,  1921 : 

As  far  as  I  understand,  when  Article  IV  of  the 
treaty  (Anglo- Japanese  alliance)  was  inserted, 
the  United  States  was  specifically  in  mind,  and 
therefore,  as  a  practical  matter,  the  question 
whether  the  general  arbitration  treaty  mentioned  in 
Article  IV  has  been  ratified  by  the  United  States 
Senate  or  not  makes  no  particular  difference.  In 
other  words,  looking  at  the  matter  from  a  broad 
point  of  view,  we  can  safely  say  that  already  at 
the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  (Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance)  it  was  understood  that  there 
should  be  no  application  of  this  treaty  to  the 
United  States. 
"Japan  is  naturally  anxious  to  strengthen  the  ties 


100         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

of  friendship  and  loyal  co-operation  between  herself 
and  the  British  Empire,  which  she  regards  as  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  the  stability  of  the  Far  East. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  the  firm  and  fixed  determina- 
tion of  Japan  to  permit  nothing  to  hamper  her  tra- 
ditional relations  of  good  will  and  good  understanding 
with  the  United  States.  She  is  satisfied  that  these  two 
affiliations  are  in  no  way  incompatible,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, complementary  and  even  essential  to  each  other. 
"Charges  have  sometimes  been  made  that  the  alli- 
ance tends  to  encourage  aggressive  designs  on  the  part 
of  Japan  in  China.  If  this  were  the  case  it  would 
be  contrary  to  the  preamble  of  the  agreement,  which 
provides  for 

the  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all 
powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  principle 
of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  in- 
dustry of  all  nations  in  China. 
"Japan  fully  realizes  that  any  such  venture  of  ag- 
gression would  be  not  only  hopeless  of  attainment,  but 
destructive  of  her  own  security  and  welfare.    She  sin- 
cerely wishes  for  China  an  early  achievement  of  peace, 
unity  and  stable  government.    She  desires  to  cultivate 
her  relations  with  that  country  along  the  path  of  mu- 
tual respect  and  helpfulness.     Her  vast  commercial 
interests  alone,  if   for  no  other  consideration,  point 
unmistakably  to  the  wisdom  of  such  a  policy. 

"This  is  a  basic  principle  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alli- 
ance. In  no  adverse  direction  has  the  alliance  ever 
exerted  its  influence." 

An  ambassadorial  statement  such  as  this,  given 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   101 

out  for  publication  presumably  with  the  authority 
of  or  under  instructions  from  the  Tokio  Grovern- 
ment,  is  unusual,  if  not  unprecedented.  In  spite  of 
its  tone  of  marked  friendliness  for  the  United 
States,  and  in  spite  of  its  obvious  intention  of  as- 
suring the  United  States  that  the  proposed  renewal 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  then  under  consid- 
eration in  London,  was  in  no  way  hostile  to  this 
country,  the  statement  had  nevertheless  the  effect 
quite  different  from  that  which  was  looked  for. 
The  first  general  impression  that  one  gets  from  a 
perusal  of  the  statement  is  that  Japan  is  eager  for 
the  renewal  of  the  alliance  and  is  determined  to  do 
everything  in  her  power  to  remove,  or  to  counter- 
act, all  antagonistic  influences  in  the  United  States 
which  might  have  an  effect  upon  the  minds  of 
British  statesmen.  The  intimation  that  propa- 
gandists were  at  work  in  the  United  States,  mis- 
representing the  possible  effect  of  the  renewal  of 
the  alliance,  raises  the  question  whether  the  ambas- 
sadorial statement,  designed  as  it  was  as  an  ex- 
planation or  as  an  answer  to  the  "campaign"  of 
misrepresentation,  was  itself  in  the  nature  of  propa- 
ganda. It  is  an  admitted  fact  that  about  the  re- 
newal of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  very  little  has 
been  said  or  written  in  the  United  States — much 
less  than  either  in  Japan  or  Great  Britain.  To  re- 
gard as  a  "campaign"  "misrepresenting  the  possible 
effect  of  the  alliance  upon  the  United  States,"  or  to 
regard  as  "a  work  of  propaganda/'  as  the  Tokio 


102         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

version  has  it,  a  few  occasional  and  scattered  com- 
ments in  the  American  newspapers  more  or  less  un- 
favourable to  the  continuance  of  the  Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance,  is  certainly  inaccurate,  if  it  is  not  in 
itself  a  case  of  ^'misrepresentation."  And  finally, 
the  question  persists  in  the  mind  of  the  readers: 
why  should  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  be  renewed 
at  all?  Or,  as  an  offensive  and  defensive  instru- 
ment, where  is  the  necessity  for  renewing  it?  In 
a  two-column  editorial,  under  the  caption  "A  Use- 
less Alliance,''  the  New  York  Times,  July  5,  1921, 
made  the  most  pertinent  remark  apropos  of  the 
statement  made  by  the  Japanese  Embassy  and  of 
the  future  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  It  de- 
serves to  be  quoted  in  full: 

"Remarkable  in  every  way  is  the  statement  about 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  given  out  for  publication 
yesterday  by  the  Japanese  Ambassador  at  Washing- 
ton. Baron  Shidehara  must,  of  course,  have  been 
speaking  with  the  authority  of  his  own  Government, 
and  if  he  followed  diplomatic  precedent  must  have 
ascertained  that  his  public  declaration  would  not  be 
displeasing  to  our  State  Department.  In  its  tone  of 
marked  friendliness  for  the  United  States  it  could  be 
displeasing  to  no  American.  It  is  gratifying  to  have 
this  official  assertion  of  the  'firm  and  fixed  determina- 
tion of  Japan'  to  allow  nothing  to  impair  a  good  under- 
standing with  this  country;  and  the  Ambassador's  as- 
sertion that  by  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  could  the 
renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  treaty  be  interpreted  as 
having  an  intent  in  any  way  hostile  to  the  United 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    103 

States  is  entirely  in  line  with  the  positive  statements 
which  the  British  Government  has  more  than  once 
recently  made. 

''Making  full  acknowledgment  of  these  protestations 
of  friendship,  Americans  must  still  ask  for  sound 
reason  why  the  alliance  between  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  should  be  continued,  even  in  modified  form. 
Both  parties  to  it  affirm  that  it  has  no  possible  bearing 
on  their  relations  with  the  United  States.  Yet  it  is 
evident  that  they  cannot  talk  about  it  at  all  without 
bringing  in  the  United  States.  This  is  just  as  true  of 
British  Ministers  as  it  is  of  the  Japanese  Government. 
The  very  first  question  which  the  Premiers  of  the 
Dominions  raised  when  they  got  to  London — in  fact, 
even  before  they  got  there — was  why  any  step  should 
be  taken  that  might  even  seem  to  involve  embarrass- 
ment for  America.  The  curious  result  is  that  in  all 
the  public  utterances,  whether  of  British  or  Japanese 
officials,  a  note  almost  of  apology  is  apparent.  It  is 
not  absent  from  the  explanations  given  by  Baron 
Shidehara.  Indeed,  his  amiable  and  considerate  words 
seem  as  if  intended  to  lead  up  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  is  no  longer  needed.  If 
in  truth  it  is  not  aimed  at  the  United  States  or  any 
other  great  Power,  why  renew  it  at  all  ? 

"This  query  is  plainly  one  which  is  troubling  Eng- 
land. A  surprising  amount  of  English  sentiment  is 
manifesting  itself  against  the  extension  of  the  alliance. 
This  has  been  taken  note  of  by  the  spokesmen  for  the 
Government.  Both  Mr.  Austen  Chamberlain  and  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  have  been  as  explicit  as  possible  in  de- 
claring that  it  is  'a  cardinal  feature  of  British  policy* 


104         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

to  cultivate  the  best  relations  with  the  United  States. 
Mr,  Chamberlain,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  stated 
flatly  that  'we  should  be  no  party  to  any  alliance  di- 
rected against  America  or  in  which  we  could  be  called 
upon  to  act  against  America.'  This  is  welcome,  but 
still  leaves  us  in  the  dark  concerning  the  motives  for 
the  renewed  alliance  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan. 
"On  this  subject  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  particularly 
obscure.  He  virtually  admitted  that  the  conditions 
which  had  given  rise  originally  to  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  had  'passed  away.'  But,  he  continued,  'what 
about  the  conditions  of  to-morrow  ?'  The  British  Gov- 
ernment had  to  look  forward  'into  the  possible  combi- 
nations of  the  future.'  All  this,  it  is  clear,  leaves  us 
just  where  we  were.  And  when  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  in 
his  speech  to  the  Premiers,  undertook  to  show  why  the 
Japanese  alliance  should  be  renewed,  he  did  not  emerge 
from  an  unsatisfactory  and  even  mysterious  vague- 
ness. He  spoke  of  England's  gratitude  to  Japan  for 
help  given  in  the  war.  It  was  a  'well-tried  friendship/ 
which  it  was  hoped  would  be  preserved.  Very  good, 
but  with  what  special  object?  Something  is  said  about 
the  solution  of  all  problems  in  the  Far  East.  But  no 
one  can  talk  of  them  without  at  once  acknowledging 
that  the  interest  of  the  United  States  in  them  is  as 
important  as  that  of  any  other  country.  In  fact,  both 
Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Chamberlain,  as  well  as  Baron 
Shidehara,  conceded  that  such  is  the  case.  So  con- 
vinced of  this  is  General  Smuts  that  he  has  proposed 
a  special  conference  of  the  Pacific  Powers  to  deal  with 
the  whole  problem  of  the  Orient  before  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  is  extended.    Yet  if  such  a  confer- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   105 

ence  were  to  succeed,  even  measurably,  it  would  cause 
the  Anglo-Japanese  treaty  to  appear  more  than  ever 
useless. 

"The  whole  matter  is  evidently  one  giving  no  small 
concern  to  the  British  Government.  It  is  not  content 
with  the  offhand  opinion  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  that 
the  failure  to  denounce  the  treaty  with  Japan  would 
have  the  effect  automatically  of  continuing  it  for  at 
least  one  or  two  years.  The  dispatches  state  that  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  intends  to  go  behind  Lord  Birkenhead 
and  consult  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown.  He  evi- 
dently is  aware  of  the  uneasiness  of  the  Dominion 
Premiers  and  also  of  the  drift  of  English  public  opin- 
ion adverse  to  the  treaty,  at  least  in  its  present  form. 

"While  the  United  States  stands  apart  at  present 
from  the  negotiation,  our  interest  in  it  is  obvious.  We 
cannot  fail  to  be  concerned  at  the  possibilities  involved 
in  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  Stronger  guarantees 
than  now  exist  that  it  could  never  be  used  against  this 
country  are  certainly  desirable,  if  it  is  to  be  kept  in 
force.  All  that  we  have  to  depend  upon  now  is  the 
rather  roundabout  and  inconclusive  legal  argument 
based  upon  Article  IV  of  the  treaty  as  it  was  revised 
in  191L  Something  more  definite  and  binding  should 
be  written  into  it  if  it  is  to  be  renewed.  This  the 
British  Dominions  would  desire  as  strongly  as  the 
United  States. 

"Even  so,  the  question  would  recur  why  there  should 
any  longer  be  such  an  alliance  at  all.  If  it  was  at  first 
designed  as  a  safeguard  against  German  ambitions  in 
the  Far  East,  any  danger  from  that  source  is  to-day 
chimerical.    The  possibilities  of  Russian  aggression  in 


106         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

the  Orient  are  no  longer  what  they  were  conceived  to 
be  in  1905.  The  occasion  of  the  treaty  has  passed,  and 
with  it  the  treaty  itself  ought  to  pass.  All  its  professed 
objects,  so  far  as  they  are  legitimate,  can  better  be 
secured  by  a  more  comprehensive  agreement.  The 
Anglo- Japanese  alliance  is  on  its  face  exclusive.  What 
the  civilized  nations  desire  is  an  understanding  that  is 
universal.  The  original  alliance,  even  if  changed  in 
detail,  would  be  continually  open  to  suspicion.  Why 
not  drop  it  in  order  to  give  place  to  an  all-embracing 
agreement  into  which  every  nation  that  desired  could 
enter  with  good-will  and  entire  confidence?" 

Now  it  remains  but  to  add  that  it  is  inaccurate 
and  highly  misleading  to  say  that,  by  virtue  of  the 
provision  on  general  arbitration  found  in  Article 
IV  of  the  1911  agreement,  the  United  States  is 
exempted  from  the  operation  of  the  alliance.  At 
the  time  of  the  revision  of  the  alliance,  there  was 
under  negotiation  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  a  treaty  of  general  arbitration.  In 
fact,  according  to  Viscount  Ishii  whom  we  have 
quoted  in  a  previous  chapter,  and  Baron  Shidehara, 
whose  statement  we  have  reproduced  in  the  above, 
the  alliance  was  revised  in  1911  with  the  object 
of  facilitating  the  negotiations  between  London  and 
Washington  for  the  conclusion  of  a  general  arbi- 
tration treaty.  Article  IV  was,  therefore,  inserted 
in  the  alliance  in  anticipation  of  successful  conclu- 
sion of  such  a  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and 
United  States.     Unfortunately,  the  Senate  refused 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    107 

to  ratify  the  treaty  when  concluded,  on  the  ground 
that  it  impinged  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  United 
States.  The  result  is  that  no  ''treaty  of  general 
arbitration"  exists  to-day  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. The  only  treaty  now  in  existence  that  ap- 
proximates the  nature  of  a  general  arbitration 
treaty,  is  the  Peace  Commission  Treaty,  signed  on 
September  15,  1914.  It  provides  for  the  investiga- 
tion of  all  disputes  before  resorting  to  war  by  a 
commission  which  will  be  given  one  year  in  which 
to  report.  It  provides  for  delay,  but  not  for  arbi- 
tration. It  contains  no  stipulation  that  would  pre- 
vent resorting  to  war,  after  an  investigation  has 
been  made.  Strictly  speaking,  it  is  not  a  "treaty 
of  general  arbitration,*'  and  can  never  be  consid- 
ered as  such.  Baron  Shidehara,  while  admitting  in 
his  statement  the  fact  that  the  Anglo-American 
treaty  of  general  arbitration  failed  to  secure  the 
approval  of  the  Senate,  refused  to  say  that  the 
Peace  Commission  treaty  "should  be  construed  as 
a  general  arbitration  treaty  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  IV  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  agreement."  It 
is  evident,  therefore,  that  Article  IV  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  is  inoperative,  so  long  as  the  speci- 
fied kind  of  treaty  does  not  exist.  The  United 
States  is  not  exempted  from  the  operation  of  the 
alliance,  and  Great  Britain  is  morally  and  legally 
bound  to  come  to  Japan's  aid  in  case  of  war  against 
the  United  States.  It  is  no  wonder  that,  among 
the   American  people,   the   belief   is  very   strong, 


108         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

amounting  almost  to  conviction,  that  the  alliance, 
if  renewed,  will  be  directed  against  the  United 
States,  protestations  by  statesmen  and  diplomats  of 
Japan  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  Both  Rus- 
sia and  Germany,  against  whom  the  alliance  was 
originally  directed,  have  disappeared  as  world  | 
Powers,  and  for  years  to  come  they  will  remain 
impotent.  Against  whom  will  the  alliance  be  di- 
rected then,  if  not  against  the  United  States? 

Very  recently,  it  has  transpired  that,  as  soon  as 
the  Peace  Commission  Treaty  was  concluded  and 
ratified  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in 
1914,  the  British  Government  notified  the  Gov- 
ernment at  Tokio  that  the  said  treaty  was  to  be 
considered  as  a  "treaty  of  general  arbitration" 
within  the  meaning  of  Article  IV  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance.  This  report  finds  circulation  only 
in  newspapers.  There  is  no  official  or  "authorita-  ] 
tive"  statement  either  denying  or  affirming  it.  It  ! 
is  not  known  that  the  United  States  has  been  in- 
formed that  the  Peace  Commission  Treaty  with 
Great  Britain  has  been  considered  as  an  arbitration 
treaty  within  the  meaning  of  Article  IV  of  the 
alliance.* 

The  Washington  correspondent  of  the  London 

*  It  is  held  in  some  quarters  that  the  Root-Bryce  arbitration 
treaty  of  1908  is  within  the  meaning  of  the  stipulation  of  the 
alliance.  Those  who  have  held  this  view  have  apparently 
overlooked  the  last  article  of  the  said  treaty,  which  provides: 
"The  present  Convention  is  concluded  for  a  period  of  five 
years,  dating  from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications." 
The  ratifications  were  exchanged  at  Washington,  June  4,  1908. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    109 

Times  stated  the  situation  quite  accurately  when  he 
said  that  the  continuance  of  Great  Britain's  and 
Japan's  association  in  aUiance  was  an  insuperable 
obstacle  to  Britain  and  America  being  in  accord. 
"I  am  able  to  say  with  absolute  certainty,"  he  said, 
"that  all  efforts  have  been  unavailing  to  get  inserted 
into  the  new  treaty  of  alliance  a  clause  exempting 
the  United  States  from  the  implications  of  the 
treaty.  To  conceal  this  fact  will  serve  no  good 
purpose,  because  the  continuance  of  Britain's  and 
Japan's  association  in  alliance,  however  it  may  be 
modified,  is  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  Britain  and 
America  being  in  accord.  America's  policy  of  close 
and  friendly  co-operation  presupposes  that  Britain 
will  be  free  from  such  commitments  as  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance.  The  alliance  will  prevent  any 
agreement  regarding  the  limitations  of  armaments, 
and  will  complicate — ^perhaps  rendering  impossible 
— the  solution  of  the  Pacific  problem.  America 
realises  that  Japan  wants  renewal  and  that  Britain 
is  reluctant  to  refuse  a  loyal  ally's  desire,  and  that 
she  does  not  wish  to  adopt  a  policy  taking  race  into 
account  if  a  road  can  be  found  out  of  it."  The 
road  is  found  in  the  Conference  on  the  limitation 
of  armaments  and  on  the  Pacific  problems,  which, 
if  successful,  will  surely  bring  about  a  solution  of 
the  involved  problems  of  armament  and  the  Far 
East  on  a  plane  above  that  of  engagements  like 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance. 


VI 

CHINA  AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE 
ALLIANCE 

4  SIDE  from  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  its  con- 
r\  tracting  parties,  there  is  no  country  whose 
interests  and  rights  are  so  directly  and  so 
intimately  affected  by  the  alliance  as  those  of  China. 
Ever  since  1902  when  the  alliance  was  entered  into 
for  the  first  time,  China  has  been  made  its  virtual 
victim  in  more  sense  than  one.  Her  interests  have 
been  adversely  affected;  her  sovereign  rights  have 
been  frequently  encroached  upon;  her  territory  has 
been  twice  made  the  theatre  of  war;  her  economic 
development  has  been  seriously  impeded;  her  po- 
litical growth  has  been  unnecessarily  retarded;  her 
territory  has  been  disposed  of  by  the  very  Powers 
who  have  professed  to  maintain  her  integrity;  her 
internal  peace  has  been  repeatedly  disturbed,  though 
somewhat  indirectly,  by  her  neighbour  who  under- 
takes to  preserve  peace  in  the  Far  East;  and  her 
Open  Door  policy  has  been  reduced  to  a  mere  fic- 
tion by  the  very  Power  who  seeks  to  preserve  "the 
common  interests  of  all  the  Powers  in  China."  In 
short,  within  the  last  score  of  years,  the  lifetime  of 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  China  has  been  its  un- 
willing victim.     She  has  been  the  loser,  not  the 

110 


THE  ANGLO- JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    111 

gainer.  Is  it  any  wonder  that  she  now  strongly 
objects  to  its  renewal?  If  there  is  one  country 
which  has  every  reason  to  object  to  the  continuation 
of  the  alliance,  it  is  China. 

That  the  interests  of  China  are  intimately  in- 
volved in  the  disposition  of  the  alliance,  as  much  as 
are  those  of  its  contracting  parties,  is  apparent  to 
any  one  who  has  watched  the  evolution  of  the  com- 
bination from  its  very  beginning.  In  1902,  when 
the  alliance  was  concluded  for  the  first  time,  the 
territory  in  which  it  was  supposed  to  operate  was 
practically  limited  to  China  and  Korea.  For  the 
second  alliance,  concluded  in  1905,  the  sphere  of 
operation  was  extended  to  India.  In  1910  Korea 
\\  as  made  an  integral  part  of  the  Japanese  Empire. 
The  scope  of  the  third  alliance  was,  therefore,  again 
limited  to  China  and  India.  The  exact  language 
used  in  the  alliance  describing  the  regions  in  which 
it  was  supposed  to  operate  is  "the  regions  of  East- 
ern Asia  and  India."  But  what  is  India  but  a 
colonial  possession  of  Great  Britain?  What  is 
Eastern  Asia  but  another  geographical  expression 
for  China?  If  Great  Britain  desires  to  have  her 
imperial  interests  and  territorial  rights  in  India 
safeguarded,  it  is  well  and  good,  and  there  shall  be 
no  one  to  question  her  right  in  doing  so,  except, 
perhaps,  the  Indian  people  who  may  have  a  better 
opinion  of  themselves  and  who  may  not  be  able  to 
see  the  necessity  of  calling  upon  Japan  to  defend 
them.     And  if  Japan  desires  to  have  her  imperial 


112         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

interests  and  territorial  rights  in  Korea  defended, 
it  is  within  her  right  to  do  so,  and  no  one  will  ques- 
tion it  except  the  Koreans  who  naturally  consider 
the  Japanese  as  interlopers  in  their  country.  Both 
Japan  and  Great  Britain,  however,  begin  to  en- 
croach upon  the  rights  of  China  as  an  independent 
and  sovereign  nation,  when  they  arrogate  to  them- 
selves the  well-intentioned  but  none  the  less  un- 
necessary task  of  maintaining  and  consolidating 
the  general  peace  in  ''Eastern  Asia'*'  which  is,  when 
Korea  and  India  are  counted  out,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  but  another  geographical  expression  for 
China. 

That  the  alliance  as  it  stands  to-day  has  its  main 
interests  in  China  is  shown  by  the  language  used 
in  its  preamble.  One  of  its  avowed  objects  is  said 
to  be  "the  preservation  of  the  common  interests 
of  all  the  Powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and 
the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations."  Why  the  two 
Contracting  Powers  alone  have  undertaken  the  task 
which,  in  its  very  nature,  ought  to  fall  upon  the 
shoulders  of  all  the  Powers  interested  in  equal  op- 
portunities in  China  and  in  her  territorial  integrity, 
is  a  question  to  which  there  has  been  yet  no  answer. 
The  same  question  may  be  asked  about  "the  con-j 
solidation  and  maintenance  of  the  general  peaces 
in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India"  which  is 
obviously  a  task  for  all,  and  not  for  individual, 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    113 

nations  interested  in  these  regions.  "The  preser- 
vation of  peace  in  the  Far  East,"  His  Excellency 
Sao-ke  Alfred  Sze,  Chinese  Minister  to  the  United 
States,  pointed  out  at  the  banquet  of  the  New  York 
State  Bankers'  Association,  Atlantic  City,  June  24, 
1921,  "is  a  matter  of  such  supreme  moment  that 
it  concerns  not  only  England  and  Japan,  but  other 
countries  as  well.  China  and  the  United  States 
ought  to  have  something  to  say  in  the  matter."  But 
has  the  alliance  ever  succeeded  in  maintaining  peace 
in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India?  Has  it 
ever  carried  out  its  professed  object  of  preserving 
"the  common  interests  of  all  the  Powers  in  China?" 
Has  it  approached  anywhere  near  its  avowed  pur- 
pose of  "insuring  the  independence  and  integrity" 
of  China?  And  finally  how  far  has  it  been  suc- 
cessful, or  has  it  been  successful  at  all,  in  maintain- 
ing "the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China"? 
Minister  Sze,  in  his  address  referred  to  above,  de- 
fined the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  as  "a  warlike 
measure  designed  by  England  and  Japan  to  protect 
their  interests  in  the  Far  East."  As  a  measure  for 
war,  it  cannot  succeed  in  maintaining  peace;  and 
as  an  instrument  designed  to  protect  special  inter- 
ests of  particular  Powers,  it  can  never  succeed  in 
preserving  the  common  interests  of  all  nations. 
The  alliance  may  have  been  useful  in  the  defence 
and  maintenance  of  the  special  interests  and  terri- 
torial rights  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  the 


114         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India,  but  it  has  proved 
worse  than  useless  as  far  as  its  other  avowed  ob- 
jects are  concerned.  It  is  worse  than  useless,  for 
it  not  only  has  failed  to  accomplish  those  objects, 
but  also  has  violated  the  fundamental  principles  in 
which  the  alliance  is  said  to  have  been  conceived. 

Without  generalising  too  much,  let  us  come  to 
the  specific  reasons  why  the  Anglo-Japanese  al- 
liance, its  high-sounding  and  lofty  pronouncements 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  has  proved  to  be 
a  compact  damaging  to  China  and  her  sovereign 
interests.  It  is  well-known  that  China  strongly  ob- 
jects to  the  renewal  of  the  alliance.  The  reasons 
for  her  objection  are  many,  of  which  the  more 
significant  ones  are  (1)  the  mention  of  China  in 
the  ag'reement  without  her  knowledge  or  assent; 
(2)  the  violation  of  her  territorial  integrity  under 
the  aegis  of  the  alliance;  (3)  the  incompatibility 
of  the  alliance  with  the  League  of  Nations,  of 
which  China,  and  Japan  and  Great  Britain  as  well 
are  members;  (4)  the  impediment  which  the  al- 
liance places  in  the  economic  development  of 
China;  (5)  the  fear  that  its  continuance  would 
mean  the  continuance  of  Japan's  dominance  and 
domination  in  China;  and  (6)  finally  the  failure  to 
maintain  peace  in  the  Far  East  owing  to  the  exist- 
ence of  the  alliance. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  failure  of  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  to  consult  China  in  the  negotiation  . 
of  the  alliance  is  a  just  cause  of  complaint,  espe- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    115 

dally  when  her  vital  interests  are  involved  in  it. 
i"You  observe  that  this  alliance  has  a  great  deal  to 
do  with  China,"  said  the  Chinese  Minister  at  Wash- 
ington in  a  speech  we  have  already  referred  to  in 
the  above,  ''but  China  has  nothing  to  do  with  it. 
Here  is  an  agreement  vitally  affecting  China,  but 
China  has  not  even  been  consulted  in  its  making. 
You  will  agree  with  me  that  any  nation  would  re- 
sent such  treatment."  As  early  as  March,  1920, 
when  the  subject  of  the  renewal  or  termination  of 
the  alliance  began  to  occupy  the  press  in  the  Far 
East,  China  made  representations  to  the  British 
Government,  pointing  out  that,  while  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  alliance  was  primarily  a  matter  between 
its  Contracting  Parties,  the  mention  of  China  in 
the  agreement  justified  her  demand  to  be  consulted. 
In  other  words,  uninformed  and  unconsulted  in  its 
making,  China  has  been  made  a  subject  of  inter- 
national agreement  by  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  not 
once,  but  again  and  again.  She  has  been  treated 
merely  "as  a  territorial  entity."  Matters  affecting 
her  international  standing  and  international  rela- 
tions have  been  disposed  of  behind  her  back  and 
without  her  assent.  This  treatment  is  not  only 
humiliating  to  China,  but  also  unbecoming  to  the 
Contracting  Powers  themselves.  It  is,  therefore, 
quite  proper  for  China  to  demand  that  either  she 
should  be  consulted  in  the  renewal  of  the  alliance 
or  no  mention  of  her  should  be  made  in  agreement. 
To    this    representation,    the    British    Government 


116         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

merely  replied  that  "the  question  of  the  renewal  or 
the  termination  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  had 
not  yet  come  up  for  consideration,"  and  that  "in- 
asmuch as  the  successive  agreements  had  been 
couched  in  the  same  language,  it  would  naturally 
follow  that  if  the  alliance  were  renewed  it  must 
follow  the  same  lines."  *  In  other  words,  the 
British  Government  insisted  on  mentioning  China 
in  the  agreement,  without  consulting  her  in  its  ne- 
gotiation. As  a  result,  an  official  memorandum  was 
sent  to  the  British  Government,  protesting  in  ad- 
vance against  reference  to  China  in  the  alliance 
agreement  without  her  actual  participation  in  the 
conclusion  of  the  treaty.  The  following  is  a  trans-j 
lation  of  the  Aide-Memoir e,  handed  to  the  British 
Minister  at  Peking  by  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office 
in  May,  1920,  relating  to  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance: 

"We  are  repeatedly  informed  that  reports  have 
been  in  circulation  regarding  the  proposed  renewal  of 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  which  will  expire  in  July 
next  year  (1921).  These  reports  aver  that  in  view 
of  a  stipulation  in  the  treaty,  which  obligates  the 
Contracting  Parties  to  confer  together  one  year  be- 
fore its  expiration,  in  case  its  renewal  is  desired,  the 
British  and  Japanese  Governments  have  already  be- 
gun informally  to  exchange  views  on  the  subject,  and 
that  the  alliance,  if  renewed,  would  have  to  be  re- 
vised. 

*  Vide  Appendix  H. 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   117 

"The  whole  question  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance 
affects  the  destiny  of  the  Far  East  in  general  and  of 
China  in  particular.  The  Chinese  people  view  the 
proposed  renewal  of  the  alliance  with  deep  concern 
and  strong  misgivings.  Fortunately  it  has  been  an 
«  stablished  international  usage  that  when  two  friendly 
nations  conclude  a  treaty,  it  can  cover  only  those 
•  i.^hts  and  interests  which  legitimately  belong  to  the 
nations  who  are  parties  to  the  agreement. 
'  "This  usage  has  acquired  fresh  strength  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  European  War,  out  of  which  has  been 
developed  the  doctrine  of  equality  of  nations.  The 
treaty  of  alliance  in  question  contains  reference  to 
China  and  her  integrity.  Such  reference,  without 
China's  actual  participation  in  the  conclusion  of  the 
treaty,  will  seriously  impair  the  dignity  and  good 
name  of  her  people  as  an  independent  nation.  The 
Government  and  the  people  of  China,  therefore,  can- 
not allow  the  matter  to  pass  without  expressing  their 
emphatic  protest. 

"Your  Excellency  is  therefore  earnestly  requested 
to  convey  the  above  statement  confidentially  to  your 
Government  for  due  consideration  when  the  terms  of 
the  alliance  are  to  be  renewed." 

To  this  protest,  it  is  not  known  that  the  British 
Government  has  ever  replied.  China  has  had  no 
assurance  that  her  views  will  be  heard  and  her 
wishes  will  be  respected  in  the  renewal  of  the  al- 
liance. She  has,  therefore,  an  unusually  strong 
reason  for  opposing  the  continuation  of  the  alliance. 
Any  reference  to  her  in  the  agreement,  without  her 


118         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

knowledge  or  assent,  or  without  her  participation 
in  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance,  will,  indeed,  seri- 
ously impair  ^'the  dignity  and  good  name  of  her 
people  as  an  independent  nation." 

The  case  becomes  all  the  more  exasperating, 
when  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  aside  from  men- 
tioning China  in  the  agreement  without  her  assent, 
continue  to  undertake  the  maintenance  of  her  in- 
dependence and  integrity.  China  does  not  and  has 
never  asked  any  Power  to  maintain  her  independ- 
ence and  integrity.  For  Japan  and  Great  Britain 
to  assume  this  role  without  reference  to  her  wishes 
is  a  gratuitous  insult,  of  which  there  should  never 
be  another  repetition.  Within  the  span  of  twenty 
years  of  the  alliance's  life,  China's  integrity  has 
been  violated,  and  her  independence  has  been  in- 
fringed upon,  repeatedly.  Japan  has  attempted  a 
number  of  times  to  establish  her  police  system  in 
Manchuria,  in  Eastern  Mongolia,  and  then  in 
Fukien  province;  she  has  erected  wireless  stations 
at  Hankow  and  Tsinan  without  the  permission  of 
the  Chinese  Government ;  she  has  extended  her  civil 
administration  practically  over  the  entire  province 
of  Shantung  against  the  vigorous  protest  by  the 
Chinese  Government.  Are  these  not  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  infringements  upon  China's  independ- 
ence? On  the  other  hand.  Great  Britain  was,  at 
least  in  one  instance,  guilty  of  violating  China's 
territorial  integrity.  We  refer  to  the  secret  agree- 
ment which  she  entered  into  with  Japan,  in  Septem- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    119 

ber,  1917,  whereby  Shantung  was  handed  over  to 
her  ally.  With  these  instances  in  view,  it  would  be 
nothing  short  of  mockery  to  say  that  the  alliance 
aims  at  insuring  the  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  of  China. 

China's  objection  to  this  gratuitous  undertaking 
by  Japan  and  Great  Britain  is  greatly  strengthened 
by  the  fact  that  they  are  all  members  of  the  League 
of  Nations.  Article  X  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  provides:  'The  members  of  the  League 
undertake  to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  ex- 
ternal aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and 
existing  political  independence  of  all  members  of 
the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in 
case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression, 
the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the  means  by  which 
this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled."  This  article,  at 
the  last  meeting  at  Geneva  of  the  Assembly  of  the 
League,  has  been  recommended  for  retention  by  the 
Amendments  Committee.  It  is  plainly  unnecessary, 
therefore,  for  Japan  and  Great  Britain  to  renew 
their  undertaking,  which  is  meaningless  as  it  is 
never  meant  to  be  carried  out. 

As  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations,  China 
has  another  reason  against  the  renewal  of  the  al- 
liance. Obviously,  the  League  and  the  alliance  are 
incompatible  with  each  other — a  fact  which  is  ad- 
mitted by  Japan  and  Great  Britain  themselves  in 
their  promise  to  revise  the  treaty,  so  as  to  make  it 
accord  with  the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  Cove- 


120         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

nant.  Article  XX  of  the  Covenant  says:  "The 
members  of  the  League  severally  agree  that  this 
Covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obligations 
or  understandings  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent 
with  the  terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  undertake  that 
they  will  not  hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements 
inconsistent  with  the  terms  thereof."  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  have  officially  admitted  that  the  al- 
liance is  inconsistent  with  the  League  Covenant. 
Being  such,  it  should  be  abrogated  altogether.  To 
retain  it,  even  after  due  revision,  would  be  not  only 
contrary  to  the  specific  engagement  provided  for 
in  Article  XX,  but  also  violating  the  very  spirit  of 
the  League.  "Since  all  members  are  on  an  equality 
and  are  allied  for  common  purposes,"  observed  the 
New  York  Tribune,  "any  special  compact  between 
two  for  mutual  defence  of  their  rights  and  inter- 
ests against  a  third  member  is  theoretically  out- 
lawed. Great  Britain  is  bound  to  side  against 
Japan,  and  Japan  against  Britain,  in  any  case  of 
disputes  in  which  one  or  the  other  is  found  to  be 
in  the  wrong  by  the  League  Council  or  Assembly. 
The  dual  community  of  interest  is  thus  broken. 
There  can  be  no  casus  foederis  against  another 
league  member  as  to  which  either  signator  may 
exercise  its  independent  judgment.  Since,  also, 
the  Covenant  provides  for  treating  as  a  member 
any  non-member  involved  in  a  dispute  with  a  mem- 
ber, a  pledge  in  advance  by  two  Powers  to  assist 
each  other  is  a  violation  of  the  whole  spirit  of  the 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    121 

peace  enforcement  sections  of  the  League  code." 
In  other  words,  it  ought  to  be  plain  to  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  that  their  obligations  to  each  other 
as  allies  should  be  superseded  by  their  obligations 
as  members  of  the  League. 

A  still  more  serious  objection  may  be  raised  by 
China  against  the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  and  it  is 
that  the  instrument  has  been  an  impediment  to  her 
economic  development  for  the  last  twenty  years. 
Instances  are  not  lacking  to  show  that  Great 
Britain,  being  tied  to  her  political  partner  in  the  Far 
East,  has  nolens  volens  sided  with  Japan  on  many 
occasions,  in  spite  of  the  obvious  fact  that  her  own 
interests,  her  profession  for  the  Open  Door  in 
China,  and  her  undertakings  in  the  alliance  de- 
manded that  she  should  act  against  her  ally. 

One  typical  instance  in  which  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  actually  obstructed  China's  economic  de- 
velopment was  furnished  in  the  bickering  between 
China  and  Japan  in  regard  to  the  construction  of 
a  Manchurian  railway  in  1909.  In  November  of 
the  said  year,  the  Viceroy  of  Manchuria  entered 
into  a  contract  with  a  British  firm  to  build  an  ex- 
tension of  the  North  China  Railway  from  Hsin- 
mintun,  about  forty  miles  west  of  Mukden,  to 
Fakumen.  The  Japanese  Government  objected  to 
the  construction  of  the  line  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  in  the  neighbourhood  of  and  parallel  to  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway  which  was  transferred 
to  the  Japanese  hands  by  the  Portsmouth  Treaty 


122         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

of  Peace  between  Japan  and  Russia.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  nearest  point  on  the  proposed  line  is 
more  than  thirty-five  miles  distant  from  the  South 
Manchurian  Railway  and  separated  from  it  by  the 
Liao  River.  Furthermore,  it  is  a  very  well-known 
fact  that  very  little,  if  any,  of  the  trade  of  this 
fertile  and  thickly  populated  district  has  found  its 
way  to  the  South  Manchurian  Railway;  not  even 
to-day.  That  the  Japanese  contention  could  not 
be  supported  was  apparent;  but  the  British  Gov- 
ernment supported  the  Japanese  position,  and  the 
entire  scheme  fell  through.  Now,  it  may  be  said  with 
truth  that  the  failure  to  construct  the  line  in  question 
has  been  proved  to  be  a  very  serious  impediment 
to  the  economic  development  of  Manchuria.  At 
any  rate,  no  one  would  believe  that  the  position 
such  as  Japan  had  taken  in  this  dispute  was  in  the 
nature  of  preserving  "the  common  interests  of  all 
nations  in  China"  by  insuring  her  independence  and 
integrity  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities. 
It  was  a  denial  of  ''equal  opportunity";  it  was  a 
direct  attack  upon  China's  independence  and  in- 
tegrity by  blocking  her  right  of  way.  If  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  of  the  alliance  meant  one  thing  and 
did  another,  they  were  not  faithful  to  their  own 
words.  They  were  either  deceiving  themselves, 
which  was  improbable,  or  they  were  deceiving  the 
world.  If  they  did  what  they  never  meant  to  do, 
they  had,  at  least,   in  that  instance,  violated  the 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    123 

principle  of  the  Open  Door  and  thus  impeded  the 
economic  development  for  Manchuria. 

But  this  was  not  all.  As  soon  as  the  Hsinmintun- 
Fakumen  scheme  fell  through,  another  line  was  pro- 
posed— one  which  we  have  already  referred  to  in 
the  previous  chapter,  the  Chinchow-Aigun  Railway. 
This  line  was  to  run  from  Chinchow,  on  the  Gulf 
of  Pechili,  via  Taonanfu,  to  Tsitsihar,  on  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railway,  and  thence  north  to  Aigun, 
on  the  Amur  River,  covering  a  distance  of  about 
800  miles.  It  would  run  entirely  through  Mon- 
golia, with  the  exception  of  a  few  miles  at  both 
ends.  A  glance  at  the  geography  of  Manchuria 
and  Mongolia  would  show  that  whole  line  would 
at  no  place  come  within  a  distance  of  less  than 
fifty  miles  from  the  South  Manchurian  Railway, 
the  traffic  of  which  would  not  at  all  be  affected. 
But  Japan,  not  particularly  anxious  to  see  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia  developed  as  they  should  be, 
raised  the  same  objection  that  the  line  under  con- 
sideration would  injuriously  affect  the  traffic  of  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway,  and  therefore  blocked 
the  project  altogether.  This  action,  curiously 
enough,  was  again  supported  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. Unofficial  explanations  were  offered  that, 
being  tied  hard  and  fast  by  her  alliance  with  Japan, 
Great  Britain  could  have  no  other  choice  but  to  say 
ditto.  If  this  were  the  real  cause  for  the  British 
support,  as  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  it  was, 


124        CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

the  alliance  could  not  be  anything  else  but  a  serious 
impediment  to  China's  economic  development,  and 
ought  to  have  been  "denounced"  and  abrogated  as 
soon  as  possible.  The  alHance  of  1905,  as  that  of 
1911,  had  as  its  object  the  maintenance  of  the  com- 
mon interests  of  all  nations.  What  the  allies  had 
done  in  this  case  was  diametrically  opposed  to  their 
professed  object.  The  alliance  undertook,  as  it  was 
defined  in  the  preamble,  to  maintain  the  principle 
of  "equal  opportunity."  What  they  did  was  a  de- 
nial of  equal  opportunity,  not  to  the  other  Powers 
only,  but  to  China  as  well.  It  was  contrary  to  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  that 
these  two  Powers  had  blocked  the  Manchurian 
Railway  development;  it  was  in  violation  of  the 
Open  Door  principle  to  which  they  had  been 
pledged;  and  it  was  a  denial  to  China  to  exercise 
her  sovereign  rights  in  her  own  territory. 

It  is,  of  course,  always  difficult  to  say  just  exactly 
how  much  Great  Britain  was  behind  her  ally  in  these 
two  instances,  or  in  other  similar  cases.  It  is  easy 
to  understand,  however,  that  being  in  alliance  with 
Japan,  Great  Britain  did  not  enjoy  freedom  of 
action.  She  could  ill  afford  to  say  "no"  to  her  ally 
even  in  cases  when  she  knew  to  be  acting  contrary 
to  the  avowed  purposes  of  the  alliance,  or  against 
her  own  interests.  We  can  readily  see  that  Great 
Britain  did  not  need  to  endorse  everything  that 
Japan  might  do  in  China.  Her  complaisant  atti- 
tude towards  Japanese  policy  in  China,  however, 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    125 

made  it  hard  to  say  whether  or  not  Great  Britain 
was  in  complete  accord  with  her  ally. 

This  policy  of  complaisance,  which  the  alliance 
has  apparently  induced  Great  Britain  to  adopt  re- 
garding Japanese  activities  in  the  Far  East  in  gen- 
eral and  in  China  in  particular,  is  the  ground  for 
the  belief,  generally  held  among  the  Chinese,  that 
the  renewal  of  the  alliance  is  tantamount  to  a  pub- 
lic endorsement  by  Great  Britain  of  Japanese  policy 
in  China  and  a  "recognition  of  the  status  quo." 

Since  1911  when  the  alliance  was  revised  and 
extended,  a  good  deal  of  water  has  flowed  under 
the  political  bridge  of  the  Far  East.  In  those  years 
immediately  following  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in 
Europe  and  before  the  conclusion  of  peace,  Japan 
has  entrenched  herself  so  firmly  that  her  present 
position  and  influence  in  China  is  not  only  domi- 
nating, but  domineering.  She  went  into  Manchuria 
in  1905  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  and  she  has  remained  there  ever  since. 
Through  her  control  over  the  means  of  communi- 
cation, over  the  Manchurian  currency  (largely  by 
the  Bank  of  Chosen),  and  over  the  postal  and 
telegraphic  systems,  Manchuria  is  to-day  virtually  a 
Japanese  economic  reserve.  She  went  into  Shan- 
tung in  November,  1914,  and  in  spite  of  her  re- 
peated promise  to  China  and  to  the  world  at  large 
to  get  out,  she  has  remained  there.  By  her  sys- 
tematic appropriation  of  the  valuable  properties  in 
Kiaochow  and  Tsingtao  left  over  by  the  Germans, 


126         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

by  her  extensive  investment  in  land,  and  by  her 
control  over  the  railways,  Shantung  is  to-day 
another  Manchuria  to  her.  In  1915,  she  presented 
the  "twenty-one  demands"  *  on  China,  and  by 
threat  of  war,  she  forced  the  unwilling  Govern- 
ment at  Peking  to  accept.  In  a  recent  statement  by 
a  Japanese  Government  official,  it  is  said  that  Japan 
would  absolutely  refuse  "scrapping  the  twenty- 
one  demands."  In  1918,  a  clash  occurred  between 
Japanese  soldiers  and  Chinese  police  at  Cheng- 
chiatun,  Manchuria.  Under  the  pretext  of  main- 
taining peace  in  the  district,  Japan  established  her 
police  system  there,  which  has  remained  ever  since. 
The  same  was  attempted  at  Amoy  but  last  year., 
And  then  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  during  the 
last  four  or  five  years,  Japan  has  loaned  to  Chinese 
officials  in  the  North  as  well  as  in  the  South  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  on  the  civil  war,  to  an  amount 
approximating  Yen  350,000,000.  Because  of  this 
huge  sum  which  Japan  has  loaned  to  China,  she  is 
now  in  a  dominating  position  in  regard  to  Chinese: 
\  finance.     In  short,  Japan's  policy  in  China  for  th 


*  The  Twenty-one  Demands  were  presented  to  China  in 
five  Groups.  The  first  group  consists  of  those  which  assure 
Japan  of  her  succession  to  the  German  rights  in  Shantung 
the  second,  of  those  which  extend  Japan's  lease  of  Port 
Arthur  and  Talienwan,  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  and 
the  Autung-Mukden  Railway,  and  assure  her  economic  (and 
political)  rights  in  Eastern  Mongolia;  the  third  relating  to 
the  taking  over  of  the  Hanyehping  Ironworks  by  a  Chino- 
Japanese  company ;  the  fourth  relating  to  the  non-alienation 
of  Chinese  territory;  and  the  fifth  relating  to  the  employ- 
ment of  Japanese  advisers,  Japanese  "missionary"  propa- 
ganda, control  of  China's  munitions  of  war,  etc.,  etc. 


*1 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    127 

last  ten  years  at  least  is  one  of  economic  penetra- 
tion and  political  aggression.  She  has  discarded 
every  argument  of  prudence,  and  every  considera- 
tion of  restraint.  She  reckons  on  the  continuous 
and  almost  almost  unquestioned  support  from 
Great  Britain,  who,  as  we  have  said  before,  is,  be- 
cause of  the  existence  of  the  alliance,  deprived  of 
her  freedom  of  action,  if  not  her  independent  judg- 
ment, and  is  consequently  incapable  of  following 
any  other  course  than  of  supporting  or  at  least 
acquiescing  in  her  ally's  policy  in  China.  When 
she  was  pressing  the  Twenty-one  Demands  on 
China,  the  United  States  filed  a  protest  with  both 
the  Chinese  and  Japanese  Governments.  But  Great 
Britain,  her  hands  being  tied  by  the  alliance,  had 
not  a  word  to  say.  And  what  more  convincing 
proof  does  the  world  need  to  show  that  Great 
Britain  has  always  been  on  Japan's  side  than  the 
secr^  agreement  which  she  entered  into  in  1917, 
giving  Shantung  to  her  ally?  Judged  by  her  con- 
duct in  the  Far  East  for  the  last  few  years,  Japan 
cares  little  or  nothing  about  the  bitter  resentments 
which  she  has  provoked  in  China  and  the  unfavour- 
able public  opinion  which  she  has  created  in  the 
Western  world.  So  long  as  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  remains,  so  long  will  Great  Britain  be  on 
her  side,  in  a  diplomatic  sense  at  least ;  and  so  long 
as  Great  Britain  takes  the  side  of  her  ally  and  acts 
as  her  second  in  all  Far  Eastern  affairs,  so  long 
will  Japan  follow  her  policy  of  economic  penetra- 


128         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

tion  and  political  aggression  in  China.  There  is, 
therefore,  more  than  legitimate  ground  to  suppose 
that  the  continuance  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance, 
even  in  a  modified  form,  will  mean  the  continuance 
of  Japan's  domination  in  China. 

A  word  may  be  said  about  the  assertion  that  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  seeks  to  maintain  peace  in 
the  Far  East — an  assertion  which  has  been  repeated 
ad  nauseam.  Now,  has  the  alliance  really  main- 
tained peace  in  the  Far  East?  The  answer  is  not 
far  to  seek.  It  may  be  said  that,  while  it  is  well 
borne  out  by  the  language  of  the  alliance,  the  as- 
sertion is  not  substantiated  by  the  fact.  In  con- 
cluding the  agreement  in  1902,  the  Governments 
of  Japan  and  Great  Britain  were  said  to  be  "actu- 
ated solely  by  a  desire  to  maintain  the  statits  quo 
and  general  peace  in  the  extreme  East."  When  re- 
vised and  renewed  in  1905,  the  alliance  had  as  one 
of  its  objects :  "The  consolidation  and  maintenance 
of  the  general  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia 
and  of  India."  The  same  wish  was  expressed  in 
the  third  agreement,  in  exactly  the  same  language. 
These  stipulations,  however,  are  nothing  more  than 
the  pious  wishes  of  the  Contracting  Powers  and 
are  never  meant  to  be  realised.  Or  else,  the  out- 
break of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  1904  and  the 
Anglo- Japanese  joint  attack  upon  the  German 
leased  territory  in  China  in  1914  would  not  be  very 
happy  examples  of  the  preservation  of  peace  in  the 
Far  East.    And  unless  one  speaks  with  tongue  in 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   129 

the  cheek,  it  is  hardly  accurate  to  say  that  the  mo- 
bilisation by  Japan  of  her  military  and  naval  forces 
to  compel  China  to  accept  the  'Twenty-one  De- 
mands," and  the  military  expedition  to  Siberia 
which  has  resulted  in  the  occupation  by  Japan  of 
Vladivostock,  of  Niklolaievsk,  of  the  northern  half 
of  Saghalien,  and  of  Eastern  Siberia,  are  exactly 
in  the  nature  of  preserving  peace  in  Eastern  Asia 
as  provided  for  in  the  terms  of  the  alliance. 

On  the  contrary,  the  alliance,  instead  of  being  an 
instrument  of  peace,  has  proved  to  be  an  instru- 
ment of  war.  At  least  for  two  armed  conflicts  in 
the  Far  East,  the  alliance  can  be  said  to  be  directly 
responsible.  If  one  thing  is  more  certain  than 
another,  it  is  that  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  the 
direct  and  almost  immediate  outcome  of  the  al- 
liance.*    In   the   first  place,   the   agreement  was 

*  Speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons,  February  13,  1902, 
defending  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  Mr. 
Arthur  J.  Balfour  said  that  the  alliance  would  make  "strongly 
for  peace."  "In  these  days,"  he  continued,  "while  a  war  be- 
tween two  Powers  is  sufficiently  formidable,  a  war  in  which 
a  large  number  of  Powers  is  involved  is  practically  so  great 
an  undertaking  that  even  the  most  adventurous  statesmanship 
would  shrink  from  it.  If  it  were  possible  for  two  first-class 
Powers  to  coalesce  to  fight  against  Japan,  the  result  would  be 
either  that  Japan  would  be  crushed,  would  suffer  very  serious 
losses,  and  be  practically  crippled,  or  that  before  that  event 
took  place  she  would  modify  her  policy  to  suit  the  demands 
of  her  two  antagonists  (the  two  antagonists  Mr.  Balfour  had 
then  in  mind  were  Russia  and  France).  It  is  neither  good 
for  us  that  Japan  should  be  crushed,  nor  that  through  a 
coalition  of  two  Powers  she  should  be  obliged  to  mould  her 
policy  in  a  direction  antagonistic  to  our  interests.  Now  that 
this  Treaty  has  been  carried  out,  it  is  quite  evident  that  that 
contingency  can  not  take  place.  There  never  can  be  two 
Powers  ranged  against  Japan  alone,  any  more  than  there  can 


130         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

entered  into  in  anticipation  of  an  armed  struggle 
between  Japan  and  Russia.  And  secondly,  the 
undertaking  by  Great  Britain  to  remain  neutral 
when  Japan  was  involved  in  war  with  one  Power 
only,  and  to  come  to  Japan's  assistance  when  she 
was  attacked  by  more  than  one  Power,  had  the 
effect  of  not  only  keeping  the  field  clear  for  Japa- 
nese action,  when  actual  hostilities  were  com- 
menced, but  also  encouraging  Japan  to  go  on  the 
war-path,  when  she  could  yet  be  dissuaded  from 
resorting  to  force.  In  1914,  upon  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  in  Europe,  Sir  Conyngham  Greene,  then 
British  Ambassador  at  Tokio,  made  a  formal  re- 
quest on  behalf  of  his  Government  for  Japanese 
assistance  under  the  terms  of  the  alliance.  On 
August  4,  Baron  Kato,  then  Japanese  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  replied  that  Japan  would  be  ready 
to  meet  the  responsibilities  which  she  had  assumed 
according  to  the  terms  of  the  alliance.  Thus,  on 
August  14,  Japan  sent  an  ultimatum  to  the  Ger- 
man Government,  demanding  Germany  to  withdraw 
from  the  Far  East  entirely.    Upon  Germany's  fail- 


be  two  Powers  ranged  against  us  alone  in  the  Far  East.  That 
fact  clearly  and  evidently  makes  for  what  is  the  greatest 
interest  of  the  civilised  world — the  interest  of  peace."  Appar- 
ently, Mr.  Balfour  did  not  think  that  a  war  between  Japan 
and  Russia  alone  would  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world. 
Lord  Lansdowne,  who  concluded  the  alliance,  was  more  prac- 
tical. Speaking  in  the  House  of  Lx)rds  on  the  same  day,  he 
said :  "It  is  an  agreement  which  will  make  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  peace  of  the  world,  and  should  that  peace 
unfortunately  be  broken,  its  effect  will  be  to  restrict  the  area 
within  which  hostilities  are  likely  to  take  place." 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    131 

lire  to  accept,  Japan  issued,  on  August  23,  the  dec- 
laration of  war,  in  which  she  referred  to  the  obli- 
gation she  incurred  under  the  alliance  as  the  ground 
for  her  action. 

In  view  of  these  facts,  it  will  be  presuming  too 
much  upon  the  intelligence  of  the  world  to  say  that 
the  alliance  has  succeeded  in  preserving  the  peace 
in  the  Far  East.  China  has  very  strong  reasons 
for  complaining  against  the  failure  of  the  Contract- 
ing Powers  to  carry  out  the  fundamental  object, 
as  it  has  been  so  called,  of  the  alliance.  Of  course, 
whether  the  alliance  has  or  has  not  succeeded  in 
maintaining  peace  in  the  Far  East  is  a  question  that 
does  not  directly  concern  China.  But  the  fact  that, 
because  of  its  failure  to  maintain  peace,  wars  were 
fought  right  on  the  Chinese  territory,  is  a  serious 
question  which  China  cannot  overlook.  The  Russo- 
Japanese  War  was  fought  in  Manchuria,  and  the 
Anglo-Japanese  attack  upon  the  German  fortress  at 
Tsingtao  was  carried  on  in  the  Province  of  Shan- 
tung. China's  neutrality  was  violated;  her  sov- 
ereignty was  infringed  upon;  and  her  territorial 
rights  were  totally  disregarded.  And  what  is  worse 
is  that,  after  each  conflict,  the  victorious  party  re- 
mains on  the  Chinese  territory!  Japan  would  not 
have  closed  the  Open  Door  in  Manchuria  had  she 
not  secured  for  herself  as  a  result  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  such  a  stronghold  therein  as  to 
enable  her  to  do  whatever  she  might  please;  and 
she  would  not  have  been  in  Shantung  to-day  if  she 


132         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

had  not  been  requested  under  the  terms  of  the  al- 
liance to  dispossess  the  Germans  from  their  leased 
territory  in  China,  so  as  to  maintain  peace  in  the 
Far  East.  These  violations  of  China's  neutrality, 
encroachments  upon  her  sovereign  rights,  and  at- 
tacks upon  her  territorial  integrity — are  they  not, 
one  and  all,  the  direct  blessings  of  the  Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance?  For  these  blessings,  China  should 
be  thankful  to  none  but  Japan  and  Great  Britain, 
who  contracted  the  alliance  to  maintain  peace  only 
to  have  war. 


VII 
CONCLUSION 

WHAT  action  is  to  be  taken  on  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance?  Will  the  Washington 
conference  permit  it  to  be  renewed,  re- 
vised, and  extended?  Or,  can  a  general  under- 
standing be  reached  at  the  conference  to  take  the 
place  of  the  alliance? 

Strictly  speaking,  the  alliance  is  an  affair  exclu- 
sively between  Japan  and  Great  Britain.  These  two 
Powers  are,  therefore,  disposed,  at  least  technically, 
to  take  the  view  that  the  question  of  the  renewal 
or  non-renewal  of  the  alliance  is  separate  from  the 
discussions  of  the  armament  conference.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  fact  is  well  recognised  that  these 
two  questions  are  interdependent,  and  that  neither 
Japan,  nor  Great  Britain,  nor  the  United  States  can 
proceed  far  with  either  question  without  the  other. 
It  is  not  at  all  unlikely,  particularly  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  armament  conference  is  also  to  discuss 
the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  problems,  that  some 
general  understanding  on  broad  principles  will  be 
reached  among  the  Powers  interested  in  the  Pacific 
and  the  Far  East  so  as  to  make  the  renewal  of  the 
alliance  entirely  unnecessary. 

There  is  a  general  belief  that  the  Washington 
133 


134        CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

conference  on  limitation  of  armaments  furnishes 
the  opportunity  of  developing  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  into  an  agreement  among  all  the  Powers 
interested  in  the  Eastern  hemisphere.  The  New 
York  Evening  Post  points  out  that,  "if  we  only 
will,  we  can  seize  upon  this  question  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  and  expand  it  into  a  grand  assize 
of  the  Pacific."  Viscount  Kato  of  Japan  said  that 
the  prime  motive  of  the  Washington  conference 
lay  in  the  common  desire  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  to  seek  some  agreement  between 
themselves,  and  between  them  and  Japan,  in  the 
hope  of  replacing  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance. 

The  hope  that  a  Pacific  understanding  of  some 
kind  would  result  from  the  Washington  confer- 
ence so  as  to  take  the  place  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  is  shared  by  many  responsible  statesmen 
of  British  Dominions  and  frankly  avowed  by  the 
British  Prime  Minister.  In  his  speech  to  the  House 
of  Commons  on  August  18,  1921,  while  saying 
ditto  to  the  American  Secretary  of  State  in  regard 
to  the  programme  of  the  Washington  conference 
and  praising  the  loyalty  of  the  Japanese  to  the  treaty 
of  alliance/ the  British  Prime  Minister  made  it  quite 
plain  that  England  would  be  at  once  pleased  and 
relieved  if  the  outcome  of  the  deliberations  at 
Washington  could  put  aside  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  and  substitute  for  it  a  Pacific  Ocean  under- 
standing in  which  all  the  Powers,  including  China, 
especially  interested  in  the  great  problems  of  the 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    135 

Pacific  and  of  the  Far  East  are  ready  to  join^  In 
other  words,  the  British  Premier,  like  many  of  his 
fellow  countrymen,  has  seen  in  the  Washington 
conference  an  opportunity  of  evolving  some  dip- 
lomatic formula  which  can  take  the  place  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  "In  the  part  of  his  speech 
in  the  Commons  which  dealt  with  the  Japanese  al- 
liance," the  New  York  Times  remarked,  "Mr. 
Lloyd  George  had  the  air  of  a  man  rubbing  his 
hands  over  happily  getting  rid  of  a  troublesome 
question."  But  the  "troublesome  question"  has  not 
yet  been  gotten  rid  of.  The  question  is  one  yet  to 
be  solved.  There  had  been  some  doubt  at  first 
whether  the  joint  communication  to  the  League  of 
Nations  about  the  treaty  of  the  alliance  had  not 
had  the  legal  effect  of  "denouncing"  it.  But  the 
Lord  High  Chancellor  has  since  definitely  decided 
that  it  had  not — a  view  shared  by  the  Japanese 
Government  itself.  The  treaty  of  alliance  is,  there- 
fore, by  its  own  terms,  in  force  for  one  more  year, 
and  will  continue  to  be  in  force  indefinitely  until 
one  year  after  its  denunciation.  And  in  the  second 
place,  there  is  no  assurance  that  any  hard  and  fast 
understanding  such  as  the  British  or  the  Japanese 
diplomats  might  expect  will  emerge  from  the  Wash- 
ington conference  with  the  United  States  and  China 
as  its  contracting  parties.  China  has  learned  to 
cherish  great  suspicions  against  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  or  any  similar  international  agreement.  As 
the  Chinese  Minister  at  Washington  has  pointed 


136         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

out,  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  "is  a  warlike 
measure  designed  by  England  and  Japan  to  protect 
their  interests  in  the  Far  East."  It  can  be  taken 
for  granted  that  China  will  not  bind  herself  to  any 
"warlike  measure"  which  seeks  to  further  Anglo- 
Japanese  interests  in  the  Far  East.  In  the  past,  the 
alliance  has  been  nothing  but  a  diplomatic  instru- 
ment which  safeguards  and  improves  the  interests 
of  Japan  and  Great  Britain  in  the  Far  East  largely 
at  the  expense  of  China.  Is  it  likely,  or  is  it  think- 
able, that  China  will  lend  her  hand  in  the  making 
of  the  rope  which  is  designed  for  her  own  strangu- 
lation ? 

On  the  other  hand,  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  towards  entangling  alliances  is  too  well- 
known  to  be  pointed  out  here.  The  United  States 
will  not  enter  into  any  agreement  partaking  the 
nature  of  an  alliance,  nor  will  she  become  a  party 
to  any  understanding  which  binds  her  to  a  certain 
course  of  action  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Far  East 
other  than  that  of  maintaining  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  Open  Door  and  equality  of  opportunity. 
This  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  political  prediction. 
The  policy  of  the  United  States  towards  entangling 
engagements  is  well  known,  and  no  one  need  be  a 
political  prophet  in  order  to  be  able  to  foretell  what 
she  might  or  might  not  do  in  regard  to  proposals 
of  an  Anglo-American-Chinese-Japanese  alliance. 
Thus,  when  Premier  Lloyd  George  expressed  the 
hope  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  Great  Britain's 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    137 

alliance  with  Japan  may  yet  emerge  into  a  greater 
understanding  between  Great  Britain,  Japan,  the 
United  States  and  China  on  all  problems  of  the  Pa- 
cific to  serve  as  a  guarantee  of  peace  in  that  region, 
the  administration  at  Washington  was  ominously 
silent,  and  no  indication  has  been  forthcoming  that 
the  hope  so  generally  cherished  by  the  statesmen 
of  Great  Britain  will  be  realised  as  a  result  of  the 
Washington  conference.  "But  a  common  under- 
standing between  the  Powers  interested  in  the  Far 
East,  with  a  view  to  maintaining  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  Open  Door  and  equality  of  opportunity, 
would  be  welcome  to  the  Administration,"  said  the 
Washington  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Times 
in  a  special  despatch  to  that  paper,  August  19, 
1921.  "Officials  are  inclined  to  make  sharp  distinc- 
tions between  the  kind  of  agreements  that  might 
be  entered  into,"  he  continued.  "In  the  usually 
accepted  sense,  an  alliance  is  an  agreement  entered 
into  by  two  or  more  Powers  to  protect  particular 
interests.  In  the  modern  acceptance  of  an  agree- 
ment, the  Contracting  Parties  reach  an  accord  upon 
common  principles  which  are  to  actuate  them  in 
their  dealings  with  the  other  parties.  It  is  this  kind 
of  understanding  that  the  Harding  Administration 
would  be  likely  to  take  an  interest  in.  Whether  the 
United  States  would  be  willing  to  enter  a  tripartite 
understanding  to  the  extent  of  agreeing  to  a  cer- 
tain course  of  action  is  doubtful."  In  other  words, 
what  the  United  States  would  like  to  arrange  is  an 


138         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

agreement  among  all  the  Powers  interested  in  the 
Pacific  upon  the  principles  that  shall  govern  them 
in  dealing  with  the  questions  that  may  arise  in  the 
Eastern  Hemisphere.  It  will  be  an  agreement  to 
which  China  can  become  a  willing  and  consenting 
party.  The  British  statesmen  and  diplomatists  may 
send  out  all  their  trial  balloons  to  test  the  public 
sentiment  in  the  United  States.  They  are,  one  and 
all,  destined  to  collapse,  if  their  goal  is  a  hard  and 
fast  agreement  to  take  the  place  of  the  Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance,  the  renewal  of  which  Japanese  states- 
men have  endeavoured  to  bring  about,  but  British 
statesmen  have  apparently  decided  to  avoid.  The 
United  States  cannot  be  expected  to  allow  herself  to 
be  tied  to  the  wheels  of  the  chariot  of  Anglo-Japa- 
nese diplomacy,  and  it  would  be  foolish  to  suppose 
that  the  nation  which  has  declined  even  to  become  a 
member  of  the  League  of  Nations  could  ever  be 
persuaded  to  form  a  hide-bound  partnership  with 
Japan  and  Great  Britain.  While  it  is  not  impos- 
sible, in  fact,  it  is  to  be  hoped  for,  that  as  a  result 
of  the  Washington  conference  a  general  under- 
standing will  be  reached  in  regard  to  the  problems 
in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East,  it  is  entirely  out 
of  question  that  either  China  or  the  United  States 
will  enter  into  any  agreement  that  has  as  its  ob- 
ject the  protection  of  special  interests  of  particular 
Powers  in  the  Far  East,  as  it  is  the  case  with  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance. 

The  question  will  naturally  arise:  To  what  kind 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    139 

of  agreement  will  China  become  a  consenting  and 
willing  party?  Of  course,  China's  position  vis-d- 
vis  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  is  well  known  and 
requires  no  further  elucidation.  It  is  to  be  ex- 
pected that  she  will  vigorously  oppose  any  attempt 
to  bring  about  an  international  agreement  that  is 
similar  to  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  in  object  and 
in  practice.  She  will  perhaps  be  ready  to  consent 
to  an  agreement  in  which  the  Powers,  instead  of 
undertaking,  as  it  has  been  their  favourite  pastime 
in  the  past,  to  guarantee  her  independence  and  in- 
tegrity, pledge  themselves  not  to  encroach  upon 
China  and  to  redeem  their  existing  relations  which 
seriously  affect  her  independence  and  integrity.  In 
other  words,  China  will  welcome  a  negative  under- 
taking, instead  of  a  positive  guarantee.  At  present, 
there  are  in  existence  more  than  ten  treaties  and 
agreements  in  which  China's  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence are  guaranteed,  but  none  of  which  have 
been  of  any  effect.  China  has  never  asked  any 
Power  to  guarantee  her  independence  and  integrity; 
what  she  wants  is  that  the  Powers  do  not  violate 
them.  To  assume  the  role  of  a  guarantor  without 
reference  to  her  wishes  is  a  humiliating  insult, 
which  can  be  easily  appreciated  by  the  Powers  them- 
selves. And  then  China  will  perhaps  also  be  ready 
to  consent  to  an  agreement  in  which  the  Powers, 
instead  of  proclaiming  once  again  the  Open  Door 
policy  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for 
all  nations,  merely  undertake  not  to  do  anything  to 


140         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

obstruct  China's  economic  development.  In  other 
words,  China  welcomes  an  engagement  by  the  Pow- 
ers not  to  obstruct  her  economic  freedom,  instead 
of  an  undertaking  by  them  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  Open  Door  policy.  Of  course,  it  is  needless 
to  add  that  any  agreement  that  tends  to  preserve 
peace  in  the  Far  East  and  in  the  world  is  welcome 
to  China. 

But  the  last  Power  to  be  heard  from  is  Japan, 
who  can  really  help  make  the  Washington  confer- 
ence a  success  or  a  failure.  It  is  a  well-known 
fact  that  Japan  is  very  anxious  to  continue  the  al- 
liance, and  through  her  opposition  or  approval,  an 
international  agreement  along  the  lines  such  as  sug- 
gested above  may  become  a  possibility  or  merely  a 
day  dream. 

It  is  interesting  to  examine  the  reasons  given  for 
the  renewal  of  the  alliance.  From  the  Japanese 
point  of  view,  it  is  urged  that  the  friendly  relations 
between  Japan  and  Great  Britain  require  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  alliance;  that  unless  it  is  renewed, 
Japan  will  be  diplomatically  isolated;  and  that  it 
is  still  needed  in  view  of  the  Bolshevik  menace 
from  Russia.  On  the  other  hand.  Great  Britain 
is  lukewarm  in  her  interest  in  the  continuance  of 
the  alliance,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  public  utter- 
ances of  her  leading  statesmen.  Whatever  argu- 
ments there  are  in  favour  of  the  alliance,  they  are 
offered  by  Premier  Hughes  of  Australia,  who,  nev- 
ertheless, like  all  his  colleagues,  thinks  of  the  al- 


AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    141 

liance  predominantly  in  terms  of  the  United  States. 
He  favours  the  renewal  of  the  alliance  on  the 
ground  that  it  affords  the  cheapest  means  of  pro- 
tection for  Australia,*  that  Great  Britain  would  be 
in  a  better  position  to  exercise  her  influence  upon 
Japan's  policy  as  an  ally  rather  than  as  a  potential 
enemy.  Besides  these  two  reasons,  there  seems  to 
be  in  England  a  general  feeling  that,  for  a  country 


*  In  this  connection,  it  is  highly  interesting  to  remember 
the  argument  which  Premier  Hughes  of  Australia  has  ad- 
vanced in  urging  the  renewal  of  the  alliance,  and  to  compare 
it  with  the  statement  which  he  had  made  in  1911,  when  the 
alliance  was  under  revision.  In  1911,  Premier  Hughes,  among 
the  supporters  of  the  alliance,  said  that  he  welcomed  it  as 
giving  Australia  ten  more  years  to  strengthen  her  defence. 
His  present  argument  is  that  the  safety  of  Australia  demands 
the  continuance  of  the  alliance  which  is  regarded  as  the 
cheapest  means  of  protection.  This  amounts  to  saying:  "Aus- 
tralia is  afraid  of  Japan,  and  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  bind 
her  in  an  alliance  to  diminish  her  danger  and  to  save  the  cost 
of  a  huge  navy."  This  point  of  view  is  very  easy  for  the 
Japanese  to  understand.  Under  the  caption  "Alliance  and 
Navy,"  the  Jiji,  a  well-known  Japanese  daily,  remarks  sar- 
castically: "Mr.  Hughes's  attitude  toward  the  alliance  was 
cool  in  the  spring  of  last  year  (1920)  when  Australia  was 
determined  to  build  a  'self -guaranteeing  navy,'  with  Japan  for 
their  hypothetical  enemy.  But  now  (June,  1921)  both  the 
Premier  (Mr.  Hughes)  and  the  Secretary  of  Finance  (Sir 
Joseph  Cook),  who  was  formerly  Secretary  of  Navy,  extol 
the  service  of  the  Japanese  Navy  in  the  past  and  express 
themselves  desirous  of  the  maintenance  of  the  same  relations 
in  future.  Seeing  that  a  battleship  will  cost  Yen  80,000,000 
in  the  near  future,  and  that  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  build  a 
really  strategically  efficient  navy,  it  is  quite  reasonable  for  the 
Australian  Government  to  try  and  economise  naval  expendi- 
ture by  means  of  every  diplomatic  means.  As  it  is  almost 
unimaginable  that  so  long  as  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance 
remains  in  force  Australia  should  be  attacked  by  a  third 
Power,  why  should  they  not  ensure  their  national  defence 
economically  by  making  use  of  the  alliance?"  It  is  open  to 
question,  however,  whether  Premier  Hughes's  attitude  repre- 
sents the  real  sentiment  of  the  Australian  people. 


142         CHINA,  THE  UNITED  STATES 

which  has  been  in  continuous  alliance  with  Por- 
tugal since  the  twelfth  century,  it  does  not  look 
well  to  throw  Japan  over  "after  nearly  twenty 
years  of  amicable  intimacy." 

We  need  not  go  into  the  merits  of  the  arguments. 
Whether  or  not  they  can  be  considered  as  valid 
reasons  for  urging  the  renewal  of  the  alliance  ought 
to  be  very  clear  to  those  who  have  watched  the 
international  situation  of  to-day.  There  can  be 
no  denying  that  Japan,  for  reasons  apparently 
other  than  those  given  above,  is  very  anxious  to 
have  the  alliance  renewed  and  extended,  and  she 
will  leave  no  stone  unturned  to  achieve  her  ambi- 
tion. Great  Britain  is,  however,  lukewarm  in  her 
interest  in  the  alliance,  and  owing  to  the  objections 
from  the  Dominions  and  China  and  America,  she 
is  more  than  ready  to  drop  it  altogether.  If  the 
alliance  is  to  be  dropped,  she  is,  of  course  desirous 
of  avoiding  "humiliating  Japan  and  perhaps  arous- 
ing within  her  a  spirit  which  might  react  unfor- 
tunately upon  the  situation  in  the  Pacific."  So,  in 
a  the  last  analysis,  Japan  is  the  one  and  only  one 
^--'  Power  who  can  help  or  kill  the  chance  of  suc- 
cessful arrival  at  a  general  understanding  in  place 
of  the  alliance.  There  can  be  no  hope  for  such  a 
general  understanding,  if  Japan  has  in  view  some- 
thing quite  apart  from  the  avowed  objects  of  the 
alliance. 


APPENDIX  A 

AGREEMENT     BETWEEN     GREAT     BRITAIN     AND     JAPAN, 

RELATIVE  TO  CHINA  AND  COREA   (ALLIANCE,  ETC.). 

SIGNED  AT  LONDON,   JANUARY  30,    1902 

The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  actu- 
ated solely  by  a  desire  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and 
general  peace  in  the  extreme  East,  being  moreover 
specially  interested  in  maintaining  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and 
the  Empire  of  Corea,  and  in  securing  equal  oppor- 
tunities in  those  countries  for  the  commerce  and  in- 
dustry of  all  nations,  hereby  agree  as  follows : — 

ARTICLE   I 

The  High  Contracting  Parties,  having  mutually  rec- 
ognised the  independence  of  China  and  Corea,  de- 
clare themselves  to  be  entirely  uninfluenced  by  any 
aggressive  tendencies  in  either  country.  Having  in 
view,  however,  their  special  interests  of  which  those 
of  Great  Britain  relate  principally  to  China,  while 
Japan,  in  addition  to  the  interests  which  she  pos- 
sesses in  China,  is  interested  in  a  peculiar  degree  politi- 
cally as  well  as  commercially  and  industrially  in  Corea, 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  recognise  that  it  will  be 
admissible  for  either  of  them  to  take  such  measures 
as  may  be  indispensable  in  order  to  safeguard  those 
interests  if  threatened  either  by  the  aggressive  action 

143 


144  APPENDICES 

of  any  other  Power,  or  by  disturbances  arising  in 
China  or  Corea,  and  necessitating  the  intervention  of 
either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Hves  and  property  of  its  subjects. 

ARTICLE  II 

If  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan,  in  the  defence  of 
their  respective  interests  as  above  described,  should 
become  involved  in  war  with  another  Power,  the  other 
High  Contracting  Party  will  maintain  a  strict  neu- 
trality, and  use  its  efforts  to  prevent  other  Powers 
from  joining  in  hostilities  against  its  ally. 

ARTICLE  III 

If,  in  the  above  event,  any  other  Power  or  Powers 
should  join  in  hostilities  against  that  ally,  the  other 
High  Contracting  Party  will  come  to  its  assistance, 
and  will  conduct  the  war  in  common,  and  make  peace 
in  mutual  agreement  with  it. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  neither  of 
them  will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into 
separate  arrangements  with  another  Power  to  the 
prejudice  of  the  interests  above  described. 

ARTICLE  V 

Whenever,  in  opinion  of  either  Great  Britain  or 
Japan,  the  above-mentioned  interests  are  in  jeopardy, 
the  two  Governments  will  communicate  with  one  an- 
other fully  and  frankly. 


APPENDICES  145 


ARTICLE  VI 


The  present  Agreement  shall  come  into  effect  imme- 
diately after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and  remain  in 
force  for  five  years  from  that  date. 

In  case  neither  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
should  have  notified  twelve  months  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  said  five  years  the  intention  of  terminating 
it,  it  shall  remain  binding  until  the  expiration  of  one 
year  from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  shall  have  denounced  it.  But  if,  when 
the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either  ally  is 
actually  engaged  in  war,  the  alliance,  shall,  ipso  facto, 
continue  until  peace  is  concluded. 

In  faith  whereof  the  Undersigned,  duly  authorised 
by  their  respective  Governments,  have  signed  this 
Agreement,  and  have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  in  duplfcate  at  London,  the  30th  day  of  Janu- 
ary, 1902. 

(L.S.)  Lansdowne,  His  Britannic  Majesty's 
Principal  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs. 
(L.S.)  Hayashi,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James. 


APPENDIX  B 

The  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  to  Sir  C.  MacDonald 

Foreign  Office,  January  30,  1902. 
Sir: 

I  have  signed  to-day,  with  the  Japanese  Minister, 
an  Agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  of 
which  a  copy  is  enclosed  in  this  despatch. 

This  Agreement  may  be  regarded  as  the  outcome 
of  the  events  which  have  taken  place  during  the  last 
two  years  in  the  Far  East,  and  of  the  part  taken  by 
Great  Britain  and  Japan  in  dealing  with  them. 

Throughout  the  troubles  and  complications  which 
arose  in  China  consequent  upon  the  Boxer  outbreak 
and  the  attack  upon  the  Peking  Legations,  the  two 
Powers  have  been  in  close  and  uninterrupted  commu- 
nication, and  have  been  actuated  by  similar  views. 

We  have  each  of  us  desired  that  the  integrity  and 
independence  of  the  Chinese  Empire  should  be  pre- 
served, that  there  should  be  no  disturbance  of  the  ter- 
ritorial status  quo  either  in  China  or  in  the  adjoining 
regions,  that  all  nations  should,  within  those  regions, 
as  well  as  within  the  limits  of  the  Chinese  Empire, 
be  afforded  equal  opportunities  for  the  development 
of  their  commerce  and  industry,  and  that  peace  should 
not  only  be  restored,  but  should,  for  the  future,  be 
maintained. 

From  the  frequent  exchanges  of  views  which  have 
taken  place  between  the  two  Governments,  and  from 

146 


APPENDICES  147 

the  discovery  that  their  Far  Eastern  policy  was  iden- 
tical, it  has  resulted  that  each  side  has  expressed  the 
desire  that  their  common  policy  should  find  expression 
in  an  international  contract  of  binding  validity. 

We  have  thought  it  desirable  to  record  it  in  the 
Preamble  of  that  instrument  the  main  objects  of  our 
common  policy  in  the  Far  East  to  which  I  have  al- 
ready referred,  and  in  the  first  Article  we  join  in 
entirely  disclaiming  any  aggressive  tendencies  either 
in  China  or  Corea.  We  have,  however,  thought  it 
necessary  also  to  place  on  record  the  view  entertained 
by  both  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  that,  should  their 
interests  as  above  described  be  endangered,  it  will  be 
admissible  for  either  of  them  to  take  such  measures 
as  may  be  indispensable  in  order  to  safeguard  those 
interests ;  and  words  have  been  added  which  will  ren- 
der it  clear  that  such  precautionary  measures  might 
become  necessary  and  might  be  legitimately  taken, 
not  only  in  the  case  of  aggressive  action  or  of  an 
actual  attack  by  some  other  Power,  but  in  the  event 
of  disturbances  arising  of  a  character  to  necessitate 
the  intervention  of  either  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property 
of  its  subjects. 

The  principal  obligations  undertaken  mutually  by 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  are  those  of  maintain- 
ing a  strict  neutrality  in  the  event  of  either  of  them 
becoming  involved  in  war,  and  of  coming  to  one  an- 
other's assistance  in  the  event  of  either  of  them  being 
confronted  by  the  opposition  of  more  than  one  hostile 
Power.  Under  the  remaining  provisions  of  the  Agree- 
ment, the   High   Contracting   Parties   undertake  that 


148  APPENDICES 

neither  of  them  will,  without  consultation  with  the 
other,  enter  into  separate  arrangements  with  another 
Power  to  the  prejudice  of  the  interests  described  in 
the  Agreement,  and  that  whenever  those  interests  are 
in  jeopardy  they  will  communicate  with  one  another 
fully  and  frankly. 

The  concluding  Article  has  reference  to  the  dura- 
tion of  the  Agreement  which,  after  five  years,  is 
terminable  by  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
at  one  year's  notice. 

His  Majesty's  Government  have  been  largely  influ- 
enced in  their  decision  to  enter  into  this  important 
contract  by  the  conviction  that  it  contains  no  provisions 
which  can  be  regarded  as  an  indication  of  aggressive 
or  self-seeking  tendencies  in  the  regions  to  which  it 
applies.  It  has  been  concluded  purely  as  a  measure  of 
precaution,  to  be  invoked,  should  occasion  arise,  in  the 
defence  of  important  British  interests.  It  in  no  way 
threatens  the  present  position  or  the  legitimate  inter- 
ests of  other  Powers.  On  the  contrary,  that  part  of 
it  which  renders  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
liable  to  be  called  upon  by  the  other  for  assistance 
can  operate  only  when  one  of  the  allies  has  found 
himself  obliged  to  go  to  war  in  defence  of  interests 
which  are  common  to  both,  when  the  circumstances 
in  which  he  has  taken  this  step  are  such  as  to  estab- 
lish that  the  quarrel  has  not  been  of  his  own  seeking, 
and  when,  being  engaged  in  his  own  defence,  he  finds 
himself  threatened,  not  by  a  single  Power,  but  by  a 
hostile  coalition. 

His  Majesty's  Government  trust  that  the  Agree- 
ment may  be  found  of  mutual  advantage  to  the  two 


APPENDICES  149 

I  countries,  that  it  will  make  for  the  preservation  of 
peace,  and  that,  should  peace  unfortunately  be  broken, 
it  will  have  the  effect  of  restricting  the  area  of  hos- 
tilities. 

I  am,  etc., 

Lansdowne. 


APPENDIX  C 

AGREEMENT     BETWEEN     THE     UNITED     KINGDOM     AND 
JAPAN,  SIGNED  AT  LONDON,    12tH  AUGUST,   1905 

PREAMBLE 

The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  be- 
ing desirous  of  replacing  the  Agreement  concluded  be- 
tween them  on  the  30th  January,  1902,  by  fresh  stipu- 
lations, have  agreed  upon  the  following  Articles,  which 
have  for  their  object: 

(a)  The  consolidation  and  maintenance  of  the  gen- 
eral peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India. 

(b)  The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of 
all  Powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
all  nations  in  China. 

(c)  The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of  the 
high  contracting  parties  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia 
and  of  India,  and  the  defence  of  their  special  interests 
in  the  said  regions. 

ARTICLE   I 

It  is  agreed  that  whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either 
Great  Britain  or  Japan,  any  of  the  rights  and  inter- 
ests referred  to  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agreement 
are  in  jeopardy,  the  two  Governments  will  communi- 
cate with  one  another  fully  and  frankly,  and  will  con- 

150 


APPENDICES  151 

sider  in  common  the  measures  which  should  be  taken 
to  safeguard  those  menaced  rights  or  interests. 

ARTICLE   II 

If  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack  or  aggressive 
action,  whenever  arising,  on  the  part  of  any  other 
Power  or  Powers,  either  contracting  party  should  be 
involved  in  war  in  defence  of  its  territorial  rights 
or  special  interests  mentioned  in  the  preamble  of  this 
Agreement,  the  other  contracting  party  will  at  once 
come  to  the  assistance  of  its  ally,  and  will  conduct  the 
war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement 
with  it. 

ARTICLE  III 

Japan  possessing  paramount  political,  military,  and 
economic  interests  in  Korea,  Great  Britain  recognises 
the  right  of  Japan  to  take  such  measures  of  guidance, 
control,  and  protection  in  Korea  as  she  may  deem 
proper  and  necessary  to  safeguard  and  advance  those 
interests,  provided  always  such  measures  are  not  con- 
trary to  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations. 

ARTICLE  IV 

Great  Britain  having  a  special  interest  in  all  that 
concerns  the  security  of  the  Indian  frontier,  Japan 
recognises  her  right  to  take  such  measures  in  the 
proximity  of  that  frontier  as  she  may  find  necessary 
for  safeguarding  her  Indian  possessions. 

ARTICLE  V 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  neither  of 
them  will,  without  consulting  the  other,   enter  into 


152  APPENDICES 

separate  arrangements  with  another  Power  to  the 
prejudice  of  the  objects  described  in  the  preamble  of 
this  Agreement. 

ARTICLE   VI 

As  regards  the  present  war  between  Japan  and 
Russia,  Great  Britain  will  continue  to  maintain  strict 
neutrality  unless  some  other  Power  or  Powers  should 
join  in  hostilities  against  Japan,  in  which  case  Great 
Britain  will  come  to  the  assistance  of  Japan,  and  will 
conduct  the  war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual 
agreement  with  Japan. 

ARTICLE  VII 

The  conditions  under  which  armed  assistance  shall 
be  afforded  by  either  Power  to  the  other  in  the  cir- 
cumstances mentioned  in  the  present  Agreement,  and 
the  means  by  which  such  assistance  is  to  be  made 
available,  will  be  arranged  by  naval  and  military  au- 
thorities of  the  contracting  parties,  who  will  from 
time  to  time  consult  one  another  fully  and  freely 
upon  all  questions  of  mutual  interest. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

The  present  Agreement  shall,  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  Article  VI,  come  into  effect  immediately 
after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and  remain  in  force 
for  ten  years  from  that  date. 

In  case  neither  of  the  high  contracting  parties 
should  have  notified  twelve  months  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  said  ten  years  the  intention  of  terminating 
it,  shall  remain  binding  until  the  expiration  of  one 


APPENDICES  153 

year  from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  shall  have  denounced  it.  But  if,  when 
the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either  ally 
is  actually  engaged  in  war,  the  alliance  shall,  ipso  facto, 
continue  until  peace  is  concluded. 

In  faith  whereof,  the  undersigned,  duly  authorised 
by  their  respective  Governments,  have  signed  this 
Agreement,  and  have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  London,  the  12th  day  of  Au- 
gust, 1905. 

Lansdowne,  His  Britannic  Majesty's 
Principal  Secretary  of  State  for  For- 
eign Affairs. 
Tadasu  Hayashi,  Envoy  Extraordinary 
and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  at  the 
Court  of  St.  James. 


APPENDIX  D 

The  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  to  Sir  C.  Hardinge 

Foreign  Office,  September  6,  1905. 
Sir: 

I  enclose,  for  your  Excellency's  information,  a  copy 
of  a  new  Agreement  concluded  between  His  Majesty's 
Government  and  that  of  Japan  in  substitution  for  that 
of  the  30th  of  January,  1902.  You  will  take  an  early 
opportunity  of  communicating  the  new  Agreement  to 
the  Russian  Government. 

It  was  signed  on  the  12th  of  August,  and  you  will 
explain  that  it  would  have  been  immediately  made 
public  but  for  the  fact  that  negotiations  had  at  that 
time  already  commenced  between  Russia  and  Japan, 
and  that  the  publication  of  such  a  document  whilst 
those  negotiations  were  still  in  progress  would  obvi- 
ously have  been  improper  and  inopportune. 

The  Russian  Government  will,  I  trust,  recognise  that 
the  new  Agreement  is  an  international  instrument,  to 
which  no  exception  can  be  taken  by  any  of  the  Pow- 
ers interested  in  the  affairs  of  the  Far  East.  You 
should  call  special  attention  to  the  objects  mentioned 
in  the  preamble  as  those  by  which  the  policy  of  the 
contracting  parties  is  inspired.  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment believes  that  they  may  count  upon  the  good- 
will and  support  of  all  the  Powers  in  endeavouring  to 
maintain  peace  in  Eastern  Asia,  and  in  seeking  to 
uphold  the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  Chinese 

154 


APPENDICES  155 

Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for 
the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  that 
country. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  special  interests  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  are  of  a  kind  upon  which  they  are 
full  entitled  to  insist,  and  the  announcement  that  those 
interests  must  be  safeguarded  is  one  which  can  create 
no  surprise,  and  need  give  rise  to  no  misgivings. 

I  call  your  special  attention  to  the  wording  of  Arti- 
cle II,  which  lays  down  distinctly  that  it  is  only  in 
the  case  of  an  unprovoked  attack  made  on  one  of  the 
contracting  parties  by  another  Power  or  Powers,  and 
when  that  party  is  defending  its  territorial  rights  and 
special  interests  from  aggressive  action,  that  the  other 
party  is  bound  to  come  to  its  assistance. 

Article  III,  dealing  with  the  question  of  Korea,  is 
deserving  of  special  attention.  It  recognises  in  the 
clearest  terms  the  paramount  position  which  Japan 
at  this  moment  occupies,  and  must  henceforth  occupy 
in  Korea,  and  her  right  to  take  any  measures  which 
she  may  find  necessary  for  the  protection  of  her  po- 
litical, military,  and  economic  interests  in  that  coun- 
try. It  is,  however,  expressly  provided  that  such 
measures  must  not  be  contrary  to  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  other  nations.  The  new  Treaty  no  doubt  differs 
at  this  point  conspicuously  from  that  of  1902.  ^It  has, 
however,  become  evident  that  Korea,  owing  to  its 
close  proximity  of  the  Japanese  Empire,  and  its  ina- 
bility to  stand  alone,  must  fall  under  the  control  and 
tutelage  of  Japan. 

His  Majesty's  Government  observe  with  satisfac- 


156  APPENDICES 

tion  that  this  point  was  readily  conceded  by  Russia 
in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  recently  concluded  with  Japan, 
and  they  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  similar 
views  are  held  by  other  Powers  with  regard  to  the 
relations  which  should  subsist  between  Japan  and 
Korea. 

His  Majesty's  Government  venture  to  anticipate 
that  the  alliance  thus  concluded,  designed  as  it  is 
with  objects  which  are  purely  peaceful,  and  for  the 
protection  of  rights  and  interests,  the  validity  of  which 
cannot  be  contested,  will  be  regarded  with  approval 
by  the  Government  to  which  you  are  accredited.  They 
are  justified  in  believing  that  its  conclusion  may  not 
have  been  without  effect  in  facilitating  the  settlement 
by  which  the  war  has  been  so  happily  brought  to  an 
end,  and  they  earnestly  trust  that  it  may,  for  many 
years  to  come,  be  instrumental  in  securing  the  peace 
of  the  world  in  those  regions  which  come  within  its 
scope. 

I  am,  etc., 

(Signed)     Lansdowne. 


APPENDIX  E 

AGREEMENT     BETWEEN     THE     UNITED     KINGDOM     AND 
JAPAN,   SIGNED  AT  LONDON,   JULY   13,   1911 

PREAMBLE 

The  Government  of  Japan  and  the  Government  of 
Great  Britain  having  in  view  the  important  changes 
which  have  taken  place  in  the  situation  since  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  of  August 
12,  1905,  and  believing  that  the  revision  of  that  Agree- 
ment responding  to  such  changes  would  contribute  to 
general  stability  and  repose,  have  agreed  upon  the 
following  stipulations  to  replace  the  Agreement  above 
mentioned,  such  stipulations  having  the  same  object 
as  the  said  Agreement,  namely: 

A. — The  consolidation  and  maintenance  of  the  gen- 
eral peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India. 

B. — The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of 
all  the  Powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  princi- 
ple of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  indus- 
try of  all  nations  in  China. 

C. — The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  the  regions  of  East- 
ern Asia  and  of  India  and  the  defence  of  their  special 
interests  in  those  regions: — 

ARTICLE   I 

It  is  agreed  that  whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either 
Japan  or  Great  Britain,  any  of  the  rights  and  interests 

157 


158  APPENDICES 

referred  to  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agreement  are  in 
jeopardy,  the  two  Governments  will  communicate  with 
one  another  fully  and  frankly,  and  will  consider  in 
common  the  measures  which  should  be  taken  to  safe- 
guard those  menaced  rights  and  interests. 

ARTICLE   II 

If  by  reason  of  an  unprovoked  attack  or  aggressive 
action,  wherever  arising,  on  tha  part  of  any  other 
Power  or  Powers,  either  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  should  be  involved  in  war  in  defence  of  its 
territorial  rights  or  special  interests  mentioned  in  the 
preamble  of  this  Agreement,  the  other  High  Con- 
tracting Party  will  at  once  come  to  the  assistance  of 
its  Ally  and  will  conduct  the  war  in  common  and 
make  peace  in  mutual  agreement  with  it. 

ARTICLE   III 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  neither 
of  them  will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into 
a  separate  agreement  with  another  Power  to  the  preju- 
dice of  the  objects  described  in  the  preamble  of  this 
Agreement. 

ARTICLE   IV 

Should  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  con- 
clude a  treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  a  third 
Power,  it  is  agreed  that  nothing  in  this  Agreement 
shall  impose  on  such  contracting  party  an  obligation  to 
go  to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such  an  arbitra- 
tion treaty  is  in  force. 


APPENDICES  159 

ARTICLE  V 

The  conditions  under  which  armed  assistance  shall 
be  afforded  by  either  Power  to  the  other  in  circum- 
stances entered  into  the  present  Agreement,  and  the 
means  by  which  such  assistance  is  to  be  made  avail- 
able, will  be  arranged  by  the  military  and  naval  au- 
thorities of  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  who  will 
from  time  to  time  consult  one  another  fully  and 
frankly  upon  all  questions  of  mutual  interests. 

ARTICLE  VI 

The  present  Agreement  shall  come  into  effect  imme- 
diately after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and  remain  in 
force  for  ten  years  from  that  date.  In  case  neither 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  should  have  notified 
twelve  months  before  the  expiration  the  intention  of 
terminating  it,  it  shall  remain  binding  until  the  expi- 
ration of  one  year  from  the  day  on  which  either  of 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  have  denounced 
it.  But  if,  when  the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration  ar- 
rives, either  ally  is  actually  engaged  in  war,  the  Alli- 
ance shall,  ipso  facto,  continue  until  peace  is  con- 
cluded. 

In  faith  whereof  the  undersigned,  duly  authorised  by 
their  respective  Governments,  have  signed  this  Agree- 
ment and  have  affixed  their  seals  thereto.  Done  at 
London  July  13,  1911. 

T.  Kato,  the  Ambassador  of  His  Maj- 
esty  the  Emperor  of  Japan   at  the 
Court  of  St.  James. 
Edward   Grey,   H.B.M.'s  Secretary   of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


APPENDIX  F 

The  views  and  opinions  of  the  Chinese  people  on 
the  subject  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  and  its  re- 
newal are  well  known.  They  are,  however,  best  em- 
bodied in  the  memorandum  which  ten  important 
Chinese  organisations  in  Shanghai  had  presented  to 
Sir  Beilby  Alston,  British  Minister  to  Peking,  who 
was  on  his  way  to  London  on  furlough,  July,  1920. 
The  document,  setting  forth  the  reasons  for  which 
the  Chinese  people  have  objected  to  the  continuance  of 
the  alliance,  was  signed  by  The  Educational  Associa- 
tion of  Kiangsu  Province;  The  Shanghai  City  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce;  The  Chinese  Bankers*  Association; 
The  Chinese  Cotton  Mill  Owners'  Association;  The 
Shanghai  Educational  Association;  The  Western  Re- 
turned Students'  Union;  The  World's  Chinese  Stu- 
dents' Federation;  The  Overseas  Federation;  The 
Chinese  Christian  Union;  and  The  National  Associa- 
tion of  Vocational  Education  of  China.     It  reads: 

"This  memorandum  is  drawn  up  in  order  to  call 
the  attention  of  the  British  Government  to  the  rapidly 
growing  public  sentiment  in  China  against  the  renewal 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  at  least  in  its  present 
form. 

"It  is  to  be  conceded  at  the  outset  that  it  is  not 
an  appropriate  act  for  a  third  party  to  interfere  when 
two  governments  desire  to  enter  into  an  alliance  or  to 
renew  an  existing  one;  but  it  will  be  the  duty  of  the 
third  party  to   register  its   objection  if   the  alliance 

160 


APPENDICES  161 

so  contracted  directly  concerns  the  welfare  of  the  third 
party. 

"The  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  does  concern  the  wel- 
fare of  China;  for,  in  section  B  of  the  preamble  of    /^ 
the  alliance,  in  the  text  of  both  the  1905  and  1911 
agreements,    matters    affecting    China's    international 
standing  and  relations  were  specially  treated. 

"The  Chinese  people  will  look  to  their  Government 
to  take  diplomatic  steps  to  register  China's  objections 
to  its  renewal  without  consulting  China. 

"The  present  memorandum  merely  sets  forth  the 
views  of  the  Chinese  people,  as  reflected  through  the 
various  organisations  in  whose  name  this  statement  is 
made. 

"The  question  is  dealt  with  here  only  in  these  aspects 
which  touch  upon  the  interests  of  China. 

"In  forming  an  alliance,  there  are,  at  least,  two  mo- 
tives to  be  accounted  for: 

"First,  what  are  the  objects  to  be  attained? 

"And,  secondly,  what  are  the  antagonisms  to  be 
offset? 

"The  objects  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  pre- 
sumably, were  to  protect  the  interests  of  Great  Britain 
and  Japan  in  the  Far  East,  and  the  antagonisms  were 
at  first  the  power  and  policy  of  Russia  and  later 
those  of  Germany. 

"The  two  motives  are,  in  the  last  analysis,  really 
only  one — to  combine  the  strength  and  resources  of 
Great  Britain  and  of  Japan  in  order  to  protect  their 
interests  in  the  Far  East,  which  were  considered  to 
be  identical,  from  a  common  enemy,  at  first  Russia 
and  later  Germany. 


162  APPENDICES 

"These  motives  do  not  exist  now.  Russia  fought 
on  the  side  of  the  Allies  for  over  three  years  and,  in 
spite  of  the  Revolution,  which  crippled  her  as  a  fight- 
ing unit  for  the  Allies,  its  menace  to  East  Asia  as  an 
aggressive  power  no  longer  exists.  She  is  in  no  posi- 
tion to  endanger  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  or 
Japan. 

"The  power  of  Germany  before  the  Great  War  was 
indeed  most  threatening.  Her  navy  was  rapidly  de- 
veloped, so  as  to  challenge  the  British  supremacy. 
Realising  her  growing  strength  she  did  not  even  take 
the  trouble  to  conceal  her  policy  of  the  conquest  of 
the  world. 

"What  the  Great  War  has  done  to  Germany  needs 
no  comment.  It  may  be  said  without  any  fear  of  con- 
tradiction that  Germany  is  no  more  a  menace  to  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan  in  East  Asia. 

"With  the  elimination  of  these  Powers  antagonistic 
to  the  contracting  parties,  the  motives  calling  forth 
the  alliance  are  also  removed. 

"We  therefore  maintain  that  there  is  no  necessity 
to  renew  the  alliance  unless  there  should  arise  a  new 
enemy.    So  far  as  we  are  aware,  no  such  enemy  exists. 

"The  United  States  of  America  is  the  only  Power 
that  has  the  strength  to  be  a  menace  to  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  interests  in  the  East ;  but  history  has  demon- 
strated America's  disinterestedness  in  China. 

"She  is  not  likely  to  change  overnight  her  tradi- 
tional policy  of  friendship  for  China,  her  Hay  doc- 
trine of  the  'open  door'  and  equal  opportunities,  to  an 
aggressive  attitude. 

"The  objects   of   the   Anglo- Japanese   alliance,   as 


APPENDICES  163 

far  as  China  is  concerned,  are  specific  and  unequivocal. 

"Section  B  of  the  preamble  says:  'The  preserva- 
tion of  the  common  interests  of  the  Powers  in  China 
by  insuring  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportuni- 
ties for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in 
China/ 

"Japan's  actions,  however,  are  at  variance  with  her 
professions.  When  Europe  was  desperately  engaged 
in  a  lif e-and-death  struggle  for  liberty,  Japan  presented 
to  China,  January  18,  1915,  the  well-known  'Twenty- 
one  Demands.' 

"These  demands  could  only  be  matched  in  spirit 
and  purpose  with  the  demands  Austria  made  upon 
Servia  which  led  to  the  World  War. 

"The  dark  designs  of  the  demands  were  greatly 
heightened  by  Japan's  unusual  actions.  Instead  of  pre- 
senting these  demands  through  the  regular  diplomatic 
channel  of  the  Chinese  Government,  its  Foreign  Office, 
the  Japanese  Minister  handed  the  same  to  President 
Yuan  Shih-k'ai  directly,  who  was  required  to  main- 
tain utter  secrecy  and  to  take  speedy  action. 

"When  secrecy  could  no  longer  be  maintained,  Japan 
at  first  made  official  denial  of  the  existence  of  any  of 
the  demands,  then  the  existence  of  some  of  them,  and 
finally  had  to  confess  to  the  existence  of  all  of  them. 

"The  demands  cannot  stand  any  scrutiny  without 
arousing  indignation,  even  among  impartial  observers 
of  Far  Eastern  affairs. 

"We  will  quote  the  words  of  a  well-known  British 
publicist  whose  analysis  of  the  demands  will  go  to 
show  such  indignation. 


164  APPENDICES 

"In  the  first  group  of  these  articles  China  concedes 
in  advance  any  arrangements  that  Japan  might  in 
the  future  make  with  Germany  regarding  the  posses- 
sion of  Kiao-chow  and  other  rights  in  the  province 
of  Shantung.  The  way  was  thus  paved  for  Japan's 
later  victory  at  the  Peace  Conference. 

"In  the  second  group  of  articles  Japan  demands  that 
China  recognise  Japan's  special  privileges  in  Man- 
churia, privileges  accorded  to  no  other  nation.  For 
example,  Article  3  reads : 

"  *J^P^i^^se  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and  travel 
in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  and 
engage  in  business  and  manufacture  of  any  kind  what- 
soever. 

"  Article  A — The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to 
grant  to  Japanese  subjects  the  right  of  opening  the 
mines  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Mongolia. 

"  Article  6 — If  the  Chinese  Government  employs  po- 
litical, financial,  or  military  advisers  or  instructors  in 
South  Manchuria  or  Eastern  Mongolia,  the  Japanese 
Government  shall  first  be  consulted.' 

"That  is  how  Japan  kept  her  promise  to  maintain, 
the  *open  door'  and  the  independence  of  China  in 
Manchuria.     In  Group  IV,  furthermore: 

"  *The  Chinese  Government  engages  not  to  cede  or 
lease  to  any  third  power  any  harbour  or  bay  or  island 
along  the  coast  of  China.' 

"Even  this  group,  however,  did  not  offer  the  worst 
instance  of  special  privilege  or  infringement  of 
China's  sovereignty.  The  articles  of  Group  V  go 
further : 

"  The  Chinese  Government  shall  employ  influential 


APPENDICES  ^       165 

Japanese  advisers  in  political,  financial  and  military 
affairs. 

"The  police  departments  of  important  places  (in 
China)  shall  be  jointly  administered  by  Japanese  and 
Chinese  or  the  police  departments  of  these  places 
shall  employ  numerous  Japanese,  so  that  they  may 
at  the  same  time  help  to  plan  for  the  improvement 
of  the  Chinese  Police  Service. 

"  'China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a  fixed  amount 
of  munitions  of  war  (say  fifty  per  cent,  or  more)  of 
what  is  needed  by  the  Chinese  Government  or  there 
shall  be  established  in  China  a  Sino- Japanese  jointly 
worked  arsenal.  Japanese  technical  experts  are  to  be 
employed  and  Japanese  material  to  be  purchased. 

"  'If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to  work  mines, 
build  railways  and  construct  harbour  work  (includ- 
ing dock-yards)  in  the  province  of  Fukien,  Japan  shall 
be  first  consulted.' 

"In  making  these  demands  Japan  broke  at  least  six 
solemn  public  promises.  That  she  had  forgotten 
neither  the  spirit  nor  the  letter  of  these  promises,  and 
that  she  was  ready  to  break  one  more,  is  a  fact  con- 
firmed by  a  statement  issued  on  May  6,  1915,  by  Bryan : 

"  'At  the  beginning  of  negotiations  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment confidentially  informed  this  Government  (the 
United  States)  of  the  matters  which  were  under  dis- 
cussion, and  accompanied  the  information  with  the 
assurance  that  Japan  had  no  intention  of  interfering 
with  either  the  political  independence  or  territorial 
integrity  of  China  and  that  nothing  she  proposed 
would  discriminate  against  other  Powers  having 
treaties  with  China,  or  interfere  with  the  'open  door' 


166  APPENDICES 

policy  to  which  all  the  leading  nations  are  com- 
mitted/ 

"What  are  we  to  think  of  the  pledged  word  of  a 
nation  which  could  vouch  for  such  assurances  at  a 
time  when  its  Government  was  attempting  to  wrench 
from  China  the  control  of  her  own  armament  and 
her  own  territory? 

"Through  just  such  stages  did  Korea  slowly  suc- 
cumb, that  same  Korea  whose  'independence'  was  once 
as  firmly  guaranteed  by  Japan. 

"This  fact  was  clear  to  China  and  to  all  the  world, 
and  an  indignant  public  opinion  in  China,  England 
and  America  prevented  China's  signing  the  articles 
under  Groups  IV  and  V. 

"The  position  of  Great  Britain  was  made  quite  em- 
barrassing by  Japan's  actions,  both  during  the  war 
and  at  the  Peace  Conference,  when  dealing  with  the 
Shantung  question. 

"Great  Britain  declared  war  against  Germany  on 
account  of  the  latter's  attack  on  France  and  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium ;  yet  she  had  to  give 
tacit  consent  to  Japan's  violation  of  the  neutrality  of 
China  when  Japan  declared  war  on  Germany  and 
undertook  to  reduce  the  German  hold  at  Kiao-chow. 

"Instead  of  landing  her  forces  within  the  leased  ter- 
ritory of  Kiaochow,  as  the  British  did,  she  took  them 
to  Lungkow,  a  point  two  hundred  miles  to  the  north- 
west of  Tsingtao ;  and  again,  instead  of  marching  her 
soldiers  southeastward  towards  the  point  of  attack, 
namely,  Tsingtao,  they  pushed  southwestward  towards 
Tsinan,  the  capital  of  Shantung,  which  was  then  neu- 
tral territory. 


APPENDICES  167 

"Great  Britain  was  further  embarrassed  by  the  secret 
agreement  entered  into  between  herself  and  Japan  on 
February  16,  1917,  wherein  she  promised  to  support 
Japan  on  the  Shantung  question  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. 

"This  promise  was  the  price  Great  Britain  had  to 
pay  in  order  to  retain  Japan's  support  in  the  prose- 
cution of  the  war ;  yet  it  was  made  at  the  time  when 
China  was  being  induced  to  join  in  the  war  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies,  which  she  afterwards  actually  did. 

"The  Chinese  people  learned  with  great  pain  of 
the  existence  of  this  secret  agreement,  when  it  was 
made  known  at  the  Peace  Conference,  knowing  fully 
well  its  effect  upon  the  Shantung  question  as  Great 
Britain  would  feel  in  honour  bound  to  maintain  the 
agreement. 

"During  the  last  two  decades  there  has  developed 
the  practice  among  the  Powers  of  treating  China  as  a 
semi-dependent  country.  Instead  of  treating  directly 
with  China  concerning  her  affairs  and  welfare,  they 
treated  among  themselves  as  if  China  were  a  mere 
diplomatic  appendage.  The  Chinese  people  cannot  but 
regard  such  practice  with  apprehension  and  resent- 
ment, especially  in  the  case  where  a  certain  Power 
assumes  a  paternal  diplomatic  relationship  to  China 
and  pretends  to  exercise  a  right  to  intervene  in  the 
diplomatic  intercourse  between  China  and  any  other 
country. 

"Even  the  United  States  Government  made  the  same 
mistake  in  the  exchange  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  notes 
without  consulting  China.  The  Chinese  Government 
had  to  file  a  protest  against  it.    The  United  States  of 


168  APPENDICES 

America  has  always  maintained  the  most  friendly  atti- 
tude towards  China,  but  we  refuse  to  be  treated  except 
as  an  independent  nation  exercising  full  sovereign 
rights. 

"With  the  formal  ratification  by  China  of  the  Aus- 
trian Treaty  (of  Peace),  which  she  signed  with  the 
Allied  Powers  on  the  one  hand  and  Austria  on  the 
other,  we  became  a  full  member  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

"A  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  under 
the  existing  or  similar  terms,  taken  with  the  previous 
interpretation  of  the  alliance  in  practice,  will  cause 
the  Chinese  strongly  to  suspect  that,  when  China 
takes  an  appeal  to  the  League  of  Nations  for  redress 
of  her  grievances.  Great  Britain  and  Japan  will  be 
found  to  have  made  a  private  agreement  prejudicial 
to  China's  case,  and  which  may  adversely  affect  China's 
hope  of  obtaining  justice  from  the  League. 

"This  has  been  amply  borne  out  by  the  secret  agree- 
ment made  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan  on  Feb- 
ruary 16,  1917,  which  was  one  of  the  chief  factors, 
if  not  the  chief  factor,  in  deciding  the  Shantung  ques- 
tion in  favour  of  Japan.  China  was  obliged  to  refrain 
from  signing  the  German  Treaty  as  a  protest  against 
the  injustice  of  the  settlement. 

"We  would  wish  to  see  that  Great  Britain  will 
make  no  further  entangling  alliances  which  might  tie 
her  hands  again  on  questions  brought  by  China  before 
the  League  of  Nations. 

In  presenting  this  memorandum  to  the  British 
Government  we  merely  voice  the  sentiment  of  the 
people.    In  our  humble  opinion  the  changed  conditions 


APPENDICES  169 

of  the  world  to-day  do  not  call  for  any  further  re- 
newal of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance. 

"The  motives  of  the  alliance,  so  far  as  they  con- 
cern China,  do  not  exist  to-day.  The  aggressive  and 
imperialistic  policy  of  Russia  and  Germany  has  passed 
away  and  there  is  no  further  menace  from  any  other 
Power. 

"The  violation  of  the  objects  of  the  alliance  by  Japan 
has  seriously  embarrassed  Great  Britain.  The  renewal 
of  the  alliance,  at  least  under  the  existing  or  similar 
terms,  tends  only  to  irritate  China  on  the  one  hand 
and  to  cause  Great  Britain  to  share  the  distrust  of 
the  Chinese  people  so  widely  and  deeply  entertained 
towards  Japan. 

"Besides,  a  renewal  of  the  alliance  will  only  cause 
the  Chinese  people  strongly  to  suspect  Great  Britain's 
having  some  other  motives,  as  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  covers  the  ground  of  the  aUiance, 
and  China  is  an  original  member  of  the  League." 


APPENDIX  G 

london  china  association's  letter  to  the  british 
foreign  office 

China  Association, 

99,  Cannon  Street,  E.  C, 
London,  June  21st,  1921. 
Sir: 

My  Committee  have  the  honour  to  lay  before  His 
Majesty's  Government  certain  points  Hkely  to  affect 
British  interests  in  China,  which  they  respectfully  hope 
will  be  taken  into  consideration  by  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment when  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  renewal 
or  modification  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  between 
Great  Britain  and  Japan. 

The  advantages  of  the  alliance  to  both  countries 
were  clearly  demonstrated  in  1904  and  1914,  and  in 
view  of  the  unsettled  state  of  affairs  still  prevailing 
in  so  large  a  portion  of  Asia,  we  would  lay  great  stress 
upon  the  importance  of  maintaining  the  cordial  rela- 
tions between  this  country  and  Japan  which  have 
existed  for  so  many  years. 

According  to  the  representations  made  to  us  from 
China,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  a  strong  feeling 
has  arisen  in  that  country  that  one  at  least  of  the 
stipulations  of  the  Treaty  has  not  been  carried  out 
in  practice — the  clause  referred  to  is  that  for  the 
preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all  Powers  in 
China  by  ensuring  the  independence  and  integrity  of 

170 


APPENDICES  171 

the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunities for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  Nations 
in  China.  A  concrete  case  in  supporting  this  conten- 
tion is  the  Japanese  action  in  Shantung  to  which  my 
Committee  called  attention  in  detail  on  the  8th  Febru- 
ary, 1920.  We  are  informed  that  the  situation  there 
is  still  unsatisfactory.  The  Chinese  view  is  that  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  have  not  been  conscientiously  car- 
ried out,  and  that  a  renewal  of  the  Treaty  upon  the 
same  terms,  after  this  non-fulfilment,  would  be  tanta- 
mount to  recognition  of  the  status  quo,  and  could  not 
therefore  be  looked  upon  as  a  friendly  act  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain,  It  is  reported  that  an  important 
section  of  public  opinion  in  Japan  is  inclined  to  regard 
the  action  of  their  Government  in  Shantung  as  ill- 
advised,  and  from  an  economic  point  of  view,  a  failure. 
If  therefore.  His  Majesty's  Government  could  take 
any  steps  to  bring  about  a  friendly  settlement  of  this 
question  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  treaty,  we  believe  their  efforts 
would  be  appreciated  by  China  and  would  be  wel- 
comed by  many  in  Japan. 

In  any  case  my  Committee  hope  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  will  give  consideration  to  the  feeling  in 
China  to  which  we  have  drawn  attention. 

Another  point  about  which  the  Chinese  people  are 
somewhat  sensitive  is  that  any  Agreement  affecting 
their  country  or  their  sovereign  rights  should  be  con- 
cluded by  foreign  Powers,  otherwise  than  in  con- 
sultation with  them. 

As  regards  the  situation  generally  my  Committee  is 
of  opinion  that  Great  Britain  has  no  interest  in  China 


172  APPENDICES 

which  is  not  shared  by  the  Dominions,  by  America, 
by  France,  and  by  Japan  as  laid  down  by  her  leading 
statesmen  in  public  utterances. 

It  would  be  idle  to  deny  that  there  is  a  powerful 
party  in  Japan  in  favour  of  a  policy  in  China  which 
is  entirely  at  variance  with  the  spirit  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty,  but  we  assume  that  the  settled  policy 
of  the  Japanese  Government  will  conform  to  the  terms 
of  any  Treaty  to  which  it  attaches  its  signature. 

If  then  the  interests  of  the  four  great  Powers  in 
China  are  identical,  if  these  interests  consist  as  we 
believe  they  do,  in  promoting  a  reconstructive  policy 
in  China,  in  uniting  to  carry  out  in  practice  the  terms 
of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty,  in  ensuring  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  China  and  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
all  nations,  and  further  in  assisting  China  to  estab- 
lish a  stable  Government  capable  of  maintaining  peace 
and  order  within  her  borders,  we  are  of  opinion  that 
a  development  of  the  Japanese  alliance  into  an  agree- 
ment between  the  four  great  Powers  would  do  much 
to  consolidate  and  maintain  the  General  peace  of  the 
Far  East  for  many  years  to  come. 

In  the  Consortium  financial  groups  representing  the 
four  Powers  have  already  come  to  an  Agreement 
regarding  some  forms  of  industrial  development  in 
China.  My  Committee  respectfully  suggest  that  it  is 
worthy  of  consideration  whether  the  four  Governments 
could  not  conclude  an  Agreement  constituting  a  na- 
tional Consortium,  in  which  China  might  be  invited 
to  join.  We  believe  an  Agreement  of  this  kind  would 
enlist  the  active  sympathy  and  co-operation  of  a  large 


APPENDICES  173 

and  influential  portion  of  the  people  of  China,  who 
would  welcome  an  opportunity  of  re-establishing  the 
stability  of  the  country  and  promoting  its  prosperity 
and  welfare. 

The  course  indicated  would  at  the  same  time  add 
to  the  prosperity  of  all  other  nations'  interests  in  the 
Far  East,  perhaps  most  of  all  to  the  prosperity  of  our 
Ally,  Japan. 

My  Committee  recognise  that  there  are  other  and 
wider  interests  involved  in  the  question  of  a  renewal 
of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  but  they  refrain  from 
discussing  these  aspects  of  the  question,  being  outside 
the  scope  of  the  activities  of  their  Association. 
I  have,  etc., 

(Signed)     F.  Anderson,  Chairman. 
H.  M.  Under  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Downing  Street, 
S.  W.  L 


APPENDIX  H 

CHINESE    OFFICIAL    STATEMENT    TO    THE    PRESS, 
JUNE  6,    1920 

"Three  months  ago  the  attention  of  the  Chinese 
Government  was  drawn  to  statements  appearing  in 
the  world's  press  regarding  the  renewal  or  termina- 
tion of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  Inasmuch  as  an 
important  element  in  the  text  of  both  of  the  1905  and 
1911  agreements  was  section  B  of  the  preamble,  which 
treated  of  matters  affecting  China's  international  stand- 
ing and  international  relations  without  the  prior  con- 
sent of  China  having  been  obtained,  and  inasmuch  as 
public  opinion  throughout  the  Republic  had  long  shown 
deep  resentment  at  this  condition  of  affairs,  the 
Chinese  Government  decided  that  the  time  has  ar- 
rived to  address  representations  to  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. 

"Instructions  were  consequently  sent  to  the  Chinese 
Minister  in  London  to  make  formal  enquiries  regard- 
ing the  reports  appearing  in  the  press  and  to  point 
out  that  while  obviously  the  international  arrange- 
ments of  other  Powers  did  not  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  events  concern  others  than  the  High  Contracting 
Parties,  the  treatment  of  China  merely  as  a  territorial 
entity  in  the  written  text  of  any  such  agreements  would 
no  longer  be  tolerated  by  the  public  opinion  of  the 
country  and  would  indeed  be  viewed  by  all  as  an  un- 
friendly act. 

174 


APPENDICES  175 

"To  these  first  enquiries  China  received  the  follow- 
ing verbal  reply :  first,  that  the  question  of  the  renewal 
or  the  termination  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  had 
not  yet  come  up  for  consideration ;  secondly,  that  inas- 
much as  the  successive  agreements  had  been  couched 
in  the  same  language,  it  would  naturally  follow  that 
if  the  alliance  were  renewed  it  must  follow  the  same 
lines. 

"In  consequence  of  this  reply  a  Memorandum  was 
prepared  analysing  the  three  successive  Alliance  in- 
struments and  establishing  clearly  (A)  that  the  orig- 
inal instrument  of  1902  was  radically  different  from 
the  1905  agreement  in  that  the  independence  of  Korea 
was  specifically  guaranteed  in  the  first;  (B)  that  the 
agreement  of  1905  so  far  from  being  identical  in- 
cluded India  for  the  first  time  within  its  scope, 
whilst  Korea  was  relegated  to  a  subordinate  position 
and  clearly  earmarked  for  annexation;  and  (C)  that 
the  agreement  of  1911  introduced  into  the  Preamble 
the  definite  statement  'having  in  view  the  important 
changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the  situation,  etc.,' 
and  then  definitely  dropped  all  reference  to  the  num- 
bered articles  regarding  either  Korea  or  India,  be- 
cause understandings  entered  into  with  Russia  had 
made  mutual  pledges  regarding  them  superfluous. 

"In  view,  then,  of  the  fact  that  beneath  the  frame- 
work of  what  is  on  the  surface  a  self-denying  ordi- 
nance, vital  and  far-reaching  changes  have  acquired 
the  sanction  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  it  is 
natural  that  Chinese  public  opinion  becomes  distrust- 
ful of  any  renewal  of  this  agreement,  from  the  opera- 


176  APPENDICES 

tion  of  which  China  had  suffered  enough  during  the 
World  War,  especially  in  the  matter  of  Shantung. 

"Furthermore,  as  the  ratification  of  the  Austrian 
Treaty  has  made  China  a  member  of  the  League  of 
Nations  which  she  assumes  was  created  in  good  faith, 
she  is  advised  that  a  contract  regarding  her  affairs 
between  other  members  of  the  League  cannot  be  en- 
tered into  without  her  prior  consent.  Article  X  is 
a  sufficient  guarantee  that  her  territorial  integrity  will 
be  respected. 

"So  far  China  has  not  received  from  Great  Britain 
a  reply  to  her  memorandum.  She  is  anxious,  how- 
ever, to  hear  from  Britain  so  that  she  may  address 
an  identical  note  to  Japan  and  establish  definitely  the 
national  attitude  on  a  question  vital  to  the  peace  and 
prosperity  of  her  people." 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  bcK^  are  ^hject  to  immediate  recall. 


tsR^ 


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General  Library 

University  of  California 

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